43. The jurisdiction conferred under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India, upon this Court is not an appellate one but
it is a combination to supervisory and equitable jurisdiction and
to do justice and to prevent miscarriage of justice. So also, the
power of this Court, while exercising power under XLI Rule 1
CPC, interfere with the discretionary order passed by the trial
Court under Order XXXIX Rule 1 & 2 CPC. It is also noteworthy
to follow the law enunciated by this Court, while examining the
scope of an appeal filed under order XLIII Rule 1 of the Code of
Civil Procedure in the case of LALITHAKSHI ANNADANAGOUDA v.
SADASHIVAPPA BASAPPA AND ANOTHER reported in 1983(2)
KLJ 298 and in the case of IIM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION
(supra). I am conscious of the proposition of law that the
Appellate Court can interfere with an order of the trial Court,
65
only when it finds that the order passed is opposed to the well-
settled principles in exercise of judicial discretion. Consequently,
the factum of other two ingredients, viz.
43. The jurisdiction conferred under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India, upon this Court is not an appellate one but
it is a combination to supervisory and equitable jurisdiction and
to do justice and to prevent miscarriage of justice. So also, the
power of this Court, while exercising power under XLI Rule 1
CPC, interfere with the discretionary order passed by the trial
Court under Order XXXIX Rule 1 & 2 CPC. It is also noteworthy
to follow the law enunciated by this Court, while examining the
scope of an appeal filed under order XLIII Rule 1 of the Code of
Civil Procedure in the case of LALITHAKSHI ANNADANAGOUDA v.
SADASHIVAPPA BASAPPA AND ANOTHER reported in 1983(2)
KLJ 298 and in the case of IIM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION
(supra). I am conscious of the proposition of law that the
Appellate Court can interfere with an order of the trial Court,
65
only when it finds that the order passed is opposed to the well-
settled principles in exercise of judicial discretion. Consequently,
the factum of other two ingredients, viz.
25. Assailing the validity of the impugned orders of both the Courts below made allowing D-1's I.A. No. 9 under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2, C.P.C. granting injunction in its favour and against plaintiffs, Mr. Goulay submitted that this order is entirely an arbitrary and pervese order which does not sustain in law, in that, I.A. No. 9 is not based on the same cause of action on which the plaintiffs' suit was instituted, and that in I.A. No. 9, no any specific instance of any sort of interference by any of the plaintiffs with the administration of the Trust is alleged against them, and that the application is totally bald and baseless. The support for the first proposition was drawn by him from the decisions of this Court in Ramalah v. Gowdappa, , and IIM Employees Association v. Indian Institute of Management, . Besides, it was also submitted by him that, on the fact of it, I.A. No. 9 filed by D-1 in plaintiffs' suit was vexatious, in that, the defendant deliberately refrained from making any such application for interim injunction against plaintiffs, in its suit for permanent injunction filed against them in O.S. No. 361/1997 pending in the trial Court.
However, another learned Judge of this Court disagreed with this view in the case of IIM EMPLOYEES' ASSOCIATION v. INDIAN INSTITUTE OF MANAGEMENT, ILR 1990 KAR 3418. But, another learned Judge preferred to follow the earliest view, in M.F.A. No. 1995/1985, M.F.A No. 1995 of 1985 decided on 13th December 1990. The principle behind the above propositions seems to be that in the appeal against an order of temporary injunction, the Appellate Court has to confine its attention to the material placed before the trial Court and the nature of the order being discretionary, normally the Appellate Court would not interfere with such an order. If the discretion is exercised unreasonably and not in a judicial manner, only then the Appellate Court should interfere with the exercise of the discretion of the trial Court. Therefore, while judging the correctness of the exercise of the discretion, no fresh material shall be considered.