Therefore, it cannot be said that any valid
title or interest has been acquired by the appellants in the suit property
and the ratio of the judgment in Surjit Singh v. Harbans Singh (supra)
would squarely apply to the appellants’ case because they are claiming
right on the basis of transactions made in defiance of the restraint order
passed by the High Court. The suppression of material facts by Bhagwati
Developers and the appellants from the Calcutta High Court, which was
persuaded to pass orders in their favour, takes the appellants out of the
category of bona fide purchaser. Therefore, their presence is neither
required to decide the controversy involved in the suit filed by respondent
No.1 nor required to pass an effective decree.
6. The question that arises for my consideration is whether the
Recovery Officer in view of a stay order by the competent Court could
have proceeded with such an auction and whether such an auction
which then creates a title, can be set aside. I am of the opinion that this
aspect of the matter has already been dealt with by the Supreme Court
in Surjit Singh and Ors. v. Harbans Singh and Ors., (1995) 6 SCC 50] ,
where the Supreme Court has laid down the law in paragraphs 3 and 4
thereof. From the law enunciated by the Supreme Court it is clear that
sale of property is non est. The Recovery Officer had no right to subject
CS DJ NO.8479/2016 page 87 of 183
the property to sale. Consequently, any auction pursuant thereto would
be of no consequence."
21. The substratal principle which supports the view that such
transactions are required to treated as non est and void is that the court
must presume the transactions that have been consummated in violation
of its order as non-existent. This is the principle on the basis of which
the Supreme Court had in Surjit Singh & Ors. v. Harbans Singh &
Ors.3 rejected the plea of the assignees of a property assigned in
violation of the orders to be impleaded in the proceedings. The
Supreme Court had declined to recognize the said transaction as it was
in violation of the orders of the court. It would be debilitating to the
judicial proceedings, and the rule of law, if any sanctity is accorded to
any transaction, which was interdicted by the court. The efficacy of
orders passed by the courts would be seriously diluted if any transfer of
property or action in defiance of the orders are recognized to accrue any
rights in favour of the transferees.
In Surjit Singh and others versus Harbans Singh and
others (1995) 6 S.C.C. 50 which is relied on by the
appellant, a preliminary decree was passed relating to
immovable property in favour of the appellants. While
proceedings for passing a final decree was pending, the
parties moved for accounting and preservation of mesne
profits. The trial court passed an order restraining all
parties from alienating or otherwise transferring in any
manner any part of the property involved, in the suit.
Nearly two years thereafter, one of the sharers assigned his
rights under the preliminary decree by a registered deed
partly in favour of the wife of his lawyer and partly in
favour of others in the teeth of the restraint order passed
by the Court. On the basis of the assignment deed, the
assignees made an application under Order XXII, Rule 10
C.P.C. for impleadment as parties to the final decree
proceedings. It was contended on their behalf that
assignment of decree was different from alienation of
property and the same was not prohibited by the order of
injunction. The application for impleadment was allowed by
the trial court and the appel filed by the plaintiffs was
dismissed by the Additional District Judge. The High Court
dismissed their revision and the matter came to this Court.
There was no dispute in that case that the assignors and the
assignees had knowledge of the order of the injunction
passed by the Court. On those facts, this Court held that
the deed of assignment was not capable of conveying any
right to the assignees and the order of impleadment of the
assignees as parties was unsustainable. Consequently, the
appeal was allowed. The relevant passage in the judgment
reads thus:
67. The learned Counsel for the appellant has referred to a
catena of decisions to show that such transfer is saved by the doctrine
of lis pendens. What however was overlooked consciously or otherwise
is that the principle of lis pendens would not be applicable in the teeth
of an order of injunction, whatever be the nature and form of such
interim order. There cannot be any two opinions or views that the trial
court wanted the parties not to alter the state of thing or affairs as it
existed on the date of the order. The present appellant knowingly had
purchased the said interest of the original appellant. In fact, the recital
in the said conveyance as produced would show that he was conscious
of the lis. In absence of any order of injunction or status quo possibly
the ground urged by the appellant that the transfer would not be hit by
the doctrine of lis pendens and hence is not void ab initio could have
come to the rescue of the appellant. None of the decisions cited by the
learned Counsel would show that the facts are similar to the facts at
issue whereas Surjit Singh (Supra) is the decision which is squarely on
the point.
In SURJIT SINGH AND OTHERS VS. HARBANS SINGH AND OTHERS reported in 1995-6 SUPREME COURT CASES 50, the Supreme Court had an occasion to decide about the validity of any alienation or assignment made in defiance of the Court's order irrespective of whether it was of the property per se or of the decree pertaining assignment as non est. The Supreme Court has ultimately held that when the Court intends a particular state of affairs to exist while it is in seisin of a lis, that state of affairs is not only required to be maintained, but it is presumed to exist till the Court orders otherwise. The Supreme Court has further held that in such circumstances, it is the duty of the Court and also the right to treat the alienation or assignment as having not taken place at all for its purposes. The relevant portion of the Supreme Court in this regard is para-4, which reads as follows: