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Documents citing Juggilal Kamlapat vs General Fibre Dealers Ltd (And ... on 12 December, 1961

Bhagheeratha Engineering Limited vs . North Eastern Electric Power on 20 May, 2024

17. The award that was passed by the Arbitral Tribunal on being set aside, has thus become unenforceable and non est in law. The same having been set aside for procedural irregularity cannot therefore preclude the disputes being adjudicated under the same reference. The judgments placed by the respondents namely; The Baranagore Jute Factory Company Ltd. vs. M/s Hulaschand Rupchand, AIR 1958 Cal 490 (supra) and Juggilal Kamlapat vs. General Fibre Dealers Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 1123 (supra) will have no application as in the considered view of this Court, the award being set aside on technical grounds, the disputes remain unresolved or undecided and it is not a question of a party seeking a second reference. The learned Commercial Court as has been discussed earlier had passed the judgment in consideration and cognition of the stand and submissions of the respective parties, and as such the grounds taken by the respondents before this Court to thwart the prayers of the petitioners is untenable and in fact deprecated. The earlier award therefore, which has Arb. Pet. No. 8 of 2023 Page 14 of 15 been set aside in effect has ceased to exist and the disputes as are present are available for adjudication under the same reference.
Meghalaya High Court Cites 14 - Cited by 0 - H S Thangkhiew - Full Document

Lohia Jute Press P. Ltd. And Ors. vs The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. And Ors. on 16 September, 1987

19. In the instant case, omission on the part of the Arbitrator to give any notice of the llth meeting and the subsequent ones had caused serious prejudice to the insurance company. Chakraborty, CJ. in the case of Juggilal v. General Fiber Dealers (supra), at page 155 had observed "Where there had been a omission to give a notice, there will always be a presumption that prejudice had caused". In the facts of this case the ex parte award was liable to be set aside on the ground that the Arbitrator did not give any peremptory notice to the respondent Insurance Company before proceeding ex parte from the stage of the 11th meeting. On this ground also the award was invalid.
Calcutta High Court Cites 13 - Cited by 2 - Full Document

Indian Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. vs The Sautna Stone & Lime Co. Ltd. on 25 July, 1989

11. Before we deal with the respective submissions made by the learned Advocate we shall deal with the decisions relied upon before us. In the case of Juggilal Kamlapat v. General Fibre Dealers Ltd., (ibid) a Division Bench of this Court presided over by Chakravarti, C. J., as he then was, considered the scope and effect of an ex parte award in detail. It is interesting to note that in that case the date fixed for hearing was 15th April, 1952 on which date the applicant did not appear and, subsequently, letters were given explaining the delay but the ex parte award was passed on 17th April, 1952. The learned trial Judge allowed that application for setting aside the award and held that there was denial of justice to the respondents and that it constituted legal misconduct. Being aggrieved, the award holder preferred an appeal. In its judgment the Division Bench observed as follows (at Pp. 358-59 of AIR):
Calcutta High Court Cites 17 - Cited by 8 - Full Document

P.C. Aggarwal vs K.N. Khosia Etc. on 22 May, 1974

(28) Shri R.L. Aggarwal for the appellant argued that the arbitrators did not hear the counsel for Shri P.C. Aggarwal in spite of his request and ultimately delivered the award against Shri P.C. Aggarwal. The question is whether the arbitrators misconducted themselves in refusing to hear the counsel for Shri P.O. Aggarwal at 12.30 P.M. on August 29, 1964. Shri R.L. Aggarwal relies on the decision of Calcutta High Court in Juggilal Kamlapat v. General Fibre Dealers, Ltd., , which lays down that if a party to an arbitration agreement fails to appear at one of the sittings, the arbitrator cannot or, at least, ought not to, proceed exparte against him at that sitting. If, on the other hand, it appears that the defaulting justice or defeating party had absented himself with a view to preventing justice or defeating the object of the reference, the arbitrator should issue a notice that he intends at specified time and place to proceed with the reference and that if the party concerned does not attend, he will proceed in his absence. If it appears from the circumstances of the case that a particular party is determined not to appear before the arbitrators in any event, as when he has openly repudiated either the reference itself or the particular arbitrators and has shown no desire to recant the arbitrators are not required to issue a notice of an intention to proceed ex parte against such a recusant person. In the light of these observations it may be said that the conduct of the appellant before the arbitrators was defiant as well as dilatory. He had openly denied the existence of the arbitration agreement itself. He had applied under section 33 of the Arbitration Act and failed. Then he applied for the revocation of the authority of the arbitrators and again failed. Hardy, J. has noted the obstructive attitude adopted by the appellant before the arbitrators. He held that the arbitrators were justified in coming to the conclusion that the appellant deliberately kept away from the proceedings and they had, therefore, no other option but to proceed ex parte and to decline to vacate the ex parte order made against him. The arbitration proceedings had been going on since about the middle of !96l. The arbitrators could not allow them to be delayed further. Hardy, J. has given all the details of the dilatory tactics adopted by the appellant before the arbitrators. In view of them we see no reason to disagree with reasoned conclusion of the learned Single Judge that the arbitrators were justified in proceeding ex parte against the appellant. We, therefore, reject this contention also.
Delhi High Court Cites 24 - Cited by 16 - Full Document

Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd. vs Siemens Public Communication Network ... on 25 February, 2005

19. On a consideration of the matter, this Court is still at a loss to pinpoint the exact date of the majority Award. The above noted circumstances would lend credit to the theory that the document purported to be a majority award was not a final award of the two members of the tribunal but it was only "draft" of the award or a formative award. The correspondence exchanged between the three arbitrators clearly points out that Justice Khanna was convinced of the reasons given by Justice Srivastava in regard to the Award for a sum of Rs.91,99,600/- with interest @ 18% from 28.6.1995 because it appears that the three arbitrators on a deliberation have already taken a view in paragraph 22 of the Award that the respondent had not filed any claim in regard to the price of DDF in the claim petition which appeared to be a afterthought and, therefore, separate claims towards the said items were unsustainable. Strangely enough and unfortunately Justice Khanna endorsed the view of Justice Kania in regard to, or for that reason the two arbitrators having become functous officio after signing the Award in view of the Supreme Court decision in the case of Satwant Singh Sodhi v State of Punjab & Ors. and that in the case of Rikhabdass v Ballabhdas and in the case of Juggilal Kamlapat v General Fibre Dealers Ltd.
Delhi High Court Cites 21 - Cited by 8 - R C Jain - Full Document

Satpal P. Malhotra vs Puneet Malhotra on 14 June, 2013

111. Similar judgment of the Supreme Court in case of Juggilal (supra) relied relied upon by the respondents would be of no assistance to the respondents. On the contrary on perusal of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the said case, it is clear that the Supreme Court had categorically held that the arbitrator is functus officio after he has made the award but that would only mean that no power is left in the arbitrator to make any change in award in any matter of substance himself. On perusal of the arbitration application filed by the respondents impugning the final award, it is clear that no such ground has been raised by the respondents in the said application that the learned arbitrator had become functus officio and could not have made any corrections in the impugned award. In my view, Mr.D'vitre is right in his submission that if no such ground was raised by the respondents in arbitration application filed under section 34, no such ground can be permitted to be raised for the first time in cross objections.
Bombay High Court Cites 117 - Cited by 13 - R D Dhanuka - Full Document

Satpal P. Malhotra vs Puneet Malhotra on 14 June, 2013

111. Similar judgment of the Supreme Court in case of Juggilal (supra) relied relied upon by the respondents would be of no assistance to the respondents. On the contrary on perusal of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the said case, it is clear that the Supreme Court had categorically held that the arbitrator is functus officio after he has made the award but that would only mean that no power is left in the arbitrator to make any change in award in any matter of substance himself. On perusal of the arbitration application filed by the respondents impugning the final award, it is clear that no such ground has been raised by the respondents in the said application that the learned arbitrator had become functus officio and could not have made any corrections in the impugned award. In my view, Mr.D'vitre is right in his submission that if no such ground was raised by the respondents in arbitration application filed under section 34, no such ground can be permitted to be raised for the first time in cross objections.
Bombay High Court Cites 117 - Cited by 0 - R D Dhanuka - Full Document

Surendranath Paul vs Union Of India (Uoi) on 29 April, 1964

16. It was also argued on behalf of the appellant that in the present case after the prescribed period for making the Award expired, Desai had no further jurisdiction to act and so resignation after the expiry of the period means nothing and is not a refusal to act because he had no power or right to act after expiry of the period nor could he be said to be incapable of acting as incapacity has reference to physical disabiliy or infirmity and not to incapacity by reason of supervening circumstances. But it appears that after the view expressed by the Supreme Court in interpreting Rule 10 of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce Arbitration Rules, there is no warrant for limiting incapacity to physical incapacity only. The decision of the Supreme Court is reported in Juggilal Kamlapat v. General Fibre Dealers Ltd., the Supreme Court observed :
Calcutta High Court Cites 13 - Cited by 7 - G K Mitter - Full Document

Union Of India (Uoi) vs M.L. Dalmiya & Co. Ltd. on 21 September, 1976

In Juggilal Kamalapat v. General Fibre Dealers Ltd., it was held that generallv speaking an arbitrator is functus officio after he has made the award but this only means that no power is left in the arbitrator to make any change of substance in the award that he has made except in certain circumstances provided in the law. The corrections made by the arbitrator here were in respect of patent errors and did not amount to any change of substance in the award and thus were permissible. We are also not prepared to accept that these corrections indicate non-application of mind on the part of the arbitrator as contended by Mr. Sen on behalf of the appellant.
Calcutta High Court Cites 25 - Cited by 8 - Full Document
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