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Documents citing B. Banerjee vs Anita Pan on 20 November, 1974

Smt. Sudha Mukherjee vs Sankar Chatterjee on 4 June, 1982

4. On the evidence led by the parties both the courts have concurrently overruled the plaintiff's claim of eviction based on the ground of subletting or the plaintiff's requirement for building and rebuilding. Neither of those two grounds according to the courts below could be substantiated by the plaintiff on the evidence led by her. The learned Munsif, however, decreed the suit upon a finding that the plaintiff had been able to make out the ground of reasonable requirement for her own use and occupation and for the use and occupation of the members of her family. The objection on the part of the tenant defendant that such a ground is not admissible to the plaintiff in the present suit which was filed within 3 years from the date of the plaintiff's purchase was overruled by the learned Munsif primarily relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of B. Banerjee v. Anita Pan, . He was of the view that the application for amendment having been filed beyond 3 years from the date of the plaintiff's purchase, plaintiff's suit for eviction on the grounds incorporated by the amendment must be deemed to be instituted on the date when such an application for amendment was filed and since that was beyond 3 years from the date of purchase there was no bar to the plaintiff's getting eviction on the ground so incorporated.
Calcutta High Court Cites 11 - Cited by 3 - Full Document

Sachindra Nath Bose And Anr. vs Jyoti Bikash Ghose And Ors. on 22 September, 1980

Mr. Ghose contended that as in view of amendment of original Section 13 (1) (f) there was necessity of specific pleading of reasonable requirement in terms of amended Section 13 (1) (ff) the Supreme Court held in the said case of B. Banerjee v. Anita Pan that as three years had already elapsed from the date of purchase of the suit premises and as by amending the plaint there would be necessity of framing additional issues and consequential retrial of such additional issues and for all practical purposes the suit was required to be heard afresh and in the aforesaid circumstances it could be held that a new suit was instituted and as such there was no bar of instituting the suit in view of provisions of Sub-section (3A) of Section 13 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act.
Calcutta High Court Cites 15 - Cited by 0 - G N Ray - Full Document

Amarendra Nath Bose vs Sachin Ghosh on 8 February, 1980

1. The plaintiff is the appellant in the instant appeal and this appeal arises out of a judgment and decree passed by the learned Additional District Judge, 11th Court, Alipore, in Title Appeal No. 1352 of 1968 reversing the judgment and decree passed by the learned Munsif, 2nd Court, Sealdah, in Title Suit No. 240 of 1966. The plaintiff-appellant instituted the said Title Suit No. 240 of 1966 for eviction of the defendant-respondent from the suit premises on the ground that the plaintiff reasonably required the suit premises for his own use and occupation and the tenancy of the defendant respondent was determined by a valid notice to quit. It appears that an application under Section 17 (2) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act was made by the defendant respondent but the said application was dismissed on the finding that the said application was barred by limitation and an application under Section 17 (3) at the said Act made by the plaintiff-landlord was allowed by the trial court and the defence of the tenant against delivery of possession was struck out. It appears that the plaintiff landlord purchased the suit premises and within three years from the date of purchase the said suit for eviction was instituted by him on the ground of reasonable requirement. But in view of Section 13 (3A) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act the landlord was precluded from instituting the said suit for eviction on the ground of reasonable requirement before the expiry of three years from the date of his purchase. It may be stated that the validity and/or vires of the said Sub-section (3A) of Section 13 of the Act was challenged before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and in the decision made in the case of B. Banerjee v. Anita Pan the Supreme Court held that the said provision was intra vires and was also applicable with retrospective effect. Accordingly in view of the aforesaid decision, the suit instituted by the plaintiff was hit by the provisions of Section 13 (3A) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act.
Calcutta High Court Cites 6 - Cited by 0 - G N Ray - Full Document

Deena @ Deena Dayal Etc. Etc vs Union Of India And Others on 23 September, 1983

This discussion will be incomplete without a close examination of the decisions of this Court in B. Banerjee v. Anita Pan and Pathumma v. State of Kerala, which have been referred to by Sarkaria, J., in Bachan Singh as evidencing a "contrary trend" according to which, even in regard to cases under Article 19, there is an initial presumption in favour of the constitutionality of the statute and the burden of rebutting that presumption lies on the person who asserts that the statute is unconstitutional. In B. Banerjee, a three-Judge Bench of this Court had to consider the question whether sub-section (3A) which was introduced in section 13 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 was violative of Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution. By the newly introduced subsection, the transferee of a property cannot file an eviction suit against his tenant for a period of three years from the date of transfer, on the grounds mentioned in clauses (f) and (ff) of section 13(1) of the Act. We have already extracted the relevant passage from the judgment of Krishna Iyer, J., who spoke for the Court in 28 that case. The learned Judge said that presumption had to be raised that the legislature understands and appreciates the needs of the people and that some courts had gone to the extent of holding that because of the presumption of constitutionality which every statute carries with it, the law will not be declared unconstitutional unless the case is so clear as to be free from doubt. The learned Judge added, citing Seervai, that "to doubt the constitutionality of a law is to resolve it in favour of its validity". With great respect, the judgment in B. Banerjee overlooks the binding decisions in Saghir Ahmed, Khyerbari Tea Co. and Mohd. Faruk which are directly in point. Not only are binding decisions not referred to in the judgment but, in support of the view propounded by the Court, Krishna Iyer, J., has cited the decision in Ram Krishna Dalmia which, as we have stated earlier, must be limited in its application to cases arising under Article 14 of the Constitution. To apply mechanically the decisions under Article 14 to cases arising under Article 19 is to ignore the significant distinction between the nature of the rights conferred by the two articles and their purport and content. B. Banerjee cannot therefore be regarded as an authority for the proposition contended for by the learned Attorney-General. Evidently, the landlord's contention that a beneficent provision, aimed at the protection of tenants harassed by motivated transfers of properties, was unconstitutional evoked a stern response. That is understandable. But, in the process of highlighting the need for social welfare legislation in the area of landlord-tenant relationship, the distinction between Article 14 and Article 19 in so far as it bears upon the question of burden of proof failed to receive any attention. The Bar too would seem not to have drawn the attention of the Court to that distinction and to the judgments which we have discussed a little earlier.
Supreme Court of India Cites 36 - Cited by 54 - Y V Chandrachud - Full Document

Balai Chandra Hazra vs Shewdhari Jadav on 12 August, 1976

In the instant case the plaint, pursuant to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of B. Banerjee v. Anita Pan ) (supra), had been allowed to be amended by us and in our view, it would now be open to both parties to canvass those points that arise out of those fresh issues, even though those may not have been taken up at any earlier stage of the present proceeding including the second appeal in this Court.
Calcutta High Court Cites 8 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Bachan Singh vs State Of Punjab on 9 May, 1980

But contended the respondents, a contrary tread was noticeable in some of the subsequent decisions of this Court and the respondents relied principally on the decision in B. Banerjee v. Anita Pan where Krishna Iyer, J. speaking on behalf of himself and Beg, J. as he then was, recalled the following statement of the law from the Judgment of this Court in Ram Krishna Dalmia v. S.R. Tendolkar and Ors., [1959] SCR 297 :
Supreme Court of India Cites 111 - Cited by 233 - R S Sarkaria - Full Document

Santi Swarup Sarkar vs Pradip Kumar Sarkar And Others on 13 September, 1996

19. True it is, the relevant suit has neither been withdrawn nor abandoned by the plaintiff, since deceased. But he has certainly dropped out from the suit by his death which, in my view, amounts to involuntary abandonment from the suit. According to Concise Oxford Dictionry the word 'Abandon' means "to give up completely or before completion, forsake or desert" etc. According to Black's Law Dictionary the expression 'Abandon' means "to desert, surrender, forsake, or cede" etc. As already indicated above, the plaintiff in the relevant suit having since died, he must be deemed to have involuntarily given up (the cause) completely before completion of the relevant suit and had ceded therefrom. By the same very interpretative process exrcised by the Supreme Court in the decision in B. Banerjee v. Smt. Anita Pan , 1 feel that in order to shorten the litigation in the instant cause I may as well strain language to the little extent of interpreting the expression "Abandoned" in Order 23, Rule 1A of the C.P. Code to mean "abondened by death as well. By such construction no violance would be caused to the language but on the other hand justice shall be provided.
Calcutta High Court Cites 13 - Cited by 6 - Full Document

Ranchod B. Das vs Lrs Of Kanhaiya Lal on 4 January, 2005

31. Next, it is true that in view of the bar of Sub-section (3) of Section 14 of the Act of 1950, the suit when it was filed by the plaintiff, for eviction of his tenant, on the ground of personal necessity of his son was not maintainable. It also true that in view of the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court delivered in the case of B. Banerjee v. Smt. Anita Pan (supra), the suit of the plaintiff so far as on that ground is required to be ignored. Still in the light of the same decision of the Supreme Court (B. Banerjee's ease) and in facts of this case suit of the plaintiff for his own need was and is maintainable. Reason is that the plaintiff retired from service in the year 1983 and amended the plaint in the year 1984 and sought decree for eviction of the tenant in the year 1984 on the ground of his own need in place of need of his son. By that time period of five years already passed to the tenancy of the defendant tenant. In the year 1984, bar of Sub-section (3) of Section 14 of the Act of 1950 had no application against the plaintiff's and the plaintiff could have instituted the suit for eviction of the defendant-respondent-tenant on the ground of his personal necessity. The plaintiff in stead of filing fresh suit after withdrawal of present suit amended the present suit and the Trial Court after hearing the defendant permitted the amendment by order dated 6.8.1984.
Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur Cites 14 - Cited by 2 - P C Tatia - Full Document
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