6. I am of opinion, therefore, that the suit is not bad for misjoinder of parties and causes of action. Should it, however, be convenient, the Court may See Umabai Mangeshrao v. Vithal Vasudeo Shetti 1 Ind. Cas. 120 : 33 B. 293 : 11 Bom. L. R. 34 : 5 M. L. T. 230 direct the successive trial of the issues separately affecting different defendants. Thus the question of the alleged fraud of B. N. Das touching all the defendants may be tried first. If it fails, there is an end of the case. If it succeeds and the Bengal National Bank does not wish to be present at the trial of the issues, so far as they affect the other defendants, viz., Cartwright & Co. and those claiming through them, there is no reason why it should attend. I would, therefore, decree this appeal with costs.
5. And that test was applied by the Lord Justice for the decision of the particular case then before the Court. Adopting that same test here, it seems to me clear that the causes of action in the two suits were distinct., In the former suit the facts, which the then plaintiff was under obligation to prove in order to entitle her to the Court's judgment, were that on the death of her mother the property devolved upon her and that the alienation to Zagdu of Survey No. 324 was invalid. But the facts, which Bahini or her vendee, the plaintiff, would have to prove in this suit in order to recover judgment, would be not only that Bahini took the property on the death of her mother, but that the sale to Dagdu of the different Survey Nos. 403 and 404 was invalid in law; in other words, the two sets of facts which require to be proved in both suits in order to enable the plaintiff to succeed were different sets of facts, and it follows, in my opinion, that the causes of action must be pronounced to be different. Mr. Rao in support of the judgment under appeal has called our attention to Nundo Kumar Nasker v. Banomali Gayan 29 C. 871 which was cited with approval in Umabai Mangeshrao v. Vithal Vasudeo Shetti 1 Ind Cas. 120 : 11 Bom. I.R. 34 : 5 M.L.T. 230 : 33 B. 283. But these decisions do not, in my opinion, conflict with the view which I have expressed. They go no further, as I understand them, than deciding that it is open or competent or lawful for a plaintiff suing in ejectment to join as co-defendants various alienees who are in possession of portions or fragments of the property in suit;. They do not, I think, decide, what alone would assist the respondents here, that it is obligatory upon such a plaintiff to join all such alienees as co-defendants at the risk of forfeiting his right to recover from those whom he fails to join in his first suit: in other words, they do not decide that the cause of action supplied by one alienation is identical with the cause of action supplied by another.
871 which was cited with approval in Umabai v. Vithal. (1908) 33 Bom. 293 But these decisions do not, in my opinion, conflict with the view which I have expressed. They go no further, as I understand them, than deciding; that it is open or competent or lawful for a plaintiff suing in ejectment to join as co-defendants various alienees who are in possession of portions or fragments of the property in suit. They do not, I think, decide, what alone would assist the respondents here, that it is obligatory upon such a plaintiff to join all such alienees as co-defendants at the risk of forfeiting his right to recover from those whom he fails to join in his first suit: in other words, they do not decide that the cause of action supplied by one alienation is identical with the cause of action supplied by another.
It appears to us, so far as the plaintiffs cause of action is concerned, that it is a matter of indifference to him upon what grounds the different per-eons in possession may seek to justify the wrongful detention of what is his. What he is entitled to claim is the recovery of possession of his land as a whole and not in fragments, and we think that all persons who oppose him in the enforcement of that right, are concerned in his cause of action and ought accordingly to be made parties to a suit in which he seeks to give effect to it." ILR 29 Cal 871 was followed in Umabai v. Vithal, JLR 33 Bom 293, Laxmi Narayan v. Ramratan, AIR 1924 Nag 55 (dissenting from, Afzal Shah v. Lachmi Narain, ILR 40 All 7: (AIR 19L8 All 425)) and Ranganatham v. Mariappa, AIR 1942 Mad 334.
307 to which the former learned Judge was also a party; and as authority for the proposition Umabai Mangeshrao v. Vithal Vasudeo Shetti 1 Ind Cas. 120 : 33 B. 203 : 11 Bom.L.R. 34 : 5.
Soma of the properties in such a suit may be claimed as self-acquisitions by one or other of the members and all the members may not be agreed as to their true character; this may render necessary the determination of questions of title involving protracted enquiry. The substance of the matter is that a suit for partition may and does often involve the investigation of disputed questions of title and an attempt to avoid them can only lead to needless multiplicity of litigation. We do not feel pressed by the contention that if this view be adopted, grave inconvenience may be caused to some of the parties, as they will have to be present during the discussion of questions which specially affect others alone. Bat, as pointed out in Umabai Mangethrao v. Vithal Vasudeo Shetti 1 Ind. Cas. 120 : 33 B. 293 : 11 Bom.
3. The rule laid down by the Bombay Court really amounts to much the same thing when it is stated that there must be successive trial of the issues separately affecting the different defendants. We think that in this particular case, as it is to go back, it is far better to admit each of the cases in separate numbers and try them as four separate cases, the first case will be with regard to property No. 1 in schedule ka. The decision as regards this in the lower Court is clearly inadequate inasmuch as there is no finding that the property was not the lady's stridhan and proceeds on the assumption that it was part of the estate of Shyam Ballabh and that there was no legal necessity for the sale. Then as regards property No. 3 in schedule ka, which will form the second suit, the same difficulty applies and there appear to have been other questions besides that of legal necessity raised in the defence. We think that it is far better that this case should have separate issues and should be separately tried. Then there is the case as regards the first property in schedule kha. It stands on a totally different footing inasmuch as the alienation is alleged to have been by verbal assignment to the defendants Nos. 1 to 4 on trust to maintain seba pujah of their family idol, and after the death of the lady, the plaintiff's father and brother are said to have executed a release to the purchaser for this property. This is not an alienation by sale and it seems to give rise to different causes of action. This will form, as we have said, the third suit for trial. The fourth suit will be about the property No. 2 in schedule kha in this case. The alienation was said to have been made by the plaintiff's father and brother, but the kobala, which is put forward, is found by the Subordinate Judge to have nothing to do with the property in suit. The assignees of the father and the brother cannot be sued on the same cause of action as the assignees of the widow. This too will have to form the subject of a separate suit. The plaintiff will be entitled to file these four suits, but as a condition precedent to his being allowed to be heard on remand on these four suits, he will have to pay the costs of the defendants in all the Courts. The costs will be paid within one month of the date of the receipt of the order in the lower Court, otherwise the suit will stand dismissed.
3. The cases which are relied on by appellant's Vakil, Ishan Chunder Hazra v. Rameswar Mondal 24 C. 831. and Umabai v. Vithal 33 B. 293 : 11 Bom. L R. 34. relate to suits by reversioners, in which the right to recovery is based on a single event, the death of the last holder : and can be distinguished on this ground.