Ramkrishna Ramnath vs G. Lakshmi Narasimhan, Income-Tax ... on 27 February, 1969
In the case of Commissioner of Income-tax v. Kishoresinh cited by Mr. Natu, the question which arose was whether the special period of limitation provided for in section 33B(2)(b) is applicable to an order passed in revision by the Commissioner under section 33B, whether so motu or after the matter is remanded back to him in pursuance of an order of a higher authority. A division Bench of this court held that, though the words of section 33B(2)(b) are wide in the abstract if a literal meaning only was to be given to them, the cardinal rule of literal construction must not be pushed so far as to result in irrational or absurd conclusions, and that the phraseology of sub-section (2) (b) of section 33B permitted of a construction which prevented a result which would be manifestly absurd. S. T. Desai J., delivering the judgment of the court, stated (at page 533) that though a causes omissions is not to be readily inferred, "the preferable meaning of the clause under consideration seems to us to be to restrict it to the fitness of the matter". Though Mr. Natu has strongly contended to the contrary, in my opinion, it is clear that what the court then proceeded to do was to supply the causes omissions (which means, literally, "a case omitted"), and held that the rule of limitation prescribed in section 33B(2) must be read as used with reference to an order made by the Commissioner in revision suo motu, and that the period of limitation prescribed by that provision did not apply to an order passed by the Commissioner in pursuance of an order or direction of a higher authority. In the course of the judgment in the said case, the court rejected the argument that the legislature having in express terms provided for a period of limitation for making an assessment order under section 23 and also provided a period of limitation for making an order of assessment or reassessment in cases of escaped income under section 34, felt the necessity of engrafting an exception on the operation of that rule of limitation, because it must have been felt that but for the exception enacted under the proviso, the period of limitation of four years would have operated in every case, even when the order was made under section 23 or under section 34 after there had been an order or direction from a higher authority. The view taken was (at page 531) that the position properly analyzed was that in a case of assessment under section 23 or an order of assessment or reassessment under section 34, a situation might arise when the Income-tax Officer might have to pass orders once again under those very section and, by the time he sat down to do so, the period of limitation of four years laid down in section 34(3) might well have already elapsed. It was pointed out in the said judgment that it being not the intention of the legislature in any such case to allow the possibility of such a contention being raised, the legislature engrafted the second proviso to sub-section (3) of section 34 only ex abundanti cautela. That, in my opinion, is not a correct view of the matter, as what the Income-tax Officer does in consequence of a finding or direction given by way of appeal, revision or reference is "assessment" or "reassessment" and the second proviso was necessary for the purpose of lifting the bar of limitation in regard to the same. The second proviso refers to "assessment" or "reassessment" made "in consequence of or to give effect to any finding or direction" in proceedings by way of appeal, revision or reference.