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Documents citing Poolpandi Etc. Etc vs Superintendent, Central Excise ... on 14 May, 1992

Jignesh Kishorbhai Bhajiawala vs State Of Gujarat & on 11 January, 2017

38 A   lot   was   argued   on   behalf   of   the   respondents   as   regards   the  conduct of the applicant. It was pointed out that in the past, for two  times, the summons issued by the authority were not honoured. This,  according to the respondents, is suggestive of the fact that the applicant  is   not   willing   to   cooperate   in   the   investigation.   Mr.   Chaudhary,   the  learned   senior   counsel   appearing   for   the   applicant   pointed   out   that  when the first summons was served, the father of the applicant informed  that the applicant was with the C.B.I. for the purpose of interrogation.  When the second summons was served, it was pointed out that since the  documents   have   been   asked   for,   it   would   take   some   time   for   the  applicant to collect the same and he would, thereafter, appear before the  Page 40 of 41 HC-NIC Page 40 of 41 Created On Sat Aug 12 03:13:41 IST 2017 R/CR.MA/289/2017 JUDGMENT authority. I am not so much concerned as regards the conduct of the  applicant. I expect the applicant to extend full cooperation in the course  of   his   interrogation   which   the   authority   wants   to   undertake   in  connection with the ECIR referred to above. Even otherwise, the person  summoned under Section 50 of the Act, 2002 is bound to state the truth  upon any subject respecting which he is examined or make statement,  and produce such documents, as may be required.
Gujarat High Court Cites 73 - Cited by 0 - J B Pardiwala - Full Document

Rohit Wassan vs Additional Director General, ... on 5 February, 2019

"The prayer has been opposed by the learned Additional Solicitor General, Mr. P.P. Malhotra, who has brought to our notice the decision of a Three Judges Bench in the case of Poolpandi and Others v. Superintendent, Central Excise and Others (1992) 3 SCC 259. Mr. Malhotra pointed out that the very first paragraph of the said judgment mentions that the common question arising in the said case before their Lordships was the stand taken by the petitioners that they were entitled to the presence of their lawyers when they were being questioned during the interrogation under the provisions of the customs Act, 1962, or the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973. Their Lordships had noticed the difference of opinion of different High Courts in this connection and had rejected the submission made on behalf of the petitioners therein, that they were entitled to have lawyers present at the time of interrogation. Such prayer, therefore, was disallowed.
Delhi High Court - Orders Cites 17 - Cited by 1 - N Waziri - Full Document

Laxman Gurjar S/O Shri Amraram Gurjar vs Union Of India on 18 October, 2019

In view of the afore-discussed law, the ratio of the judgment of the Supreme Court Poolpandi, supra, cannot be taken to have been diluted by mere enforcement of Section 30 of the Advocates Act. The Custom Officer, who has summoned the petitioners to appear before him for recording their statements under Section 108 of the Customs Act, does not qualify the test of a "tribunal or person legally authorised to take evidence". But here, the word 'or' in section 30(ii) has not been used as disjunctive. It rather has to be read as "and" because "tribunal" and "person" both qualify the requirement of having power to record evidence. No doubt, the word "or" is normally treated as disjunctive and "and" is normally conjunctive but at times they are read vice versa to give manifest intention of the legislature as disclosed from the context. (Refer to Principals of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh 14th Edition 2016 Page 530). If the word "or" in Section 30(ii) of the said Act is interpreted to mean disjunctive, it would mean that though the "person" would be taken as legally authorised to take evidence but the "tribunal" referred to in that very provision would not be taken so authorised to take evidence. This would lead to absurd consequences.
Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur Cites 146 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Usmanbhai Chandbhai Mansuri vs State Of Gujarat And Anr. on 8 May, 2003

44. Mr. E. E. Saiyed has attacked the statement Exh. 41 on the ground that Mr. Bakshi ought not to have recorded the statement Exh. 41 in his own office, because atmosphere was so charged with fear and anxiety that the statement of accused cannot be said to be free and voluntary. As per his arguments, said statement ought to have been recorded at independent place. This contention is countered by Mr. Asim Pandya by arguing that on going through Section 67 of the N.D.P.S. Act, law does not require that statement of a person under Section 67 of the N.D.P.S. Act should be recorded at some another place other than a Office of the officer empowered to record such statement. He has further argued that when law confers the powers on the officer to call a person, document etc., it is obvious that the person from whom such information or the document are called for, should attend the office of that officer. The officer is not required to go and collect the information at the place as desired by that person. On this point, he has placed reliance on the case of Poolpandi v. Superintendent, Central Excise & Ors., reported in AIR 1992 SC 1795, wherein it has been held in Para 11 as follows :-
Gujarat High Court Cites 55 - Cited by 0 - D P Buch - Full Document

Sanwar Lal Sen S/O Shri Sukhdev Sen Sadar vs Union Of India on 18 October, 2019

In view of the afore-discussed law, the ratio of the judgment of the Supreme Court Poolpandi, supra, cannot be taken to have been diluted by mere enforcement of Section 30 of the Advocates Act. The Custom Officer, who has summoned the petitioners to appear before him for recording their statements under Section 108 of the Customs Act, does not qualify the test of a "tribunal or person legally authorised to take evidence". But here, the word 'or' in section 30(ii) has not been used as disjunctive. It rather has to be read as "and" because "tribunal" and "person" both qualify the requirement of having power to record evidence. No doubt, the word "or" is normally treated as disjunctive and "and" is normally conjunctive but at times they are read vice versa to give manifest intention of the legislature as disclosed from the context. (Refer to Principals of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh 14th Edition 2016 Page 530). If the word "or" in Section 30(ii) of the said Act is interpreted to mean disjunctive, it would mean that though the "person" would be taken as legally authorised to take evidence but the "tribunal" referred to in that very provision would not be taken so authorised to take evidence. This would lead to absurd consequences.
Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur Cites 146 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

P.Giribabu vs The Deputy Director Of Enforcement on 26 March, 2010

12. With regard to the observation of the Lower Appellate Court for the handicap faced by the accused in the absence of an Advocate, the supreme court in Poolpandi v. Superintendent, Central Excise [1992 (60) E.L.T. 24 (S.C.) = AIR 1992 S.C. 1795] has considered that when a person was summoned to appear before the officers under FERA , he cannot be treated as an accused and under such circumstances, he is not entitled to the presence of his lawyer when he was examined by the officers. Therefore, refusal to allow the presence of lawyer in such cases, would not be violative of protection under Article 20(3) of the constitution. When the Apex Court itself has held so clearly that a person, who was summoned to appear before the Enforcement Directorate for interrogation, is not entitled to seek the presence of the Advocate, the Lower Appellate Court cannot make use of this as a circumstances in favour of the accused to arrive at the conclusion that his statement could not be voluntary.
Madras High Court Cites 38 - Cited by 5 - Full Document
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