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Documents citing The State Of Madras, Represented By The ... vs Balmadies Plantations Limited, ... on 27 January, 1960

Rash Mohan Chatterjee And Ors. vs The Controller Of Estate Duty, W. Bengal on 18 September, 1963

." The difference indicated may, according to the Editor of Dymond's book, be sufficient to distinguish the two lines of cases. It is also stated in this text book that, notwithstanding the sweeping character of the term "entire exclusion", there must, it is thought, be some limit to its meaning: the condition cannot be infringed merely because the donor paid occasional visits to the donee, and the Stewart and Secomb's decisions ((1906) 43 Sc LR 465 and 1911-2- KB 688) if still valid, indicate that more permanent residents as a guest does not offend the condition, at any rate if there was no "honourable understanding". On the other hand, specific rights of lodging in the property secured to the donor at the time of the transfer are a Breach of the condition: Revenue Commr. v. O. Donohoe, 1936 IR 342, where the deceased retained the right to the exclusive use of a room and "the right of his support therein."
Calcutta High Court Cites 8 - Cited by 13 - Full Document

The State Of Madhya Pradesh vs Ramesh Nai And Anr. on 14 October, 1974

17. The learned Advocate General cited Income-tax Special Purposes Commissioners v. Pemsel (1891) 4 AH ER 28 at p. 59 and Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Dowdell O'Mahonev & Co. Ltd. (1952) 1 AH ER 531. wherein it has been laid down that sometimes provisions on the statute may be superfluous and in that event, the legislature could be presumed to have enacted those provisions bv way of abundant caution. We do not accept the suggestion that Section 67 of the M. P. Bal Adhinivam, 1970, is superfluous. But for suspension of Section 29-B of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, the Juvenile Courts, constituted in this Bal Adhinivam could not have tried the offences punishable with death or imprisonment for life. In this view of the matter it is futile to contend that the said section is superfluous and it was enacted bv way of abundant caution. The learned Advocate General adopted a novel argument suggesting that as the said section was superfluous. Section 13 of the Madhva Pradesh General Clauses Act, 1957, or its equivalent, namely, Section 8 of the Central General Clauses Act, 1897. about references to repealed enactments would be attracted. Section 8 of the Central General Clauses Act. 1897, is as under:
Madhya Pradesh High Court Cites 78 - Cited by 7 - Full Document

Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Punjab, ... vs Jagatjit Distilling And Allied ... on 22 March, 1965

After hearing the counsel for the parties, I am of the view that there is no merit in this contention. The expression "wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the business" occurring in section 10(2)(xv) of the Income-tax Act, 1922, is of very wide import. The words "for the purpose of the business" were the subject-matter of a recent Supreme Court decision in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Malyalam Plantations Ltd. There it was held that :
Punjab-Haryana High Court Cites 3 - Cited by 11 - Full Document

N. Rengaswami Pillai vs Commissioner Of Income-Tax on 19 April, 1973

16. The learned counsel for the assessee points out that the fact that Clause (iii) imposes a charge on remittance basis only on the past profits alone, it must be assumed that the legislature intended only to tax past profits and not current profits on remittance basis. As pointed out by Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Dowdall O' Mahoney & Co. Ltd., the beliefs or assumptions of those who frame acts of Parliament cannot make the law. Therefore, we have to actually construe the various clauses in Section 4(1) in the light of the object of the Act. Undoubtedly the Act imposes a tax on an assessee who is a resident on the income, profits and gains received or accrued to him in the taxable territories during the year of account. It cannot, therefore, be assumed that the legislature intended to exempt the income or profits or gains accrued to a resident but not ordinarily resident from tax in respect of the amounts accrued in the year of account and to impose tax only on the income earned or accrued in the prior years. The proper construction of Section 4(1) in our view would be to interpret clauses (ii) and (iii) as supplementing each other. Clause (b)(ii) is to be taken as covering the income of a resident accrued and remitted during the year and Clause (b)(iii) covering cases of accrual of income in the previous years but remitted in the taxable territories during the year. In this view we have to uphold the view of the Tribunal in this case.
Madras High Court Cites 13 - Cited by 0 - V Ramaswami - Full Document

Dollar Company vs Commissioner Of Income-Tax on 10 September, 1975

Therefore, the provision, even before 1956, was wide enough to rope in gains on compulsory acquisitions. Thus, even proceeding on the basis that the legislature should be taken to have assumed that the transfer did not include compulsory acquisition until the Act of 1961, still it would not be a proper assumption. The very fact that the exemption originally granted in the third proviso was taken away in 1956 clearly goes to show that Parliament intended to tax gains on compulsory acquisition. Further, as pointed out by Lord Radcliffe in Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Dowdal O' Mahoney & Co. Ltd. [1952] 33 TC 259, 287 (HL) the beliefs or assumptions of those who frame Acts of Parliament cannot make the law. The modification made to the third proviso to Section 12B when the provision was being re-cast in 1956, goes to show that the compulsory acquisition was not intended to enjoy exemption under the 1956 Act. If the draftsman in 1961 assumed that it did enjoy the exemption even after 1956, it would be contrary to the provisions and the consequence following the amendment in 1956. There is no substance in this submission of the learned counsel that compulsory acquisition was brought within the ambit of "capital gains" only in 1961. The first question is, therefore, answered in the affirmative and against the assessee.
Madras High Court Cites 26 - Cited by 4 - V Ramaswami - Full Document

Income Tax Officer, Distt. ... vs Shri Mani Ram Etc on 20 August, 1968

"I have looked at the later Acts to which the Attorney General referred to in order to satisfy myself that they do not contain a restrospective declaration as to the meaning of the earlier Act. They clearly do not, and I do not think that it has been contended that they do. At the highest it can be said that they may proceed upon an erroneous assumption that the word "sold" in section 17(1)(a) of the Income Tax Act, 1945, has a meaning which I hold it has not. This may be so and, if so, it is an excellent example of the proposition to which reference was made in the report of the Committee of the Privy Council in In re MacManasway(1) and again by my noble and learned friend Lord Radcliffe in Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Dowdall, O'Mahoney & Co. Ltd. (2) that the beliefs or assumptions of those who frame Acts of Parliament cannot make the law".
Supreme Court of India Cites 31 - Cited by 23 - V Ramaswami - Full Document

Zee Telefilms Ltd, Mumbai vs Department Of Income Tax on 23 December, 2011

4. After considering the rival submissions and perusing the relevant material on record it is seen that the Hon'ble jurisdictional High Court in CIT Vs. Mukta Arts Pvt. Ltd. vide its judgment dated 25th August, 2008 in Income Tax Appeal No.584 of 2001 considered a question whether the Tribunal was justified in holding that the cost of production of the abandoned film "Devaa" was trading loss. The learned Counsel on behalf of the Revenue conceded before the Hon'ble High Court that no question of law was involved and the appeal itself was misconceived in view of the fact that the film in question was admittedly not released and hence it was stock-in-trade and there was no question of the same being capital asset. The learned A.R. has placed on record a copy of this judgment available on page no.166 of the paper book.
Income Tax Appellate Tribunal - Mumbai Cites 10 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

A.K. Films Pvt. Ltd., Mumbai vs Department Of Income Tax on 26 July, 2012

A.K. Films Pvt. Ltd. (A.Y. 2005-06) The order by the hon'ble court in the case of Mukta Arts Pvt. Ltd. (supra) and again, following it, in the assessee's case, are on the premise that no question of law arises; in fact, the hon'ble court goes on to observe that the appeal itself is misconceived in view thereof as well as the admitted fact of the film being a stock-in-trade, so that on being abandoned its cost represents a loss on revenue account. The said decisions, being even otherwise based on concession, therefore, cannot be considered as laying down any binding principle or proposition of law. In view thereof, we are unable to consider the issue as a covered matter despite the concession by the ld. DR; it being incumbent on us to consider the decision by the hon'ble jurisdictional High Court holding, in fact, otherwise.
Income Tax Appellate Tribunal - Mumbai Cites 14 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Abdul G. Nadiadwala, Mumbai vs Department Of Income Tax on 12 June, 2013

5. In this view of the situation, after hearing both the parties we find that Ld. CIT(A) did not commit any error in allowing proper relief to the assessee. For the sake of completeness we may reproduce the relevant observation Hon'ble Bombay High Court from the decision in the case of CIT vs. M/s. Mukta Arts Pvt. Ltd. (supra) "1. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the appellant and the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent.
Income Tax Appellate Tribunal - Mumbai Cites 2 - Cited by 0 - Full Document
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