M.N. Nagendran Chettiar vs Lakshmi Ammal on 18 January, 1933
In I.L.R. 5 Calcutta there are two cases relevant to the question, one Nanack Chand v. Teluckdye Koer (1879) I.L.R. 5 Cal.
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Nanack Chand And Anr. vs Teluckdye Koer And Ors. on 8 April, 1879
Mulla Vittil Seethi vs Korambath Paruthooli Achuthan Nair And ... on 12 January, 1911
The second mortgagee had not obtained a decree for sale of the equity of redemption, that is, the interest of his mortgagor which had passed to the purchaser under the first mortgagee's decree, Shephard J. quotes with approval Venkata Narasammah v. Ramiah (1879) I.L.R. 2 M. 108, Nanack Chand v. Teluckdye Koer (1879) I.L.R. 5 C. 255 and Venkata v. Kannam (1882) I.L.R. 5 M. 184. Having once sued for sale, making the mortgagor and the purchaser under the first mortgagee's decree parties, the second mortgagee could not sue them a second time for sale. The observation, therefore, that the right of redemption and no other was all that remained to the second mortgagee in the circumstances of the case was perfectly right. No general proposition was laid down that a second mortgagee had a mete right to redeem and after redemption to sell, nor that, after the first mortgagee's suit and sale without making the second mortgagee party, the right of redemption was all that could remain in him.
Mulla Veetil Seethi Kutti vs Korambath Paruthooli Achuthan Nair And ... on 12 January, 1911
Shephard, J., quotes with approval Venkata Narasammah v. Ramiah 2 M. 108; Nanack Chand v. Teluckdye Koer 5 C. 265 : 4 C.L.R. 358 and Venkata v. Kannam 5 M. 184. Having once sued for sale, making the mortgagor and the purchaser under the first mortgagee's decree parties, the second mortgagee could not sue them a second time for sale. The observation, therefore, that the right of redemption and no other was all that remained to the second mortgagee in the circumstances of the case was perfectly right. No general proposition was laid down that a second mortgagee had a mere right to redeem and after redemption to sell, nor that after the first mortgagee's suit and sale without making the second mortgagee a party the right of redemption was all that could remain in him.
Kutti Chettiar And Ors. vs Subramania Chettiar And Ors. on 16 April, 1909
He had then a mortgage charge on the entire house, but a moiety of that house was admittedly subject to a prior charge in favour of Chockalingam. The decree that was passed in. Chockalingam's suit made the other half also liable for payment of the debt due to Chockalingam but subject to a prior charge on that half in favour of Ambalathadi Chetti. When, therefore, defendants bought the house in execution of their decree no saleable interest was left in the judgment-debtor. As pointed out in Venkatanarasammah v. Ramiah 2 M. 108; Nanack Chand v. Teluckdye Koer 5 C. 265; 4 C.L.R.358 and Akatti Moidin Kutti v. Chirayil Ambu 26 M. 486 where there is a question between the purchasers at two distinct Court sales held on different dates in execution of two several mortgage decrees the Court in deciding between the two competing titles is guided not by the dates of the several mortgages but of the several purchases. For both the mortgagees have an equal right to sell the property, and once it is sold at the instance of one mortgagee there is no further saleable interest left in the judgment-debtor to be | sold again. Apart, however, from the effect of the two sales on the question of title to the property, the defendants as representatives of Chockalingam, would have a first charge on one moiety, and the plaintiff claiming the rights of Ambalathadi Chetti has a second charge on that moiety, and the plaintiff has a first charge on the other half and the defendant a second charge on that half. We are asked by the learned Advocate-General, who appears for the appellant, to give his client such relief as he may be entitled to upon the above state of facts even if he be held to have no right to the possession of the house.
Chinnu Pillai And Ors. vs Venkatasamy Chettiar And Ors. on 21 December, 1915
18. The decisions in this Court purport to follow the decisions in Nanack Chand v. Teluckdue Koer 5 C. 265 : 4 C.L.R. 358 and Dirgopal Lal v. Bolake 5 C. 269. At that time the practice in mortgage suits was not settled, and decrees were executed as if they were mere decrees for money by attachment and sale. The statement in the judgments that the purchaser was holding as a trustee for the mortgagor subject to redemption shows that the previous decrees, in execution of which the sales took place, were mere money decrees, and not decrees for sale in suits, by a mortgagee to enforce his right to realise the security. To a suit on the covenant to pay, none but the mortgagor need be made a party, and if a sale of the equity of redemption is permitted in execution of such a decree it is obvious that the 1st purchaser would be entitled to possession. These decisions are not authorities for the position that in a mortgage sale the 1st purchaser is always entitled to possession.
Babu Lal vs Jalakia on 27 June, 1916
24. It is true that this title was in point of time acquired prior to the title obtained by the first mortgagee under her purchase. It is also true that it has been laid down in a number of cases, beginning with Nanack Chand v. Teluckdye Koer 5 C. 265 : 5 Ind. Jur. 81 : 4 C. L.R. 358 : 2 Ind. Dec. (N.S.)
Chinnu Pillai And Ors. vs Venkatasamy Chettiar And Ors. on 21 December, 1915
19. The decisions in this Court purport to follow the decisions in Nanack Chand v. Teluchdye Koer (1879) I.L.R. 5 C. 265, and Dirgopal Lal v. Bolakee (1879) I.L.R. 5 C. 269. At that time the practice in mortgage suits was not settled, and decrees were executed as if they were mere decrees for money by attachment and sale. The statement in the judgments that the purchaser was holding as a trustee for the mortgagor subject to redemption shows that the previous decrees, in execution of which the sales took place, were mere money decrees, and not decrees for sale in suits by a mortgagee to enforce his right to realise the security. To a suit on the covenant to pay, none but the mortgagor need be made a party, and if a sale of the equity of redemption is permitted in execution of such a decree it is obvious that the 1st purchaser would be entitled to possession. These decisions are not authorities for the position that in a mortgage sale the 1st purchaser is always entitled to possession.
Ram Narain Sahoo vs Bandi Pershad on 22 April, 1904
10. There is another aspect of the case which under the authorities preclude the appellant from claiming possession as against the respondent. The right to possession depends upon the purchase of the outstanding equity of redemption and is ordinarily determined by the priority of the respective sales at the instance of the different mortgagees Nanack Chand v. Teluckdye Koer (1879) I.L.R. 5 Calc. 265.
Sheikh Bikala vs Sheik Ali And Ors. on 2 March, 1950
116) ; Nanack Chana v. Teluck Dye Koer, 5 Cal.
Srihari Banerjee And Anr. vs Khitish Chandra Rai Bahadoor on 11 March, 1897
12. The issue in the rent suit was "for what share is the plaintiff entitled to rent" and not to what share of the property is the plaintiff entitled as owner." And the judgment of the Court of Appeal rested upon considerations based on the provisions of the Land Registration Act, and on the fact of the purchase of the present plaintiffs being subsequent to that under which the present defendant No. 1 claimed; considerations which were necessary and sufficient for the determination of the rent suit, but which are not conclusive in a suit like the present, which is for determination of title to land, as distinguished from title to recover rent, and in which the plaintiffs claim a preferential right, notwithstanding that their purchase was subsequent to that of the defendant No. 1, by reason of that purchase being in satisfaction of a decree on a prior mortgage. Section 78 of Bengal Act VII of 1876, and Section 60 of Act VIII of 1885, bar inquiry in a rent suit into any question of title independently of the Land Registration record, while clause (a) of Section 89 of the former Act reserves the right to obtain a declaration of title independently of such record by a regular suit. And the cases of Nanack Chand v. Teluckdye Koer I.L.R. 5 Cal.