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Documents citing J.N. Gupta vs State Of West Bengal And Anr. on 25 July, 1958

N. R. Ghose Alias Nikhil Ranjan Ghose vs The State Of West Bengal on 27 October, 1959

It is said that notwithstanding the judgment of the High Court in J. K. Gupta's case (1) it must now be held in view of the judgment of this Court in Kedar Nath Bajoria's case(2) that the acquittal by Mr. Dutta Gupta was an acquittal by a court of competent jurisdiction. It seems to me that the judgment in Kedar Nath Bajoria's case(") is really irrelevant. If the Court of Mr. Dutta Gupta, was in law a court of competent jurisdiction, it would remain such whether this Court declared it to be so or not. Any court before which a plea of autrefois acquit is taken, must decide for itself and of course in coming to its decision it must follow such precedents as are binding upon it-whether the Court which had earlier acquitted the accused was a court of competent jurisdiction. Its power to decide that question is not derived from a decision of a higher court pronouncing upon the question of the competence of the Court which earlier acquitted' the accused.
Supreme Court of India Cites 17 - Cited by 38 - J L Kapur - Full Document

Suresh Kumar Singala vs State Of U.P. on 13 May, 2016

Following Kedar Nath Bajoria's case we are of the opinion that Section 4(1) of the Act was not ultra vires and the judgment of the Calcutta High Court in J.K. Gupta Vs. State of West Bengal (1952) 56 C.W.N. 701 was erroneous and the acquittal by the Special Judge Mr. S. C. Dutt Gupta was an order made by a court of competent jurisdiction; as such it was binding unless set aside in appeal and it was never set aside in appeal.
Allahabad High Court Cites 52 - Cited by 1 - S Agarwal - Full Document

Shaik Hanif, Gudma Majhi & Kamal Saha vs State Of West Bengal on 1 February, 1974

It is true that a similar reason given for not furnishing the affidavit of the Magistrate who passed the impugned order, was accepted by this Court in J. N. Roy v. State of West Bengal,(2) and instead, the counter- affidavit of the Secretariat official specially entrusted with detention cases was deemed sufficient. But that was so because nothing turnedon it. Nevertheless, the failure to furnish the counter-affidavit of theMagistrate who passed the order of detention, is an impropriety. In most cases, it may not be of much consequence but in a few cases, for instance, where mala fides or extraneous considerations are attributed: to the Magistrate or the detaining authority, it may, taken in conjunction with other circumstances, assume the shape of a serious infirmity, leading the Court to declare the detention illegal. In the present case, too, the mere omission to file the affidavit of the District- Magistrate does not vitiate the detention orders. But it is a circumstance, among others, in the light of which contention (2) is to be appreciated.
Supreme Court of India Cites 17 - Cited by 59 - R S Sarkaria - Full Document

Bhut Nath Mete vs The State Of West Bengal on 8 February, 1974

We emphasize this infirmity because routine summaries of files, marked as affidavits, appear in the returns to rules nisi, showing scant courtesy to the constitutional gravity of deprivation of civil liberty. In some cases where a valid reason for the District Magistrate's inability to swear affidavits directly has been furnished, this Court has accepted the concerned Deputy Secretary's affidavit. This should, however, be the exception, not the rule. We may refer in this context to the rulings in Ranjit Dam v. State of West Bengal, (1), J. N. Roy v. State of West Bengal, (2) and Shaik Hanif and others v. State of West Bengal.(3) We need not proceed further with this aspects, in the ultimate view we take on this writ petition. We are not persuaded that a speaking order should be passed by Government or- by the Advisory Board while approving or advising continuance of detention although a brief expression of the principal reasons is desirable. The communication of grounds, the right to make representation and the consideration thereof by the Advisory body made up of men with judicial experience the subject-matter being the deprivation of freedom, clearly implies a quasi-judicial approach. Indeed. where citizen's rights are affected by an authority, the question is not so much the mould into which the nature of the act should be fitted but the nature of the consequence which obligates impartiality, judicial evaluation and reasoned conclusion on facts. as distinguished from policy formulation and zealous imple- mentation regardless of two sides and weighing of evidence. Thebare bones of natural justice in this context need not be clothed with the ample flesh of detailed hearing and elaborate reasoning. It must be self-evident from the order that the substance of the charge and the essential answer in the representation have been impartially considered. We do not think that a speaking order like a regular Judicial performance is either necessary or feasible. Article 22(5) (1) A. I. R. (1972) SC 1753. (2) A. I. R. (1972) SC 2143. (3) Writ Petitions Nos. 1679 etc; judgment on February 1, 1974.
Supreme Court of India Cites 22 - Cited by 185 - V R Iyer - Full Document
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