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Lakshmi vs Santha on 30 April, 2020

7. The next question is as to what is the remedy available if the order under Section 340 is passed by a civil court. A Bench consisting of five Judges in Patna High Court had considered this issue. On analyzing the provisions contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898(old Code), in Mt. Rampati Kuer and others v. Judunandan Thakur and others(AIR 1968 Patna 100), with respect to Section 476 therein, which is similar to Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973(new Code) it is held that, an inquiry under Section 476 of the Code will also be an inquiry as defined in Section 4(k) of that Code. It will be a criminal proceedings, Unnumbered Crl. Appeal 16 of 2020 -:11:- even if the inquiry is conducted by a civil court, in view of the express provisions of Section 476 r/w Section 5(1). Hence if Section 439 read with Section 5(1) is considered, it will be reasonable to hold that inquiries even by civil courts into an offence under the Penal Code will come within the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 439 Cr.P.C. and the High Court can interfere under Section 561-A. The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot apply, because Section 5(1) is an exhaustive provision so far as inquiries into offences under the Penal Code is considered. It is noticed that, against an order under Section 476 an appeal is provided under Section 476-B. Even if an appellate order under Section 476-B is passed by a civil court, the order being passed in a criminal proceedings, is revisible under Section 439 of the old Code, is the finding. It was categorically found that Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot apply in such a situation. The Bench in Patna High Court had relied on various decisions Unnumbered Crl. Appeal 16 of 2020 -:12:- rendered by different High Courts, including Full Bench decisions, in order to arrive at the above conclusion.
Kerala High Court Cites 25 - Cited by 2 - B P Kumar - Full Document

Sambhu Nath Sadhukhan vs Maghesh Kumar Sadhukhan And Ors. on 23 April, 1981

20. Before we conclude our discussion on the views expressed by the High Courts in support of the petitioner, we must refer to another aspect of the matter which weighed with the Puniab Full Bench in the case of Hakim Rai 1957 Cri LJ 790 (supra) and approved by the Patna Full Bench in the case of Rampati Kuer 1968 Cri LJ 355 (supra). According to the Puniab Full Bench once a person has been ordered to be prosecuted for one of the offences mentioned in Section 195(b) or (c) his position would be the same whatever be the kind of Court which has ordered his prosecution and it would be a denial of equal rights under the lav if a person whose prosecution has been ordered by a Criminal Court is entitled to ask the High Court to review the correctness, legality and propriety of the order under Section 439 of the Code while a man whose prosecution has been ordered by a Civil Court can only have the order reviewed within the narrow limits of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and finally a man whose prosecution has been ordered by a Revenue Court has apparently no remedv at all in the High Court. With these observations the Bench said that such a discrimination could not be regarded as reasonable: but at the same time pointed out that it was not possible to Lavonias finger on any particular provision of any of the statutes involved and sea that that particular provision offended against Article 14 of the Constitution of India. According to the learned Judges in such a matter the statute ought to be interpreted by the High Courts in such a way as not to offend against the equality of treatment guaranteed by Article 14 of the Constitution: and it was nosebleed to do so without placing any undue strain on the language of the relevant provisions of law. Keeping in view the intention of the legislature, the express provisions of the relevant statutes and the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court, we are of the opinion that the spirit and language of the law would be unduly strained if it is held that an application under Section 476 when filed before a Civil Court would be governed by the Code of Criminal Procedure, We are, therefore, unable to accept the above reasoning of the Puniab Full Bench and the Patna Full Bench.
Calcutta High Court Cites 38 - Cited by 2 - M K Mukherjee - Full Document

Ramchander Mistry vs The State on 12 May, 1967

4. In support of his first contention Mr. Banerjee has drawn our attention to a recent unreported Full Bench decision of this Court in Civil Revn. Nos. 757 of 1965 and 130 of 1967, Mt. Rampati Kuer v. Jadunandan Thakur, decided on 23rd of March 1967 = (AIR 1968 Pat 100). It was held in that case after discussion of the relevant authorities and provisions of law that the order of transfer by the District Judge of Muzaffarpur, of some criminal appeals under Section 476-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to the Additional District judge of the place, was invalid and the appellate orders passed by the Additional District Judge were without jurisdiction. The orders which were subject-matter of the appeals before the District Judge and the Additional District Judge were passed by a Munsif, obviously not by a Magistrate and the learned Chief Justice who delivered the leading judgment in the Full Bench observed at our place as follows:--
Patna High Court Cites 26 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Weizmann Ltd vs Ms Shoes East Ltd. & Ors. on 16 May, 2013

In support of his submissions Mr Chandhiok relied upon following judgments: In re D.S. Raju Gupta AIR 1939 Madras 472; Emperor vs Bhatu Sadu Mali AIR 1938 Bombay 225 (FB); Mt. Rampati Kuer and Ors. vs Jadunandan Thakur & Ors. AIR 1968 Patna 100 (FB); Sri Chand vs State of U.P. 2003 Cri.L.J. 4094; Jose Kuruvinakunnel vs A.T. Jose 1997 Cri.L.J. 816; and C.S. Agarwal's case; 9.3 Mr Chandhiok lastly contended that, the criminal procedure code, i.e., the New Code was a complete code and therefore the court could not look to other statutes for enabling an aggrieved party to prefer an appeal. The exclusion of the High Court in Section 341 of the New Code, barred such an examination.
Delhi High Court Cites 74 - Cited by 7 - R Shakdher - Full Document
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