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Documents citing Rafiquennessa vs Lal Bahadur Chetri (Dead) Through His ... on 24 February, 1964

Eknath Kira Akhadkar And Ors. Etc. vs Administrative Tribunal And Ors. Etc. on 27 January, 1983

The Act is a beneficial piece of legislation enacted for the protection of the tenant and hence, had to be applied retrospectively, for otherwise there will be discrimination. However, this was not done either by the "Rent controller or by the Administrative Tribunal with the result that the eviction orders are abinitio null and viod since the landlords in each case, having failed to give the statutory notice had no cause of action. Reliance was placed im support of the above contentions in the cases of Mst. Refiquennessa v. Lal Bahadur chetri, .
Bombay High Court Cites 22 - Cited by 4 - Full Document

National Insurance Co. Ltd. And Anr. vs Usha Debi And Anr. on 8 October, 1991

11. The object and reasons of the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act 47 of 1982, inserting Section 92-A in the Act of 1939, and the principle enunciated by the Apex Court in the cases of Dayawati v. Inderjit, AIR 1966 SC 1423, Rafiquennessa v. Lal Bahadur Chetri, AIR 1964 SC 1511, and in the case of Mithilesh Kumari v. Prem Behari Khare, AIR 1989 SC 1253, lead to the conclusion that the provision of Section 140 of the Act of 1988, which is identical with the provision of Section 92-A of Act of 1939, shall operate retrospectively in respect of pending claims of fixed amount of compensation on the principle of no fault liability although the accident out of which the claims arose might have taken place prior to date of coming into force of the Act of 1988.
Gauhati High Court Cites 14 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

General Auto Agencies, Jaipur vs Hazari Singh on 7 March, 1977

In our view, such a contention is untenable. The point of time when Section 14 (2) requires a finding on comparative hardship is at the time when a decree for eviction is to be passed and as we are still at the stage of the hearing of the appeal, it is apparent that if we were to ignore Section 14 (2) and pass a decree of eviction, without & finding on the question of comparative hardship we would be going against the mandate of amended Section 14 (2). In Mst. Rafiquennessa v. Lal Bahadur, AIR 1964 SC 1511, Section 5 (1) (a) of the Assam Non-Agricultural Urban Areas Tenancy Act provided that the tenant shall not be evicted by the landlord from the tenancy except on the ground of nonpayment of rent etc., was held to give protection to the tenant even at the appellate stage, when by the proceedings pending before the appellate court, the landlord is seeking to evict the tenant and that obviously indicates that pending proceedings are governed by Section 5 (1) (a), though they have been initially instituted before the Act came into force. It may be noticed that in that case, the landlord had succeeded before the trial court in getting an order of eviction, but while the appeal was pending in the High Court, the amended Act had come into force, and the appeal by the High Court had been dismissed by applying the amended provision, which decision was upheld by the Supreme Court.
Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur Cites 26 - Cited by 7 - Full Document

Hussainali Sharif Punjwani vs The Board Of Trustees Of The Port Of ... on 18 January, 2012

61 Jcra193-217-11.sxw a suit was pending. The words used in the statute were 'a landlord shall not be entitled to the recovery of possession of any premises....' These words were contained in the Bombay Rent, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947. It was held that the provision barring a decree to be passed applied to pending suits and applied at the time the decree was to be passed. Another Constitution Bench in Mst. Rafiquennessa and Anr. v. Lal Bahadur Chetri and Ors. MANU/SC/0002/1964 : [1964]6SCR876 held that the prohibition against passing a decree for possession would apply even at the appellate stage, unless of course, appeals were kept outside the impact of the new Act, as in the proviso to Section 31 of the Act. Even the appellate Court has to apply the law ousting its jurisdiction.
Bombay High Court Cites 74 - Cited by 5 - G S Godbole - Full Document

University Of Kerala And Ors. Etc. vs Merlin J.N. And Anr. Etc. Etc. on 17 August, 2022

“Lastly, it was contended on behalf of the Appellants that the amending Act whereby new Section 15 of the Act has been substituted is declaratory and, therefore, has retroactive operation. Ordinarily when an enactment declares the previous law, it requires to be given retroactive effect. The function of a declaratory statute is to supply an omission or to explain a previous statute and when such an Act is passed, it comes into effect when the previous enactment was passed. The legislative power to enact law includes the power to declare what was the previous law and when such a declaratory Act is passed, invariably it has been held to be retrospective. Mere absence of use of the word 'declaration' in an Act explaining what was the law before may not appear to be a declaratory Act but if the court finds an Act as declaratory 18 Rafiquennessa v. Lal Bahadur Chetri (Dead) Through His Representatives and Ors., (1964) 6 SCR 876, para
Supreme Court of India Cites 15 - Cited by 9 - S R Bhat - Full Document

Ramesh Singh And Anr. vs Chinta Devi And Ors. on 11 October, 1993

7.3 In the case of Mst. Rafiquennessa v. Lal Bahadur Chetri, AIR 1964 SC 1511 the Supreme Court was dealing with the Assam Non-Agricultural Urban Areas Tenancy Act. In that case by Section 5 of the said Act certain protection was given to the tenants. When the said Act came into force, an appeal was pending against the decree allowing the appellant's claim. The tenant made an application in the High Court on the basis of Section 5 of the Act. The Supreme Court after examination of relevant provisions of the said Act observed that the scheme which is evident in the operative provisions of the said Act was to afford protection to the tenants by regulating in certain aspects the relationship between the tenants and their landlords. It was argued before the Supreme Court on behalf of the landlord -- appellant that at the relevant date, when the suit was filed by the appellant, he had acquired a right to eject the tenant under the terms of the tenancy, and it was contended that where vested rights were affected by any statutory provisions, the said provisions should normally be construed to be prospective in operation and not retrospective, unless the provisions in question related merely to a procedural matter. In this context the Supreme Court observed as follows (at page 1514) :
Patna High Court Cites 72 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

West Coast Paper Mills Ltd. vs Indira Rao on 31 August, 1990

On the question whether the provision applied to pending suits for possession, the learned Judges drew attention to the point of time specifically mentioned in the sub-section. It operated, they said, "when the decree for recovery of possession will have to be passed" and did not refer back to the institution of the suit. By a unanimous Judgment the learned Judges held that the sub-section applied to pending suits. In passing it may be noted that the learned Judges expressed a degree of hesitation on whether a statutory injunction of that nature could be applied retrospectively to appeals against decrees already made. But any doubt on the point must be considered to have been finally removed by this Court when in Mst. Rafiquennessa v. Lal Bahadur Chetri another Bench of five Judges which included J.C. Shah, J. who was a member of the Bench in the earlier case, held on an interpretation of Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of the Assam Non-agricultural Urban Areas Tenancy Act, 1955, which prohibited the eviction of a tenant, that the statutory provision came into play for the protection of the tenant even at the appellate stage. The learned Judges relied on the principle that an appeal was a continuation of the suit and that the appeal would be governed by the newly enacted Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 5 even though the trial Court decree had been passed earlier.
Karnataka High Court Cites 60 - Cited by 7 - Full Document
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