28. But in the present case the trial Court has found that the transaction was not for the benefit of the estate, and all the members of this Bench have concurred in that finding. We also agree that the loan was not taken for legal necessity or for discharging an antecedent debt. On these findings I think the appeal is concluded. The further questions suggested above, do not arise and therefore I refrain from expressing any opinion on them. I would only add that I agree with Sulaiman, C.J., that the authority of the Full Bench ruling in Jagat Narain v. Mathura Das A.I.R. 1928 All.
12. Once it is conceded that the father in a Hindu family has full power to manage the family property in the most beneficial manners as a prudent owner. It is difficult to understand, on general principles, why an alienation made by him and found to be beneficial to the family should not be upheld. Of course, he has no power to enter into transactions of a speculative nature, but where a transaction is warranted by the circumstances of the family it ought to be upheld though it may not be of a "defensive nature." For the reasons given above, and following the Full Bench ruling reported in Jagat Narain v. Mathura Das A.I.R 1928 All 454 I hold that it is within the competence of a Hindu father to alienate the joint family estate where the transaction is for the benefit of the estate and is such as a prudent owner would have made with the knowledge that was available to him at the time.
In this case there was no question of borrowing money to pay off a pre-emption decree and therefore the facts are somewhat different from the case which we are considering at present, but it is open to argument that this case has thrown considerable doubt upon the validity of the Full Bench case to which we have referred, namely the case in Jagat Narain v. Mathura Das 1928 50 All 969.
In my opinion, the view taken by the full bench of the Allahabad High Court in Jagat Narain v. Mathura Das that the question turns on what a prudent owner would do in dealing with his own estate goes too far, and there is no justification in Hindu law for saying that the manager of a minor can sell the minor's property solely on the ground that if he were the owner of the property he would as a prudent man sell it. I may point out that the question whether a transaction is for the benefit of an estate or not involves the consideration of something more, than merely whether the purchase price paid is a good price ; it involves the further question of what is to be done with the purchase money. In the present case the purchase money was invested in business, so that the ultimate result of the transaction was that the minor, in place of a piece of land worth Rs. 600, had an interest costing Rs. 900 in a business ; but whether that interest was worth more than Rs. 600 does not appear on the evidence. To sell a piece of land at a very good price would not be beneficial if the purchase money was to be invested in an insolvent business. However, apart from that consideration, in my opinion, the manager of a minor under Hindu law is not entitled to sell merely for the purpose of enhancing the value of the property of the minor, or for increasing the minor's income.
6. The two rulings mentioned above on which the learned Judge relied, were referred to and not followed. In the present case X think it is clear that Sunder who had only about 3 or 4 bighas of cultivation and a family consisting of 3 or 4 members, was compelled to supplement his income and he did so by transporting loads on a carnal for hire. The camel fort which the loan in question was incurred was not the first camel which Sunder had employed in this manner. The purchase of the camel on this occasion therefore was not a new venture. Presumably: Sunder must have found the business profitable, otherwise he would not have bought another camel after the previous one had died. There is certainly no evidence that the business of carrying loads on camels was an ancestral business but on the principle laid down in Jibe Full Bench ruling it is not necessary for the purpose of binding the joint family property that the loan should be incurred for the purpose of an ancestral business. On the facts of this case it appears to me that Sunder acted in a reasonable and prudent manner for the benefit of the family and that the family must have benefited by his purchase of the camel, and I see no "reason why the loan should not be treated as binding upon the family. When the lower appellate Court held that it was not proved that the business had been carried on "by Sunder's father or in the family" we take it to mean that it was not proved that the business was carried on by his father or by other members of his family. There was no doubt about it that Sunder himself was carrying on the business and had been carrying it on for some time before the loan in question.
The earlier F. B. decision in 'Jagat Narain v. Mathura Das', AIR (15) 1928 All 454: 50 All 969 FB), was affirmed and it was held that it was not overruled by the pronouncement of the P. C. in the 'Benares Bank case', (AIR (19) 1932 PC 182: 54 All 564).
In this connexion we would refer to the following rulings : Jagat Narain v. Mathura Das (1928) 15 A.I.R. All. 454 for a definition of the term "benefit to the estate."