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Sri.Suresh Kallappa Kambale vs State Of Karnataka on 23 December, 2021

any person other than the accused, the Court can proceed against such person and the Court need not have to wait for the evidence against the proposed accused to be summoned is tested by cross-examination. It is also held that the degree of satisfaction i.e., required to summon a person under Section 319 of Cr.P.C would be same as for framing a charge. The Hon'ble Apex Court also made it clear that Section 319 of Cr.P.C could be invoked to proceed against any person even though named in the FIR and charge sheet is not filed or is discharged, however, subject to requirement under Section 300 and 398 of Cr.P.C. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi (Supra) considered the authority under Section 319 of Cr.P.C in light of its earlier decisions on the subject and categorically held that the other accused those who have not been arrayed as accused against whom proceedings have been quashed could be arrayed as accused if it is shown that they have also committed the offence, the Court can take cognizance against them and try them along with the other accused.
Karnataka High Court Cites 44 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Smt Leelawati @ Leela Devi vs State And Ors on 9 September, 2022

The observation of this Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi (supra) and other decisions following the same is that mere existence of a prima facie case may not serve the purpose. Different standards are required to be applied at different stages. Whereas the test of prima facie case may be sufficient for taking cognizance of an offence at the stage of framing of charge, the court must be satisfied that there exists a strong suspicion. While framing charge in terms of Section 227 of the Code, the court must consider the entire materials on record to form an opinion that the evidence if unrebutted would lead to a judgment of conviction. Whether a higher standard be set up for the purpose of invoking the jurisdiction under Section 319 of the Code is the question. The answer to these questions should be rendered in the affirmative. Unless a higher (Downloaded on 09/09/2022 at 09:39:28 PM) (9 of 12) [CRLR-32/2016] standard for the purpose of forming an opinion to summon a person as an additional accused is laid down, the ingredients thereof, viz., (i) an extraordinary case and (ii) a case for sparingly exercise of jurisdiction, would not be satisfied.
Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur Cites 11 - Cited by 0 - P S Bhati - Full Document

Bachittar Singh vs State Of Punjab on 14 September, 2011

18. The observation of this Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi (supra) and other decisions following the same is that mere existence of a prima facie case may not serve the purpose. Different standards are required to be applied at different stages. Whereas the test of prima facie case may be sufficient for taking cognizance of an offence at the stage of framing of charge, the court must be satisfied that there exists a strong suspicion. While framing charge in terms of Section 227 of the Code, the court must consider the entire materials on record to form an opinion that the evidence if unrebutted would lead to a judgment of conviction.
Punjab-Haryana High Court Cites 14 - Cited by 4 - A Lamba - Full Document

Zal Balsara vs State Of Delhi And Ors. on 25 February, 2008

In support of this submission, reliance was placed on the Supreme Court decision in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ram Kishan Rastogi . It was a case under the Prevision of Food Adulteration Act. In that case the Manager (accused No. 2) and all the directors (accused Nos. 4 to 7) were charged. The complaint against the Manager was upheld looking into the nature of his duties and the complaint against the directors was quashed observing that if during the trial some evidence comes on record, cognizance could be taken against the directors as well under Section 319 CrPC. Each case depends upon its own facts. Here, in reply to the notice served upon them by the Insecticide Inspector before filing of the complaint, petitioners did not take any stand as to who was responsible for the conduct of business of the company (petitioner No. 1). This fact is especially within their knowledge and the onus to prove the same would lie upon them after the initial burden is discharged by the prosecution that the sale was effected by the company as provided by Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act. Even in the petition before this Court it is not stated as to who was responsible for the conduct of business of petitioner No. 1. Petitioner No. 2 has not yet appeared before the trial court. In view of the same, I do not find any merit in this contention and reject the same.

Mukesh Rani vs State Of Haryana And Others on 26 August, 2013

In this context, reference can be made to the judgments of Hon'ble the Supreme Court of India in Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Ram Krishan Rastogi, 1983(1) RCR, (Criminal) 73, Micheal @ Machado and another Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation and another, 2000(2) RCR (Criminal) 75, Sarabjit Singh and another Vs. State of Punjab, 2009(3) RCR (Criminal), 388.
Punjab-Haryana High Court Cites 9 - Cited by 1 - R Mittal - Full Document

Pratap Narayan vs The State Of U.P on 22 September, 2010

I have given thoughtful consideration to the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Additional Government Advocate for the State as well as gone through the impugned order. The learned Additional Sessions Judge in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Sarvjeet Singh and Ors. Vs. State of Punjab reported in [2009 (3) JIC 522 (SC)], Lal Suraj @ Suraj Singh and Ors. Vs. State of Jharkhand reported in [2009 (2) JIC 793 (SC)] and Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Ram Kishan Rastogi reported in [1983 (1) SCC 1] was of the opinion that the accused can be summoned under Section 319 of the Code only when their involvement in commission of the offence is established and there is most likelihood of their conviction. The learned Additional Sessions Judge keeping in view the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court as referred above has held that on the basis of evidence led by the prosecution, the only allegation against the accused-Vivek Kumar Singh who is to be summoned is that he had instigated the main accused i.e., the husband of the deceased to make demand of dowry but there is no allegation in the First Information Report that he has ever made any demand of dowry and he had put the deceased to harassment and torture. As regards, the accused Dharmendra Veer Vikaram Singh and Smt. Baby who are brother and sister-in-law (bhabhi) of the deceased, they were living separate. Dharmendra Veer Vikram Singh was serving as constable in Lucknow while Smt. Baby was living in Hardoi, therefore, their involvement too is not established.
Allahabad High Court Cites 6 - Cited by 0 - R M Chauhan - Full Document
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