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Prantosh Sinha vs State Of West Bengal & Ors. on 15 March, 2000

However, emphasis was given on the observations of the Supreme Court in paragraph 28 of Its Judgment in the case of Guppapalli Nageswara Rao v. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, and also on the observations made by the Supreme Court in paragraph 8 of Its judgment in the case of GuIlappalH Nageswara Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh, . In the earlier observation the Supreme Court clarified that since quasi-Judicial act is not wholly Judicial, by the Rules, the Governor is authorised to make, he can regulate his own acts as well as the acts of his subordinates in relation thereto. By section 15(2) of the Act the State Government has not been vested with any quasi-judicial power. Pure judicial power has been vested in the authority and the Governor or the State Government has been authorised to prescribe such authority. It Is, therefore, a power to nominate. The statute, however, says that such nomination must be made by rules. In that matter of making such rules or in the matter of nominating such appellate authority, the Governor of the Slate does not exercise any quasi-Judicial authority. The later observation is confined to hearing given by a governmental authority, in support of the objections the Government had Invited in exercise of a power vested on the Government by a Statute. Those observations throw no light to answer the questions involved in this case.
Calcutta High Court Cites 20 - Cited by 1 - B Ghosh - Full Document

New Ushanagar Co-Operative Housing ... vs Maharashtra Electricity Regulatory ... on 15 March, 2019

APPEAL NO. 50 OF 2017 6.3 Learned counsel to substantiate his submissions relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in (a) Gullapalli Nageswara Rao & Ors v. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, 1959 Supp (1) SCR 319 and (b) Union of India v. Shiv Raj and Others, (2014) 6 SCC 564. In case (a) it was held that "If one person hears and another decides, then personal hearing becomes an empty formality. We therefore hold that the said procedure followed in this case also offends another basic principle of judicial procedure." The relevant extract in case (b) is reproduced as under:-
Appellate Tribunal For Electricity Cites 27 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

M/S.Kamachi Sponge & vs The District Collector on 7 February, 2019

The object of hearing arguments is to give an opportunity to a party to satisfy the Tribunal about the case set up by that party and to explain any adverse facts which may emerge on the record. The doubts entertained by the Tribunal can be expressed to the party and an attempt can be made by the party concerned or his counsel to resolve those doubts. In case doubts expressed by the Presiding Officer of a Tribunal are resolved, but he leaves the matter without a decision, his successor can adjudicate upon the matter fairly only if he puts his doubts to the party against whom he decides the matter. For this purpose it is essential that the successor must hear the arguments afresh. Any other view would render the hearing of arguments an empty formality and a mere farce. I may in this context refer to the following observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Gullapalli Nageswara Rao Vs. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, AIR 1959 SC 308:
Madras High Court Cites 14 - Cited by 0 - M Venugopal - Full Document

Dosa Satyanarayanamurty Etc. vs The Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport ... on 8 September, 1960

17. Re. (4) : by the next contention the learned counsel attacks the validity of the scheme on the ground that the Government is actuated by bias against the private operators of buses in West Godavari District, and indeed had predetermined the issue. In the petitions it was alleged that the Government had complete control over the Road Transport Corporation, that the entire administration and control over such road transport undertaking vested in the Government, that the Chief Secretary to the Government of Andhra Pradesh was its chairman and that, therefore, the entire scheme, from its inception to its final approval, was really the act of the Government. On this hypothesis it was contended that the Government itself was made a judge in its own cause and that, therefore, its decision was vitiated by legal basis. That apart, it was also pleaded that a sub-committee, consisting of Ministers, Secretaries and officers of connected departments and presided over by the Minister in charge of transport decided in its meeting of January 28, 1960, that under the scheme of nationalization of bus service, the State Government would take over the bus services in West Godavari District and Guntur District before the end of that year and, therefore, the Minister in charge of the portfolio of transport, he having predetermined the issue, disqualified himself to decide the dispute between the State Transport Undertaking the petitioners. The self same questions were raised in Gullapalli Nageswara Rao v. The State of Andhra Pradesh . There, as in this case, it was contended that the Chief Minister, who was in charge of the portfolio of transport, could not be a judge in his own cause, as he was biased against the private operators. This Court pointed out the distinction between official bias of an authority which is inherent in a statutory duty imposed on it and personal bias of the said authority in favour of, or against, one of the parties. In dealing with official bias this Court, after considering the relevant English decisions, observed at p. 587 thus :
Supreme Court of India Cites 23 - Cited by 5 - Full Document

Saraswati Education Societys ... vs All India Council For Technical ... on 14 August, 2015

(See Rasid Javed & Ors. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & 23 24 Anr. and Gullapalli Nageswara Rao Vs. A.P . SRTC ) In the present cases, prima-facie, it appears that authorities/ bodies, invoked their respective powers at different stages and ultimately the impugned orders were passed against the Petitioners without giving proper and reasonable opportunity, in breach of the principles of natural justice as well as the respective provisions/ procedures declared by AICTE.
Bombay High Court Cites 34 - Cited by 5 - A V Mohta - Full Document

Godfrey Philips India Limited, A ... vs The Director, Mandi Parishad And Krishi ... on 29 April, 2005

45. The breach of principle of natural justice was upheld on the ground that the person who gave hearing was himself party to the dispute The above judgment does not help the petitioner in this case since the Director who decided the dispute in the present case cannot be said to be party to the dispute before him. It is relevant to rote the second judgment of Gullappalli Naqeshwar Rao and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. reported in A.I.R.1959 Supreme Court 1376.
Allahabad High Court Cites 116 - Cited by 2 - A Bhushan - Full Document
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