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Mohanan.P. & Another vs Food Inspector &Another on 25 November, 2021

9. Coming to the facts of the present case, Ext.P10 would show that the method of analysis as per which the public analyst has found synthetic food colour "tartrazine" is present in the sample is ISI method. The sampling was done on 23/9/2004 and the analysis was done on 15/10/2004. There is no case for the prosecution that the ISI method is a method defined as per the provisions of the Act as on the date of sample or on the date of analysis. For the reasons stated above, I hold that the dictum laid down by the Apex court in Pepsico's case (supra), followed by the learned single Judge of this court in Gopalakrishnan (supra) and the Division Bench of this Court in Rasheed (supra) are squarely applicable to the facts of the case inasmuch as the laboratories are not defined for the analysis by the public analyst and the methods of analysis were not thus defined. Thus, the argument of the learned counsel for the revision petitioners that Ext.P10 cannot be relied on is only to be accepted. Hence, the impugned judgments convicting and sentencing the accused under Section 16(1-A)(i) read with Sections 2(ia)(j) and 7 (i)(v) of the PFA Act and Rule 29 of the PFA Rules based on Ext.P10 cannot be sustained. The accused are entitled for acquittal.
Kerala High Court Cites 9 - Cited by 0 - K Edappagath - Full Document

Kanan Devan Hills Plantations Company ... vs State Of Kerala

3.As noticed hereinbefore, in this case, the proceedings were instituted by filing the complaint by the Food Inspector Alappuzha Circle alleging commission of offence under section 16 (1-A) (ii) read with section 2(i-a)(b), 7(i)(v) Rule 5 Appendix-B A-14 of PFA Act. The allegation against the accused is that on 31.7.2009, the predecessor in office of the complainant conducted an inspection of shop VI/72 of Purakadu Panchayat and purchased tea dust under a mahazar and on compliance with the legal formalities, one of the samples was sent for analysis to Government Analytical Laboratory, Thiruvananthapuram. The result would reveal the presence of iron Crl.R.P.152/15 3 filings not less than 257.6 ppm and based on the same, it was opined that the food article is adulterated. Paragraph 6 of the impugned order would reveal that the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Pepsico India Holdings (P) Ltd v. Food Inspector [2010 (4) KLT 706 SC] and the decision in Gopalakrishnan's case (supra) were considered by the learned Magistrate. It was found that the Hon'ble Apex Court held that non-formulation of the rules under section 23(1A) (ee) and (hh) is fatal to the prosecution and in such circumstances when tolerance limit of presence of pesticide was not prescribed in regard to sweetened carbonated water no fruitful purpose could be served by sending company's sample to forensic laboratory. The learned Magistrate found that subsequently notification was issued and rules were promulgated for implementing the mandate of the statutory provisions under section 23(1A) (ee) and (hh) of the PFA Act and in such circumstances, the opinion of the public analyst stands confirmed by the analysis conducted at Central Food Laboratory. I do not think it necessary to look into the correctness of the findings of the learned Crl.R.P.152/15 4 Magistrate at this stage as the trial is going on. That apart, a mere glance at the provisions under section 245 Cr.P.C would reveal that it empowers the learned Magistrate to discharge an accused if, upon taking all the evidence referred to in section 244 he considers, for reasons to be recorded, that no case against the accused has been made out which, if unrebutted, would warrant conviction of the accused. Taking into account the contentions of the petitioners, a report was called for, from the Court of Judicial First class Magistrate, Ambalappuzha. The report furnished by the learned Magistrate would reveal that earlier, to be precise on 9.1.2013, PW1 was examined and Exts.P1, P1(a) and P2 to P8 were marked as part of the enquiry under section 245, Cr.P.C and on 9.5.2013, after preliminary hearing charge was framed against all the accused under section 246, Cr.P.C. and it was read over and explained to all of them and they pleaded not guilty. The report would further reveal that PW1 was recalled and he was examined on 29.9.2014. It was then that the aforementioned CMP was filed seeking their discharge. After dismissing the petition Crl.R.P.152/15 5 as per the impugned order, the case is now posted to 18.2.2015 for examination of the remaining witnesses. It is thus evident that in this case, the evidence of the prosecution as referred to in section 244 was already taken and it was thereafter that charge was framed against the accused under section 246, Cr.P.C.. As part of the procedure prescribed thereunder PW1 was recalled and was virtually cross- examined and the remaining witnesses are yet to be cross examined. Going by section 247, Cr.P.C after following the procedure under section 246, Cr.P.C the revision petitioner/accused shall be called upon to enter upon his defence and needless to say that if he produces his evidence, then the provision of section 243, Cr.P.C shall have to be applied. When once a charge was framed in terms of the provisions under section 248, Cr.P.C. the Magistrate has to enter into a finding as to the guilt of the accused and then he shall be acquitted or convicted according to such finding, in accordance with law. From the facts and circumstances obtained thus, it cannot be said that the case on hand is groundless and the petitioners have to be discharged. When the Crl.R.P.152/15 6 charge was framed and PW1 was examined this Court will not be justified to go into a roving enquiry and now, it is for the revision petitioners to decide whether they should seek for recalling the remaining witnesses and to cross-examine them. As regards the trial court now, it has to follow the procedure under sections 246 to 248, Cr.P.C.. Though the petitioners attempted to canvass the position that the case is groundless they have failed to establish the same and in view of the aforesaid circumstances I am of the considered view that now, the procedures contemplated under sections 246 and 249 have to be followed. The learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the petitioners could not produce Annexure- A4 before the learned Magistrate along with the petition for discharge. According to the petitioners, in the light of Annexure-A4, no prosecution against the petitioners is possible and permissible in the facts and circumstances. The court below could not be found fault in not looking into those documents as admittedly the said document was not produced and no contention based on the same was raised before the trial court for Crl.R.P.152/15 7 consideration. The facts expatiated above would reveal that no interference is possible and permissible in the circumstances and certainly, it will be open to the petitioners to bring Annexure-A4 to the notice of the court appropriately at the appropriate stage and to adduce evidence in defence. In such circumstances, this revision petition is dismissed without prejudice to the right of the petitioners to seek for recalling of witnesses and to adduce evidence, in accordance with law.

M. Narayana Pillai vs State Of Kerala

In the decision of this Court in Gopalakrishnan v. Food Inspector [2013 (3) KLT 455], the court relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Pepsico India Holdings (supra) and found that the Public Analyst's report was not admissible in evidence and accordingly, the Court acquitted the accused. The Crl.R.P.3158/2006 : 5 : matter was referred to a Division Bench and the Division Bench also affirmed the said decision, submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Public Prosecutor.
Kerala High Court Cites 7 - Cited by 0 - B P Kumar - Full Document

M.A.Majeed vs Joseph Shaji George on 25 September, 2025

9. Therefore, I hold that the dictum laid down by the Apex court in Pepsico's case (supra), followed by the learned single Judge of this court in Gopalakrishnan (supra) and the Division Bench of this Court in Rasheed (supra) are squarely applicable to the facts of the case inasmuch as the laboratories are not defined for the analysis by the public analyst and the methods of analysis were not thus defined. Thus, the argument of the learned counsel for the revision petitioner that Ext.P13 cannot be relied on is only to be accepted. Hence, the impugned judgments convicting and sentencing the accused under Section 16(1)(a)(ii) of the PFA Act based on Ext.P13 cannot be sustained. The accused is entitled for acquittal.
Kerala High Court Cites 7 - Cited by 0 - K Edappagath - Full Document
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