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Documents citing The Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Bihar & ... vs Maharaja Pratapsingh Bahadur Of ... on 29 November, 1960

Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Madras vs S. Raman Chettiar on 27 October, 1964

These observations certainly show that this Court assumed that fresh notices could have been issued in that case. Mr. Sastri says that the Department has done exactly what the Supreme Court indicated in that case should be done. But, apart from the fact that there is no discussion on the question of the validity of the return, it is possible to say that on the facts in that case fresh notices could have been issued. In Maharajah Pratap Singh, s(2) case, the Maharajah had filed returns for four assessment years 1944- 45 to 1947-48 under s. 22, and assessments had been made but the income of the assessee with regard to interest on arrears of rent was not included. His returns in pursuance to a notice under s. 34 could not be treated as a return under s. 22(3) because he had already filed returns and was not purporting to revise his previous returns.
Supreme Court of India Cites 14 - Cited by 73 - S M Sikri - Full Document

Mittal Roadways Pvt.Ltd., vs Assistant Commissioner Of Income Tax, on 4 March, 2021

There is however no gainsaying that the time constraint, as stated in the 'approval' itself, is the reason for its grant in the manner it has, so that this aspect becomes, even as in Maharaja Pratap Singh Bahadur (supra), academic. In fact, this fact itself, i.e., the grant of approval so as to circumvent the time limitation for assessment, is itself reason enough to invalidate the approval. The impugned assessments are, subject of course to the fulfillment of the other pre-requisite conditions of the provision, non-est in law.
Income Tax Appellate Tribunal - Jabalpur Cites 38 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Shri Pawan Kumar , Mittal, vs Assistant Commissioner Of Income Tax, on 4 March, 2021

There is however no gainsaying that the time constraint, as stated in the 'approval' itself, is the reason for its grant in the manner it has, so that this aspect becomes, even as in Maharaja Pratap Singh Bahadur (supra), academic. In fact, this fact itself, i.e., the grant of approval so as to circumvent the time limitation for assessment, is itself reason enough to invalidate the approval. The impugned assessments are, subject of course to the fulfillment of the other pre-requisite conditions of the provision, non-est in law.
Income Tax Appellate Tribunal - Jabalpur Cites 32 - Cited by 4 - Full Document

Assistant Commissioner Of Income Tax, vs Shri C.R Mittal & Sons (Huf), on 15 March, 2021

There is however no gainsaying that the time constraint, as stated in the 'approval' itself, is the reason for its grant in the manner it has, so that this aspect becomes, even as in Maharaja Pratap Singh Bahadur (supra), academic. In fact, this fact itself, i.e., the grant of approval so as to circumvent the time limitation for assessment, is itself reason enough to invalidate the approval. The impugned assessments are, subject of course to the fulfillment of the other pre-requisite conditions of the provision, non-est in law.
Income Tax Appellate Tribunal - Jabalpur Cites 40 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Dalmia Dairy Industries Ltd. vs Income-Tax Officer on 30 April, 1987

Though for the Revenue we were referred to the judgment of the Hon'ble Rajasthan High Court in the case of CIT v. Pratapsingh [1987] 164 ITR 431 for the proposition that Tribunal has power to permit new ground to be raised before it, even if the same has the effect of enhancement but in the present case, the request is to restore the matter to the assessing officer or the CIT (Appeals) and that is how it is the judgment in the case of Rai Bahadur Hardutroy Motilal Chamaria (supra) which would be applicable.
Income Tax Appellate Tribunal - Delhi Cites 36 - Cited by 4 - Full Document

Merit Enterprises vs Dy. Commissioner Of Income Tax on 26 April, 2006

Having held so, we examine as to whether the proviso to Section 4(1) and/or Section l58BA(2) enables levy of surcharge answer, in our considered opinion, is in the affirmative. It is well settled that 'income-tax' includes 'surcharge' which is a receipt in the nature of additional income-tax, as held in the case of CIT, Bihar and Orissa v. Maharaja Pratapsingh Bahadur of Gidhaur 41 ITR 421 (SC). The assessee's argument that the term "tax" has been defined under Section 2(43) and that it includes only income-tax and super-tax and not surcharge, is against the proposition laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, as surcharge has been interpreted as nothing but additional income-tax. The only requirement is that the levy should have been under the Income-tax Act itself as there is no reference to any Central Act in this proviso or in Section 158BA(2). Thus, the argument that Section 158BA(2) and the proviso to Section 4(1) are charging provisions in a block assessment and as they do not refer to surcharge but only to tax, the same cannot be levied under the Income-tax Act, cannot be accepted. At the same time, we find that for the period under consideration, the Income Tax Act prescribes only 60% rate of tax on block assessments, but it does not authorise levy of surcharge. As there is no reference to the Central Act either in Section 158BA(2) or in the proviso to Section 4(1), the question of any Central Act prescribing the levy of surcharge under these charging provisions does not arise. The Finance Act has to be examined de hors these two charging sections of the Income-tax Act, to find out as to whether it levies independently surcharge on undisclosed income of a block period by having an independent and distinct charging section. The charging section in the Finance Act does not authorise the levy in the Finance Act.
Income Tax Appellate Tribunal - Hyderabad Cites 157 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

Income-Tax Officer vs Reno Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals And ... on 28 July, 1984

The other Supreme Court case, namely, CIT v. Maharaja Pratap Singh Bahadur AIR 1961 SC 1927, which, according to the counsel, is nearest to the facts of his client's case, is obviously distinguishable inasmuch as it was held in that case that the notices reopening the assessments were ab initio void and, therefore, the assessments made on that basis had to be held null and void. The other submission, including reliance on some other decisions, does not really improve the position.
Income Tax Appellate Tribunal - Mumbai Cites 23 - Cited by 11 - Full Document
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