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Documents citing Sri Sri Sridhar Jiew And Another vs Income-Tax Officer, District Ii(I), ... on 17 September, 1965

Official Trustee Of West Bengal vs Commissioner Of Income-Tax, West ... on 4 January, 1966

I now come to the last question, namely, as to whether Thakur Radhagobind Jew is liable to assessment under the Indian Income-tax Act. The question may be put in another way, namely, as to whether a Hindu deity is liable to assessment under the Indian Income-tax Act. This question was sided over by P. B. Mukharji J. - Commissioner of Income-tax Act v. Jogendra Nath Naskar and Hem Chandra Naskar, - and my decision in Sri Sri Sridhar Jiew v. Income-tax Officer, District II (I). Mr. Mitter has formulated his argument in the following way : The charging section in the Income-tax shall be charged in respect of the total income of the previous year of every individual, Hindu undivided family, company, and local authority, and of every firm and other associations of persons or the partners of the firm or the members of the association individually. The only heading under which a Hindu deity can be assessed is the an "individual" The question is whether a Hindu deity can be called an "individual". Mr. Mitter has argued and this argument finds support from the authorities as well as the text-book writers that under the Hindu law, when property is dedicated to a deity a Hindu deity not being a sentient being, cannot hold and enjoy property like a human being, In this sense, the deity cannot be a beneficiary. On the other hand, it has been repeatedly pointed out that it is a mistake to equate a Hindu deity with a sentient being. According to Hindu notions, although a deity cannot hold property or enjoy the same like a human being, it does so in a ideal sense. In the ideal sense, it no only can hold property and enjoy the income, but its seva and puja consist of operations as if is was a human being. It is fed and made to sleep and is washed and clothed as if it was a sentient being. It is fed and made to sleep and is washed and clothed as if it was sentient being. The benefit, in fact, enures to the shebait and the worshippers but that is fiction that has been introduced in the Hindu law and must be kept in mind. Mr. Mitter has taken us to the philosophical aspect of Hindu endowments. He argues that an "individual" must be a person under section 3. The Hindu concept of God is that of an infinite being. He points out that in the ekrarnama and the postcript mention is made of Shri Shri Iswar and not Radhagobind Jew. Even this philosophical conception does not destroy the proposition mentioned above. The law of Hindu endowments recognised that God is infinite and, in its spiritual embodiment, can neither hold from nor substance nor is it capable of enjoyment of mundane properties. Nevertheless, it is permissible for Hindus to see the infinite in a finite form. In other words, a Hindu recognised divinity in a finite form which ultimately progressed into and dissolved itself in the infinite. There is, therefore, no conflict in conceiving the infinite in a finite form and to attribute to the infinite a capacity to enjoy mundane properties. This is why the word "individual" in section 3 should not be taken to mean only human beings.
Calcutta High Court Cites 31 - Cited by 3 - Full Document

Vanditbhai Rajendrakumar Patel, ... vs The Ito, Ward-3, Mehsana on 22 April, 2022

In the case of Sridhar Sahoo v. ITO [2017] 88 taxmann.com 881 (Cuttack - Trib.) the assessee was maintaining a saving bank account in joint name with his wife. In said bank account, certain cash was found deposited to which assessee explained that said amount was deposited by his wife by taking advance from 20 persons. Said 20 persons duly appeared before the Assessing Officer, affirmed the fact of advancing money in question to the wife of the assessee not only by way of affidavits but also in the statements given before the Assessing Officer and they also produced before the Assessing Officer the evidence of owning agricultural lands by them wherefrom agricultural income was earned out of which money in question was advanced. The Assessing Officer could not bring any positive material on record to show that from agricultural land possessed by the creditors, they could not have earned so much of agricultural income out of which amount in question could not be advanced by them.
Income Tax Appellate Tribunal - Ahmedabad Cites 12 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Income-Tax Officer vs Vinayaka Agencies on 8 August, 1989

In that decision the Calcutta High Court approvedly quoted a still older decision of the same High Court in the case of Sri Sri Sridhar Jiew v. ITO [1967] 63 ITR 192 where a Division Bench held that a Hindu Deity was a juristic person capable of having property and acting through shebait. The shebait can hold the property, realise the income and look after the estate of the Deity and do all acts in connection therewith. In that case a Hindu Deity was recognised as an 'individual' within the meaning of Section 3 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. Their Lordships of the Calcutta High Court realised the distinction between the word 'individual' used in the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 on one hand and the word 'person' used in the Income-tax Act, 1961 on the other. Keeping that distinction in view their Lordships held that it is only in an ideal sense that a property belongs to an idol. But the management of the property of an idol in its entirety is entrusted with the Manager or shebait with certain limitations and restrictions.
Income Tax Appellate Tribunal - Hyderabad Cites 14 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Educational Trust Fund vs Income-Tax Officer on 26 November, 1984

Next, they considered whether the beneficiaries under the trust deed can be considered to be within the definition of the word 'individual'. The Bench held that the word 'individual' was not defined under the Act but the ambit of the word 'individual' takes in a group of persons forming a unit. For instance, a corporation created by statute, viz., a university, a bar council or the trustee of a baronetcy trust, can as well be considered as an individual. They relied upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in CIT v. Sodra Devi [1957] 32 ITR 615 and Sri Sridhar Jiew v. ITO [1967] 63 ITR 192 (Cal.). Having regard to the wide amplitude of the word 'individual', as explained by the Supreme Court in the abovesaid cases, the Madras Bench came ultimately to the conclusion that the correct status of the three assessees in the cases before them, in respect of whom undisputably tax had been levied at the rate of 65 per cent by virtue of Clause (ii) of Section 164(1) is individual.
Income Tax Appellate Tribunal - Hyderabad Cites 29 - Cited by 6 - Full Document

State Bank Of Travancore Employees ... vs Wealth-Tax Officer on 24 March, 1984

It is to be noted that in the decision in Sri Sri Sridhar Jiew v. ITO [1967] 63 ITR 192 (Cal,), which no doubt was a decision under the 1922 Act, it has been held that the word 'individual' includes a Hindu deity who is a juristic person and that the word 'individual' does not, according to the Supreme Court decision in Sodra Devi's case (supra), necessarily refer to a human being.
Income Tax Appellate Tribunal - Madras Cites 26 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Gopal Srinivasan Trust, Mahesh Venu ... vs Income-Tax Officer on 6 July, 1982

(See the decisions in CIT v. Sodra Devi [1957] 31 ITR 615, Sri Sri Sridhar Jiew v. ITO [1967] 63 ITR 192, etc.) We, therefore, hold that the correct status of the three assessees in this case in respect of whom undisputedly tax has been levied at the rate of 65 per cent by virtue of Clause (ii) of Section 164(1) is 'individual'. Since an assessee with the status of 'individual' is entitled to a relief under Section 80L, it must follow that each of the three assessees in the present case is entitled to the relief according to Section 80L. We must make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion of finding in a case where the revenue has adopted the status of 'an association of persons" by reference to Clause (i) of Section 164(1) under the option available to it (sic), because as we have already pointed out, in the present case, the revenue has adopted the alternative flat rate of 65 per cent. It is possible that even in the case of the same assessee the revenue may find it necessary in some of the years to adopt the rate provided by the option in Clause (i), in which case different considerations may arise and possibly the revenue's stand may be vindicated having regard to the concession made by the learned counsel that the association of persons contemplated by the provisions of Section 80L(3) is one made up of husband and wife governed by the community of interest as stated therein.
Income Tax Appellate Tribunal - Madras Cites 13 - Cited by 5 - Full Document

Commissioner Of Income-Tax vs Tapang Light Foundry And Co. on 29 November, 1982

7. Reference was also made to the observations of this court in the case of Sri Sri Sridhar Jiew v. ITO, [1967] 63 ITR 192 (Cal), where a Division Bench of this court held that a Hindu deity was a juristic person capable of having property and acted through the shebait, who held the property, realised the income and looked after the estate of the deity and did all acts in connection therewith. A Hindu deity was, therefore, included in the word " individual" in Section 3 of the Indian I.T. Act, 1922, and was liable to be assessed to income-tax as an individual under the said Act. We may incidentally mention that there has been a slight alteration in the terminology and now the expression is " person " and not " individual". It must be emphasised that it is only in the ideal sense that a property belongs to an idol but the management of the property in entirety is entrusted with the manager or shebait with certain limitations or restrictions. In that case, it was also emphasised by the Division Bench of this court that the word " trustee " in Section 41(1) of the said Act had been used in the larger sense and would include the shebait of a Hindu deity, and the view that the Indian I.T. Act, 1922, did not provide a machinery for the assessment of, or realising the tax from, a Hindu deity was not correct. It was, according to the Division Bench, competent for a shebait to sign a form of the return on behalf of the deity. Such signature should be taken to be the signature of the deity, who could hold property and receive income but who could not be equated with an ordinary human being. In expressly including a juristic person within the net of taxation and in amending the form of return, the 1961 Act had done nothing but had made clear what was always the law.
Calcutta High Court Cites 26 - Cited by 2 - S Mukharji - Full Document

M.P. Road Development Corporation ... vs Assessee on 11 January, 2010

The Hon'ble Calcutta High Court in Sri Sri Sridhar Jiew vs. ITO (63 ITR 192) held that the concept of a Hindu deity is such that it must be taken that the signature of the shebait is the signature of the deity itself. Even otherwise, there is no specific requirement under the Act for signing the application u/s 12A/12AA that it can only be signed by the Chairman. Since the CEO, being statutorily appointed secretary of the IDA, is a "Principal Officer", therefore, very much competent to sign and file an application for registration u/s 12A/12AA on behalf of the IDA, hence, such application, signed by the CEO, cannot be treated as invalid. CEO, appointed u/s 46 of Madhya Pradesh Nagar Tatha Gram Nivesh Adhiniyam, 1993, being the secretary of the IDA, is the Principal Officer of the IDA within the meaning of sec. 2 (35) of the I.T. Act, 1962 and as such, CEO is competent to sign an application for and on behalf of IDA. We have already discussed the position of CEO qua IDA in para no.14 (supra) of this order wherein CEO is appointed by state govt. u/s 46(2) from amongst the members of Development Authority Services belonging to state cadre or from amongst the members of the state technical/administrative services and such CEO is appointed by virtue of sec. 40 (h) of the said Act. Since CEO is statutorily appointed secretary of IDA, he is a "Principal Officer", the requirement of sec. 2(35) of the I.T. Act is fulfilled. Even otherwise, the department has assessed IDA as local authority except for exemption u/s 10(20) of the Act. The mode of making an application is prescribed in Rule 17A, according to which, an application for registration shall be made in Form 10A. Section 12A/12AA does not 25 prescribe any mode of signing the application. Under these circumstances, one may refer to the provisions for signing of return enjoined u/s 140 of the Act. As mentioned earlier, the returns signed by the CEO were duly assessed and accepted by the department, therefore, for signing application u/s 12A/12AA by a person/authority who is competent to sign a return of such authority cannot be said to be invalid. Moreover, the Chairman of IDA has specifically authorized the CEO to take necessary/appropriate steps towards application for registration u/s 12A/12AA which would naturally include signing of prescribed form (Refer copy of note-sheet for such authorization page 264 of compilation), therefore, the order of the ld. CIT dismissing the application as invalid, on this ground, is not justified. During hearing, an alternative plea was raised by the ld. Counsel for the assessee that for curable defect, if any, a duly signed application by the Chairman (page 265 of the compilation) was filed by the assessee during the course of proceedings itself, therefore, the defect was cured and such application should have been treated as date back to the original application, therefore, this ground of the assessee is allowed.
Income Tax Appellate Tribunal - Indore Cites 125 - Cited by 0 - Full Document
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