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Sri.V.Krishna Reddy vs Sri. B.Devaraj on 19 March, 2020

26. It is also relevant here to mention that, whether the finger print or hand writing expert is required special study of subject or shall acquire special experience on the subject or an expert must be skilled and has adequate knowledge of the subject to give opinion on particular subject or not, this principles of law laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court in a decisions reported in AIR 1977 SC 1694 in the case of Laxmichand Khajuria and others Vs. Smt. Ishroo Devi and in AIR 1999 SC 3138 in the case of State of Himachala Pradesh Vs. Jailal and others.
Bangalore District Court Cites 32 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Sri.Kondappa.K.V vs Sri. G. Rajanna on 5 February, 2020

18. It is also relevant here to mention that, whether the finger print or hand writing expert is required special study of subject or shall acquire special experience on the subject or an expert must be skilled and has adequate knowledge of the subject to give opinion on particular subject or not, this principles of law laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court in a decisions reported in AIR 1977 SC 1694 in the case of Laxmichand Khajuria and others Vs. Smt. Ishroo Devi and in AIR 1999 SC 3138 in the case of State of Himachala Pradesh Vs. Jailal and others.
Bangalore District Court Cites 26 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

B. Ramaswamy (Huf) vs Income-Tax Officer on 30 September, 1988

The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Lakshmi Chand Khajuria v. Smt. Ishroo Devi AIR 1977 SO 1694 at p. 1699 considered whether a mother is entitled to a share of partition of a Mitakshara joint family governed by Southern School of Mitak-shara Law or not. In that case their Lordships of the Supreme Court, held that in Madras though Mitakshara Law is applicable it has been held that on a partition between sons and the father, the mother is not entitled to any share.
Income Tax Appellate Tribunal - Hyderabad Cites 11 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Controller Of Estate Duty vs Smt. Geetaben Vipinbhai Shah on 7 May, 2003

(See : Mayne's Hindu Law, 11th Edition, page 534 paragraph 434, referred to in para 14 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Lakshmi Chand Khajuria v. Smt. Ishroo Devi AIR 1977 SC 1694). In Mullah's Hindu Law, 17th Edition, it is noted in paragraph 315, on the basis of judicial pronouncements, that, a wife cannot herself demand a partition, but if a partition does take place between her husband and his sons, she is entitled (except in Southern India) to receive a share equal to that of a son and to hold and enjoy that share separately even from her husband. In paragraph 317, after referring to a paternal grandmothers entitlement to share when partition takes place at the end of the paragraph it is stated that : "No female except those mentioned in paragraphs 315 and 317 is entitled to a share on partition. Thus daughter, sisters etc. are not entitled to a share on partition. However, on a partition provision must be made for their maintenance and marriage expenses".
Gujarat High Court Cites 17 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Controller Of Estate Duty vs Smt. Geetaben Vipinbhai Shah on 7 May, 2003

(See: Mayne's Hindu Law, 11th Edition, page 534 paragraph 434, referred to in para 14 of the judgement of the Supreme Court in Lakshmi Chand Vs. Ishroo Devi AIR 1977 SC 1694). In Mulla's Hindu Law, 17th Edition, it is noted in paragraph 315, on the basis of judicial pronouncements, that, a wife cannot herself demand a partition, but if a partition does take place between her husband and his sons, she is entitled (except in Southern India) to receive a share equal to that of a son and to hold and enjoy that share separately even from her husband. In paragraph 317, after referring to a paternal grandmother's entitlement to share when partition takes place at the end of the paragraph it is stated that: "No female except those mentioned in paragraphs 315 to 317 is entitled to a share on partition. Thus daughter, sisters etc. are not entitled to a share on partition. However, on a partition provision must be made for their maintenance and marriage expenses".
Gujarat High Court Cites 19 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Devisingh S/O Balaramsingh ... vs Smt. Shailabai Wd/O Rajendrasingh ... on 24 April, 1994

32. It may then be seen that when Jagdishsingh, the son of the deceased Rajendrasingh died, Hindu Succession Act, 1956 had come into force. Section 6 of the said Act envisages devolution of interest in coparcenery property of a male Hindu who dies after the commencement of the said Act. Explanation 1 to said section 6 provides for determination of his interest in the coparcenery property at the time of his death. According to it, his interest in the coparcenery property is deemed to be his share in the said property which would have been allotted to him, had the partition of the property taken place immediately before his death. It is further necessary to see that when the notional partition takes place amongst the coparceners i.e. between the deceased Rajendrasingh and his son Jagjitsingh, the plaintiff would get share equal to the share of her son Jagjitsingh, although she may not have right to claim partition (see para 14 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Lakshmi Chand v. Ishroo Devi, . Thus, in the property allotted to the deceased Rajendrasingh in the family partition on 1-10-1952, the deceased Rajendrasingh, his son Jagjitsingh and the plaintiff i.e. the wife of Rajendrasingh had equal shares i.e. 1/3rd each. On death of Jagjitsingh on 11-7-1979, his 1/3rd share would devolve on the plaintiff i.e. his mother being his only Class-I heir under the Schedule to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 as per the proviso to section 6 of the said Act.
Bombay High Court Cites 28 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

Smt. P.N. Wankudre vs C.S. Wankudre And Ors. on 9 January, 2002

23. The Memorandum of 4th May, 1953 gave a life interest in respect of the said plot to Savitribat after which the same was to go the three sons in equal shares. Thus the Memorandum of 4th May, 1953 did not grant the plot to Savitribai absolutely. The judgment of the Supreme Court would therefore, be inapplicable to the facts of this case so far as the Memorandum of 4th May, 1953 is concerned. Thereafter the three sons i.e. Including the Appellant's husband were free to deal with the said plot. They did so by the agreement of 8th Oct. 1959. Mr Walawalkar was unable to show any impediment in the rights of the three sons to do so. In this view of the matter, it is really unnecessary for me to deal with the Judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Lakshimi Chand Khajuria v. Smt. Ishroo Devi reported In cited by Mr. Kumbhakoni, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondents.
Bombay High Court Cites 5 - Cited by 11 - S J Vazifdar - Full Document

Basappa Mallappa Sonnad vs Bhagawwa on 2 February, 1989

The thrust of the argument, founded on the said observations, before us was that unless actual partition look place by metes and bounds, the 1st plaintiff could not independently claim 2/3rd share at the notional partition which is contemplated under Explanation-1 to Section 6 of the Act Similarly, he drew our attention to the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of LAKSHMI CHAND KHAJURIA AND ORS. v. SMT. ISHROO DEVI . That was a case arising out of Jammu and Kashmir Hindu Succession Act. What fell for consideration under Section 27 of that Act which provided for was testamentary succession of the undivided interest of the coparcener. After referring to a number of earlier decisions of the various High Courts," Their Lordships observed that right of a wife under the Customary Hindu Law of Mitakshara School in areas other than Madras Province (meaning, Southern India) to include erstwhile Madras Province, (part of the present Andhra Pradesh which was part of the old Madras Province) Princely Mysore State, (the erstwhile Coorg Province and Kerala) the wife acquired a right to her share only if and when there was an actual partition that was in fact effected by metes and bounds. But the Supreme Court itself did not express any opinion as to whether disposition made by one 'M' therein constituted his particular share at a notional partition or whether it should be a larger one as that question had not been canvassed before the High Court. Therefore, they remitted the matter to the High Court to dispose of the question relating to the determination of quantum under the notional partition to be effected if there was a partition before the death of the said M, who had disposed of his undivided interest by a will in favour of one of the parties.
Karnataka High Court Cites 10 - Cited by 0 - Full Document

Shailndra Kumar Jain vs Maya Prakash Jain on 9 April, 2019

10. The earlier suit was filed by a son against his parents, three brothers and four sisters. In terms of compromise entered into between the Plaintiff, the parents and three brothers, the properties were mutually divided amongst said six persons. Since Amba Prasad Jain and Smt. Devi Jain were alive, the proper parties in an action seeking relief of partition of joint family estate, going by the then prevailing principles of Hindu Law, were only the husband, wife and their sons. The daughters in the family, namely, Defendant Nos.6 to 9 could not, as a matter of right, claim any share if the joint family properties were to be partitioned. However, it is well settled 1 that if a partition takes place between her husband and sons, a wife is entitled (except in Southern India) to receive a share equal to that of a son and enjoy that share separately 1 See: Lakshmi Chand Khajuria and Ors vs. Ishroo Devi – (1977) 2 SCC 501 para 14 5 even from her husband2. Therefore, if the compromise was entered into between the Plaintiff and Defendant Nos.1 to 5, there was nothing improper about it. In the circumstances, the absence of any challenge to the decree in 1966 Suit was irrelevant. As a matter of fact, the applicant Srikanta Jain could not have challenged the decree in 1966 Suit.
Supreme Court of India Cites 3 - Cited by 3 - U U Lalit - Full Document
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