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Documents citing Anandram Mangturam vs Bholaram Tanumal on 13 March, 1945

Vinod Kumar Shrivastava vs Ved Mitra Vohra And Ors. on 10 December, 1969

10. The power of a Court to allow interest prior to the date of suit is governed by the Interest Act, 1839. This Act is modelled on the language used in Section 28 of the English Civil Procedure Act, 1833. This power to allow interest under the Interest Act can be exercised only in respect of "debts and sums certain" and interest cannot be allowed if the claim is for unliquidated damages. In England Section 28 of the Civil Procedure Act, 1833 has been repealed and replaced by Section 3 of the Law Reforms (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1934 which empowers a Court to allow interest from the date of the cause of action to the date of judgment in any proceedings for recovery of "any debt or damages." The change introduced by the Law Reforms Act thus enables a Court in England to award interest for a period prior to the date of suit even when the suit is for recovery of unliquidated damagest No such change has taken place in India and interest cannot be awarded for a period prior to the date of suit when the suit is for recovery of unliquidated damages. As regards any period after the institution of suit, the power to award interest in India is governed by Section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. This section empowers a Court to allow interest from the date of the suit to the date of decree and/or from the date of decree to the date of payment when the decree is for "payment of money." It has been held that this provision applies even when the suit is for unliquidated damages; [Pannalal v. Radhakissen, AIR 1924 Cal 637; Ramalingam Chettiar v. Gokul Das Madavji and Company, AIR 1926 Mad 1021; Anandram Mangturam v. Bholaram Tanumal, AIR 1946 Bom 1]. In England as provided in Section 17 of the Judgments Act, 1838, every judgment debt, other than one arising on a county court judgment, carries interest at four percent from the time of entering up the judgment until it is satisfied. There is no similar provision in India and the award of interest for any period after judgment is govered by Section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Madhya Pradesh High Court Cites 10 - Cited by 27 - Full Document

Dinkerrai Lalit Kumar vs Sukhdayal Rambilas on 19 August, 1946

7. In this case Sir Jamshedji Kanga has relied on the fact that although the contract was arrived at on June 26, 1942, 22 bales were delivered between -July 3, and August 21, 1942. Nothing happened in September and, as I have pointed out, there were oral demands in October, 1942; and finally a tender for a sum of Rs. 7,300 to cover the delivery of the remaining bales was made on November 12, 1942. Sir Jamshedji has argued that the contract must be deemed to be alive till November 12, 1942, and the breach took place when there was a final refusal to perform the contract on November 12, 1942. Now in Anandrmn Mangturam v. Bholaram Tanwmal (1945) 47 Bom. L.R. 719, we very recently held that a party to the contract cannot extend the time for the performance of the contract by a unilateral act and that there must be an agreement to extend the time. Now in this case no agreement to extend the time is either pleaded or attempted to be proved. It is true that in. that particular case the time for delivery was fixed; but I see no reason in principle to distinguish between a contract where the time for delivery is fixed and a contract where the time for delivery is, not fixed. If the time for the performance of a contract or the time for delivery is fixed, it cannot be extended by the unilateral act of a party.
Bombay High Court Cites 11 - Cited by 13 - Full Document

Phoenix Mills Ltd. vs M.H. Dinshaw And Co. on 4 July, 1945

17. In my opinion in order to constitute a waiver or a dispensation of a promise under Section 63 of the Indian Contract Act, neither consideration nor an agreement is necessary. Mr. M. V. Desai drew my attention to a judgment I have recently delivered sitting with the learned Chief Justice in Anandram Mangtmam v. Bholaram and where I expressed the opinion that time cannot be extended by the promisee under Section 63 of the Indian Contract Act by a unilateral act of his, and in order to extend time there must be an agreement between the promisor and the promisee. Now, as I have pointed out in that judgment, Section 63 provides that the promisee may make certain concessions to the promisor which are advantageous to the promisor, and one of these concessions is the extension of time for the performance of the contract; but time can only be extended provided the promisor wants it, and when he applies for the extension of time and the promisee agrees to it, an agreement is formed. It would be no advantage to the promisor if the promisee unilaterally extended the time and altered the date of the performance of the contract and, therefore, also the date of the breach at his own sweet will. That, as far as I can see, was the reasoning of the judgment that I had delivered in that case. But I do not think it follows from that judgment that every dispensation made by the promisee under Section 63 of the Indian Contract Act necessarily requires an agreement between the promisor and the promisee. The very illustrations to the section, which though they cannot control the language of the section are certainly a good guide as to its construction, clearly show that no agreement is necessary for the purpose of attracting the application of Section 63 of the Act.
Bombay High Court Cites 8 - Cited by 9 - Full Document

M/S Raj Land Corporation vs Ichchhapore Industrial Co Op Service ... on 14 February, 2024

9. Moreover, once the plaintiffs breached the contract and reasonable time has run, then there is no question of enforcing such a contract. Once it is shown that the plaintiffs have committed breach of agreement of failing to perform within a stipulated time or reasonable time, then it cannot be held that he was ready and willing to perform his obligation during the subsistence of contract. In such circumstances, as per Section 16(C)(3) of the Specific Relief Act, the plaintiff loses his right of specific performance of contract. This is also held in the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Anandram Mangturam (supra).
Gujarat High Court Cites 49 - Cited by 0 - B Vaishnav - Full Document

Arrow Engineering Limited vs Punit Jitendra Chande And Anr on 21 February, 2024

159. I find much merit in the submission of Mr. Jaisinghani on behalf of the Petitioner that time for performance of a contract can only be extended by agreement between the parties as stipulated in Section 63 of the Indian Contract Act. Such an agreement is required to be pleaded and proved just like in other agreement. This has been held by the Supreme Court in Keshavlal Lallubhai Patel (Supra) as well as by this Court in Anandram Mangturam (Supra) and the Karnataka High Court in Venkateshwara Minerals (Supra) which have been relied upon by the Petitioner.
Bombay High Court Cites 45 - Cited by 0 - R I Chagla - Full Document

Arrow Engineering Limited vs Chintan Tribhuvan Kapdi And Anr on 21 February, 2024

159. I find much merit in the submission of Mr. Jaisinghani on behalf of the Petitioner that time for performance of a contract can only be extended by agreement between the parties as stipulated in Section 63 of the Indian Contract Act. Such an agreement is required to be pleaded and proved just like in other agreement. This has been held by the Supreme Court in Keshavlal Lallubhai Patel (Supra) as well as by this Court in Anandram Mangturam (Supra) and the Karnataka High Court in Venkateshwara Minerals (Supra) which have been relied upon by the Petitioner.
Bombay High Court Cites 45 - Cited by 0 - R I Chagla - Full Document
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