In Lekhraj Satramdas Lalvani v. Deputy Custodian-cum-
Managing Officer & Ors.(1), the appellant who was removed
from the manager-ship of certain evacuee properties filed a
petition in the Kerala High Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution praying for a writ of mandamus against the
Deputy Custodian and others. This Court held that the
appellant's appointment was contractual in its nature and
the duties or obligations arising out of contract could not
be enforced by the machinery of a writ under Article 226.
There was some discussion before us as to whether
Fundamental Rights could be waived and in answer to the
preliminary contention of 'he respondents it was urged on
behalf of the appellants that they are entitled to enforce
their fundamental rights, no matter whether they agreed to
waive those rights while entering into contracts with the
Government.
In the view we have taken, the argument that the Government
cannot by contract do what it cannot do under a statute must
fail. ,No statute forbids the Government from trading in its
own rights ,or privileges and the statute under
consideration, far from doing so, expressly empowers it by
sections 27 and 34 to grant lease of its right to issue the
requisite licences, permits or passes on payment of such
fees as may be prescribed by the Financial Commissioner.
The argument that in Cooveriee's case the impugned power
having been exercised in respect of a centrally
administrated area, the power was not fettered by
legislative lists loses its relevance in the view we ,:are
taking. It is true that in that case it was permissible to
the court to find, as in fact it did, that the fee imposed
on the licencees was ,'more in the nature of a tax than a
licence fee". As the authority which levied the fee had the
power to exact a tax, the levy could be upheld as a tax,
even if it could not be justified as a 'fee', in the
constitutiotin sense of thatterm. But the 'Licence fee' or
'Fixed fee' in the instant case does not have to conform
to the requirement that it must bear a reasonable
relationship with the services rendered to the licensees.
The amount charged to the licensees is not a fee properly
so-called nor indeed a tax but is in the nature of the price
of a privilege, which the purchaser has to pay in any
trading or business transaction.
In our opinion, the true position governing dealings in
intoxicants is as stated and reflected in the Constitution
Bench decisions of this Court in Balsara's case, Cooveriee's
case, Kidwai's case, Nagendra Nath's case, Amar
Chakraborty's case and the R.M.D.C. case, as interpreted in
Harinarayan Jaiswal's case and Nashirwar's case, There is no
fundamental right to do trade or business in intoxicants.
The State, under its regulatory powers, has the right to
prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to
intoxicants-its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale
and possession. In all their manifestations, these rights
are vested in the State and indeed without such vesting
there can be no effective regulation of various forms of
activities in relation to intoxicants. In "American
Jurisprudence", Volume 30 it is stated that while engaging
in liquor traffic is not inherently lawful,. nevertheless it
is a privilege and not a right, subject to governmental
control. (page 538). This power of control is' an incident
of the society's right to self-protection and it rests upon
the right of the State to care for the health, morals and
welfare of the people. Liquor traffic is a source of
pauperism and crime. (pp. 539, 540, 541).
In our opinion, the true position governing dealings in
intoxicants is as stated and reflected in the Constitution
Bench decisions of this Court in Balsara's case, Cooveriee's
case, Kidwai's case, Nagendra Nath's case, Amar
Chakraborty's case and the R.M.D.C. case, as interpreted in
Harinarayan Jaiswal's case and Nashirwar's case, There is no
fundamental right to do trade or business in intoxicants.
The State, under its regulatory powers, has the right to
prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to
intoxicants-its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale
and possession. In all their manifestations, these rights
are vested in the State and indeed without such vesting
there can be no effective regulation of various forms of
activities in relation to intoxicants. In "American
Jurisprudence", Volume 30 it is stated that while engaging
in liquor traffic is not inherently lawful,. nevertheless it
is a privilege and not a right, subject to governmental
control. (page 538). This power of control is' an incident
of the society's right to self-protection and it rests upon
the right of the State to care for the health, morals and
welfare of the people. Liquor traffic is a source of
pauperism and crime. (pp. 539, 540, 541).
In our opinion, the true position governing dealings in
intoxicants is as stated and reflected in the Constitution
Bench decisions of this Court in Balsara's case, Cooveriee's
case, Kidwai's case, Nagendra Nath's case, Amar
Chakraborty's case and the R.M.D.C. case, as interpreted in
Harinarayan Jaiswal's case and Nashirwar's case, There is no
fundamental right to do trade or business in intoxicants.
The State, under its regulatory powers, has the right to
prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to
intoxicants-its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale
and possession. In all their manifestations, these rights
are vested in the State and indeed without such vesting
there can be no effective regulation of various forms of
activities in relation to intoxicants. In "American
Jurisprudence", Volume 30 it is stated that while engaging
in liquor traffic is not inherently lawful,. nevertheless it
is a privilege and not a right, subject to governmental
control. (page 538). This power of control is' an incident
of the society's right to self-protection and it rests upon
the right of the State to care for the health, morals and
welfare of the people. Liquor traffic is a source of
pauperism and crime. (pp. 539, 540, 541).
Since rights in regard to intoxicants belong to the State,
it is open to the Government to part with those rights for a
consideration. By Article 298 of the Constitution, the
executive power of the State extends to the carrying on of
any trade or business and to the, making of contracts for
any purpose. As observed in Harinarayan Jaiswal's case, "if
the Government" is the exclusive owner of those privileges,
reliance on Article 19 ( 1 ) (g) or Article 14 becomes
irrelevant. Citizens cannot have any fundamental right to
trade or carry on business in the properties or rights
belonging to the Government, nor can there be any
infringement of Article 14, if the Government tries to get
the best available price for its valuable. rights." Section
27 of the Act recognises the right of the Government to
grant a lease of its right to 'manufacture, supply or sell
intoxicants. Section 34 of the Act read with section 59(d)
empowers the Financial Commissioner to direct that a
licence, permit or pars be granted under the Act on payment
of such fees and subject to such restrictions and on such
conditions as he may prescribe. In such a scheme, it is not
of the essence whether the amount charged to the licensees
is predetermined as in the appeals of Northern India
Caterers and of Green Hotel or whether it is left to be
determined by bids offered in auctions held for granting
those rights to licensee,,. The power of the Government to
charge a price for parting with its rights and not the mode
of fixing that price is what constitutes the essence of the
matter. Nor indeed does the label affixed to the price
determine either the true nature of the charge levied by the
Government or its right to levy the same.