Search Results Page

Search Results

1 - 3 of 3 (0.19 seconds)

Harcharan Singh vs Smt. Shivrani And Ors. on 20 February, 1981

Similar presumption is raised under Illustration (f) to s. 114 of the Indian Evidence Act whereunder it He also relied citation in Civil Appeal No.1402 of 1979 between Harcharan Singh Vs. Shivrani and others of Hon'ble Supreme court of India, wherein it has been held that, is stated that 17 O.S.No.6123/2021 the Court may presume that the common course of business has been followed in h a particular case, that is to say, when a letter is sent by post by pre-paying and properly addressing it the same has been received by the addressee. Undoubtedly, the presumptions both under s. 27 of the General Clauses Act as well as under s. 114 of the Evidence Act are rebuttable but in the absence of proof to the contrary the presumption of proper service or effective service on the addressee would arise. In the instant case, additionally, there was positive evidence of the postman to the effect that the registered envelope was actually tendered by him to the appellant on November 10, 1966 but the appellant refused to accept. In other words, there was due service effected upon the appellant by refusal. In such circumstances, we are clearly of the view, that the High Court was right in coming to the conclusion that the appellant must be imputed with the knowledge of the contents of the notice which he refused to accept. It is impossible to accept the contention that when factually there was refusal to accept the notice on the part of the appellant he could not be visited with the knowledge of the contents of the registered notice because, in our view, the presumption raised under s. 27 of the General Clauses Act as well as under s. 114 of the Indian Evidence Act is one of proper or effective service which must mean service of everything that is contained in the notice. It is impossible to countenance the suggestion that before knowledge of the contents of the notice could be imputed the sealed envelope must be opened and read by the addressee or when the addressee happens to be an illiterate person the contents should be read over to him by the postman or someone else. Such things do 18 O.S.No.6123/2021 not occur when the addressee is determined to decline to accept the sealed envelope. It would, therefore, be reasonable to hold that when service is effected by refusal of a postal communication the addressee must be imputed. with the knowledge of the contents thereof and in our view, this follows upon the presumptions that are raised under s. 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and s. 114 of the Indian Evidence Act.
Supreme Court of India Cites 33 - Cited by 66 - Full Document

Sriram Pasricha vs Jagannath & Ors on 24 August, 1976

105. We may add that Ch. V of the Transfer of Property Act, which deals with leases of immovable property has nowhere made any distinction between a lease and a sub-lease and all the provisions of that Chapter which apply to a lease also apply to a sublease. It is only when dealing with the rights and liabilities of the lessee that s. 108(j) of the Transfer of Property Act lays down that the lessee may transfer absolutely or by way of mortgage or sub- lease the whole or any part of his interest in the property, and that is 15 O.S.No.6123/2021 where one finds mention of a sub-lease, namely, that it is a lease by a person who is himself a lessee. But the fact that the lessor is himself a lessee and the transaction between him and the person in whose favour he makes the transfer by way of lease is called a sub-lease does not in any way change the nature of the transfer as between them. Therefore on the plain words of s. 3(d) read with s. 105 of the Transfer of Property Act there can be no doubt that the term 'mining lease' includes a sub-lease.' He also relied citation in Civil Appeal No.1223 of 1975 between Ram Pasricha Vs. Jagannath and others of Hon'ble Supreme court of India, wherein it has been held that, There are two reasons for our not being able to accept the above submission. Firstly, the plea pertains to the domain of the frame of the suit as if the suit is bad for non-joinder of other plaintiffs. Such a plea should have been raised, for what it is worth, at the earliest opportunity. It was not done. Secondly, the relation be- tween the parties being that of landlord and tenant, only the landlord could terminate the tenancy and institute the suit for eviction. The tenant in such a suit it estopped from questioning the title of the landlord under section 116 of the Evidence Act. The tenant cannot deny that the landlord had title to the premises at the commencement of the tenancy. Under the general law, in a suit between landlord and tenant the question of title to the leased property is irrelevant. It is, therefore, inconceivable to throw out the suit on account of non-pleading of other co-owners as such.
Supreme Court of India Cites 12 - Cited by 439 - P K Goswami - Full Document

Sri Srinivasa Rao vs Smt Puttamma on 17 August, 2022

He also relied another citation in CRP No.2677 of 1982 between Ganapathi Rao S.R. Vs. Puttamma of Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka, wherein it has been held that, In the normal course, when the tenant pleads satisfaction of arrears of rental, the burden of proving satisfaction is on him. The Act has come into force in the year 1961 and it make provision for taking action against the landlord if he does not issue receipt on receiving the rent. It makes it incumbent on the landlord to issue receipts for the rents received by him. If for three long years, the tenant went on paying the rents and the landlord did not issue receipts, it is normal to infer that the tenant either would have stopped payment to the landlord or the landlord did issue receipts. If the landlord did not issue receipts. In the circumstances, therefore, the mere plea of satisfaction, without more, of the tenant, on the facts of the case, could not be upheld and believed. The learned Civil Judge has done so it is highly illegal.
Karnataka High Court Cites 3 - Cited by 0 - Full Document
1