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Erach Boman Khavar vs Tukaram Sridhar Bhat & Ors on 12 December, 2013 cites

Arjun Singh vs Mohindra Kumar & Ors on 13 December, 1963

11. The Division Bench placed reliance on Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar and others[1] and came to hold that when the second application for leave was filed, there was no change in the circumstances and in the absence of any changed circumstances, the second application for leave was not maintainable as it was barred by principles of res judicata being a successive application in the same court on self-same facts. It was further opined that it is open to the appellant to file an application for review or to file an appeal against the said order and as long as the said order remained alive, a fresh application could not have been entertained by the learned Company Judge. To interpret the term “grant of liberty” the Division Bench held that on the basis of the grant of liberty the case could not have been reopened.
Supreme Court of India Cites 10 - Cited by 672 - N R Ayyangar - Full Document

Bansidhar Shankarlal vs Mohd. Ibrahim & Anr on 25 September, 1970

The two-Judge Bench referred to the earlier decision rendered in Bansidhar Shankarlal v. Mohd. Ibrahim[6], wherein the leave had been obtained at the time of filing of the suit and the question was whether fresh leave ought to be obtained before proceeding under Section 446(1) of the 1956 Act before institution of execution proceedings. The Court considered the contrary views expressed by different High Courts on the effect and purport of Section 446(1) of the 1956 Act and came to the conclusion that the view that failure to obtain leave prior to institution of suit would not debar the court from granting such leave subsequently and that the only consequence of the same would be that the proceedings would be regarded as having been instituted on the date on which the leave was obtained from the High Court.
Supreme Court of India Cites 12 - Cited by 48 - J C Shah - Full Document

Satyadhyan Ghosal And Others vs Sm. Deorajin Debi And Another on 20 April, 1960

The principles stated in Arjun Singh (supra), Satyadhyan Ghosal (supra) and the other authorities clearly spell out that principle of res judicata operates at the successive stages in the same litigation but, the basic foundation of res judicata rests on delineation of merits and it has at least an expression of an opinion for rejection of an application. As is evident, there has been no advertence on merits and further the learned Company Judge has guardedly stated two facets, namely, “not necessary to grant present Judge’s Summons” and “liberty to applicant to apply, if necessary”. On a seemly reading of the order we have no shadow of doubt that the same could not have been treated to have operated as res judicata as has been held by the Division Bench. Therefore, the irresistible conclusion is that the Division Bench has fallen into serious error in dislodging the order granting leave by the learned Company Judge to file a fresh suit.
Supreme Court of India Cites 9 - Cited by 469 - K C Gupta - Full Document

Prahlad Singh vs Col. Sukhdev Singh on 24 February, 1987

In Prahlad Singh v. Col. Sukhdev Singh[8] an ex-parte decree passed in a petition for eviction based on ground of default in payment of rent was set aside on the finding that the landlord had agreed to withdraw the petition and accept rent from the tenant. After the decree was set aside the petition for eviction was once again ordered on the ground of default of payment of rent for the same period. The submission of the tenant that the eviction petition could not be allowed to continue and deserved to be dismissed on the finding of the court in the proceeding for setting aside the ex parte order was negatived by the High Court on the ground that those findings were made in the context of setting aside the ex parte order and not in the context of deciding the main petition for eviction.
Supreme Court of India Cites 2 - Cited by 60 - O C Reddy - Full Document

C.V. Rajendran And Anr vs N.M. Muhammed Kunhi on 13 September, 2002

In C.V. Rajendran and another v. N.M. Muhammed Kunhi[9] the question arose for consideration whether the order of remand passed by the Rent Control Appellate Authority, Payyannur, dated November 25, 1988, holding that the second eviction petition (R.C.P. No. 13/87) filed by the respondent against the appellants under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, is not barred by Section 15 of the Act, can be permitted to re-agitate in a proceeding arising from the order passed by the Rent Controller pursuant to the order of remand. Be it noted, in the said case, learned Rent Controller had declined to grant relief to the respondent on the ground that under Section 15(3) of the Act the eviction petition was not maintainable. On appeal being preferred the appellate authority remanded the matter to the Rent Controller for fresh disposal. After remand, the Rent Controller found that the need of the respondent was bona fide and alternative accommodation in the area was available and, accordingly, allowed the eviction petition. The same was affirmed by the Rent Control Appellate Authority. On a civil revision being preferred the High Court opined that the earlier order of the appellate authority holding that Section 15 of the Act does not bar the eviction proceeding against the tenant, had become final and could not be re-agitated. However, the High Court recorded a finding that Section 15 of the Act did not bar the subsequent eviction petition and being of that view dismissed the revision petition. A contention was raised before this Court that order passed by the appellate authority holding that the eviction petition was maintainable and Section 15 of the Act was not a bar, does not operate as res judicata. In that context, this Court observed as follows: -
Supreme Court of India Cites 3 - Cited by 45 - S S Quadri - Full Document

Y.B. Patil And Ors vs Y.L. Patil on 23 August, 1976

In this regard, the pronouncement in Y.B. Patil and others v. Y.L. Patil[12] is worth referring to. In that case the High Court in the writ petition preferred on earlier point of time had recorded a finding and gave directions to the tribunal not to reopen the question of fact in revision and the tribunal complied with those directions of the High Court. This Court opined that the appellants therein were bound by the judgment of the High Court and it was not open to them to go behind the judgment earlier passed by the High Court as they had not preferred any appeal against the said judgment and it had attained finality. The Court observed that it is well settled that principle of res judicata can be invoked not only in separate subsequent proceedings, they also got attracted in subsequent stage of the same proceeding. The aforesaid decision has noted the fact that in the earlier writ petition the High Court has clearly stated that the tribunal shall not reopen the question of fact in revision. It is manifest that, this Court has taken note of the fact that there was an expression of opinion by the High Court that facts need not be adverted to again by the tribunal and that attracted the principle of res judicata.
Supreme Court of India Cites 2 - Cited by 120 - H R Khanna - Full Document

State Of Uttar Pradesh vs Brahma Datt Sharma And Anr on 25 February, 1987

36. After so stating the Court referred to the decision in State of U.P. v. Brahm Datt Sharma[13] wherein it has been held that when proceedings stand terminated by final disposal of writ petition it is not open to the court to reopen the proceedings by means of a miscellaneous application in respect of a matter which provided a fresh cause of action, for if the said principle is not followed, there would be confusion and chaos and the finality of the proceedings would cease to have any meaning.
Supreme Court of India Cites 8 - Cited by 967 - K N Singh - Full Document
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