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Abdul Rashid vs Sri Sitaramji Maharaj Brajman And Ors. on 17 April, 1974 cites

Lalji Koeri vs Gajadhar Koeri on 3 October, 1961

4. The main point which has been canvassed on behalf of the appellant is that the orders of the courts below holding that the decree-holder's execution application was not barred by time are erroneous. His contention is that the decree-holder could have given the notice in terms of the compromise decree and could have executed the decree on the very date on which it was passed and hence the limitation started running from the date of the compromise decree itself and Article 182 of the old Limitation Act (Act No. IX of 1908) applied and the execution application having been made after six years of the decree was barred by limitation. Reliance was placed on behalf of the appellant on Narain Tewari's case AIR 1931 All 326 (supra). In that case a decree was obtained in 1912 by Mst. Jokhna Tewarin against Raja Bahadur Brij Narain Rai and Rai Jagdish Narain Rai. The decree passed against them was for delivery of possession of Zamindari Property but it provided that the right of possession was contingent upon the decree-holder depositing in the court to the credit of the judgment-debtors certain sum of money. No date for payment of the same was specified by the decree. The decree-holder died. She did not fulfil the condition in her lifetime nor did she apply for execution of the decree. The application for execution was made by her sons and heirs on 31-7-1928. Money was deposited in the court to the credit of the judgment-debtors in September 1928. It was held by the High Court that Article 181 of the Limitation Act applied and Limitation would be three years from the date when the right to apply for execution accrued. The rule of law was thus stated:
Allahabad High Court Cites 5 - Cited by 1 - Full Document

(Siri) Narain Tewari And Anr. vs Brij Narain Rai And Anr. on 10 January, 1931

4. The main point which has been canvassed on behalf of the appellant is that the orders of the courts below holding that the decree-holder's execution application was not barred by time are erroneous. His contention is that the decree-holder could have given the notice in terms of the compromise decree and could have executed the decree on the very date on which it was passed and hence the limitation started running from the date of the compromise decree itself and Article 182 of the old Limitation Act (Act No. IX of 1908) applied and the execution application having been made after six years of the decree was barred by limitation. Reliance was placed on behalf of the appellant on Narain Tewari's case AIR 1931 All 326 (supra). In that case a decree was obtained in 1912 by Mst. Jokhna Tewarin against Raja Bahadur Brij Narain Rai and Rai Jagdish Narain Rai. The decree passed against them was for delivery of possession of Zamindari Property but it provided that the right of possession was contingent upon the decree-holder depositing in the court to the credit of the judgment-debtors certain sum of money. No date for payment of the same was specified by the decree. The decree-holder died. She did not fulfil the condition in her lifetime nor did she apply for execution of the decree. The application for execution was made by her sons and heirs on 31-7-1928. Money was deposited in the court to the credit of the judgment-debtors in September 1928. It was held by the High Court that Article 181 of the Limitation Act applied and Limitation would be three years from the date when the right to apply for execution accrued. The rule of law was thus stated:
Allahabad High Court Cites 4 - Cited by 9 - Full Document

Jugal Singh Alias Jugal Kishore vs Lochan Singh And Ors. on 9 August, 1944

9. Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963) appears to give a legislative approval to the view that we are taking in this regard. In the new provision 12 years' period of limitation prescribed for the execution of any decree commences from the time "when the decree or order becomes enforceable or where the decree or any subsequent order directs any payment of money or the delivery of any property to be made at a certain date or at recurring periods, when default in making the payment or delivery in respect of which execution is sought, takes place." The principle that limitation remains in abeyance so long as the contingent condition is not performed is clearly embodied in Article 136. We are also fortified in our view by some observations made by another Division Bench of this Court in, Jugal Singh v. Lochan Singh, 1944 All LJ 449 = (AIR 1945 All 10) in which Malik, J., summed up the position in these words:--
Allahabad High Court Cites 8 - Cited by 4 - Full Document

Musammat Rukmina Kuar And Ors. vs Sheo Dat Rai And Anr. on 2 June, 1919

Rukmina Kuar v. Sbeo Dat Rai, AIR 1919 All 224. There the decree provided that upon payment by the plaintiff of certain sum of money "in any year in the month of Jeth" he was to receive possession of certain property. The decree was passed on 22-1-1894. The money was deposited on 15-6-1915 and an application to execute the decree was made on 29-6-1916. The defendant objected that the application was barred by limitation. It was held that the decree, being indefinite as to the date on which payment was to be made, was incapable of execution on the date on which it was passed and was therefore not governed as to the period of limitation for its execution by Article 182 of the Limitation Act. It was also held that the right to execute the decree could not arise unless payment was made and that the plaintiff was, therefore, entitled to execute the decree within three years of the date when he made the payment.
Allahabad High Court Cites 3 - Cited by 5 - Full Document
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