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Bhagavan Das Dhananjaya Das vs Union Of India on 3 August, 2018 cites

A. K. Kraipak & Ors. Etc vs Union Of India & Ors on 29 April, 1969

35. From the above discussion, it becomes clear that the opportunity to provide hearing before making any decision was considered to be a basic requirement in the court proceeding. Later on, this principle was applied to other quasi-judicial authorities and other tribunals and ultimately it is now clearly laid down that even in the administrative actions, where the decision of the authority may result in civil consequences, a hearing before taking a decision is necessary. It was, thus, observed in A.K.Kraipak case (1969) 2 SCC 262 that if the purpose of rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice, one fails to see how these rules should not be made available to administrative inquiries.
Supreme Court of India Cites 9 - Cited by 1426 - Full Document

Nabendu Dutta And Ors. vs Arindam Mukherjee And Ors. on 20 May, 2003

14. Under this background, the learned Additional Solicitor General submitted that the disqualification for appointment of directors contemplated under Section 164(2)(a) is necessarily to be read along with Section 167. A conjoined reading of both sections, the post of director shall become vacant in case he incurs any of the disqualification defined under Section 164. Therefore, if a director of a company has not filed the financial statement or annual return for a continuous period of three financial years, he/she shall not be eligible to be reappointed as director of a company, as a result, the office of directorship shall become vacant, because of incurring the disqualification under Section 164. Now by virtue of the operation of law, all the writ petitioners suffered disqualification by virtue of Section 164(2)(a) read with Section 167(1)(a). Hence, Section 164(2)(a) of the Companies Act, 2013 alone cannot be read in isolation. Mr.G.Rajagopalan further submitted that the petitioners have not approached this Court with clean hands and it is the duty of the directors to make statutory compliance within the time prescribed under the law. Since the petitioners have failed in their statutory duties for not filing the annual returns for a continuous period of three financial years, the striking off the names of the companies and the consequential effect of disqualification of their directorship in the same company or in any other company cannot be found fault with. Taking support from the judgment of the Calcutta High Court in Nabendu Dutta v. Arindam Mukherjee, (2004) 55 SCL 146 (Cal.), it has been submitted that the Calcutta High Court has held that on the date of commencement of the amending Act, if any person has been a director in a defaulting company, he shall also be debarred to be appointed as director of any company for a period of five years. Therefore, when Section 164(2)(a) have two limbs, the words no person who is or has been director of a company which are used in the present continous and present perfect continuous form, respectively and the words has not filed financial statements or annual returns for any continuous period of three years which are used in present perfect tense, meaning thereby that in case any company has defaulted in filing its financial statement or annual return for a continuous period of three years, then no person who is occupying the position of director shall be eligible for reappointment as director of that company and he shall be debarred to be appointed as director in any company for a period of five years. In the light of the above, actions have been taken by the answering respondent only in identification of the disqualified directors and in accordance with the operation of law as envisaged under Section 164(2)(a) read with Section 167(1)(a). Therefore, this Court does not have any jurisdiction to undo the disqualification which had occurred on account of operation of law. Referring to paragraph-15 of the counter affidavit, the learned Additional Solicitor General submitted that on verification of the statutory returns for the financial years 2013-14, 2014-15 and 2015-16, it was found that the defaulting companies in which the petitioners are directors, failed to file the statutory returns for the financial years 2013-14, 2014-15, 2015-16, hence, they would stand disqualified due to the operation of law under Section 164(2)(a) of the Companies Act, 2013.
Calcutta High Court Cites 24 - Cited by 4 - K J Sengupta - Full Document

Vijay vs State Of Maharashtra & Ors on 26 July, 2006

The same doctrine of fairness, to hold that a statute was retrospective in nature, was applied in the case of Vijay v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., [(2006) 6 SCC 289]. It was held that where a law is enacted for the benefit of community as a whole, even in the absence of a provision the statute may be held to be retrospective in nature. However, we are (sic not) confronted with any such situation here.
Supreme Court of India Cites 4 - Cited by 170 - S B Sinha - Full Document

Suresh Koshy George vs The University Of Kerala & Ors on 15 July, 1968

Enquiries which were considered administrative at one time are now being considered as quasi-judicial in character. Arriving at a just decision is the aim of both quasi-judicial enquiries as well as administrative enquiries. An unjust decision in an administrative enquiry may have more far reaching effect than a decision in a quasi-judicial enquiry. As observed by this Court in Suresh Koshy George v. University of Kerala, [1969] 1 SCR 317, the rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the law under which the enquiry is held and the constitution of the Tribunal or body of persons appointed for that purpose. Whenever a complaint is made before a court that some principle of natural justice had been contravened the court has to decide whether the observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision on the facts of that case.
Supreme Court of India Cites 9 - Cited by 348 - K S Hegde - Full Document

Maneka Gandhi vs Union Of India on 25 January, 1978

In view of this vast difference, the impugned order disqualifying the petitioner to be appointed as director in any company or continuing as director in any other company is wholly arbitrary, unreasonable and unconstitutional for being against the established principles of natural justice, as laid down by the Apex Curt in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 2 SCC 248. Once a company was struck off, no notice was issued to any of the directors holding directorship in any other company for their disqualification. This is against the principles of natural justice.
Supreme Court of India Cites 134 - Cited by 1982 - M H Beg - Full Document
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