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Srimath Jagathguru Sringeri Sri ... vs C.P. Duraiswami Naidu (Dead) And Ors. on 6 January, 1931 cites

Sri Ravu Seshayya Garu vs The Rajah Of Pittappur, Sri Raja Ravu ... on 24 March, 1916

Speaking with all respect, it seems to me that the definition of the word "agriculture" in Murugesa Chetti v. Chinnathambi Goundan (1901) I.L.R. 24 M. 421 by Sir V. Bhashyam Aiyangar, J. and by Sadasiva Aiyar, J. in Rajah of Venkatagiri v. Ayyappareddi (1913) I.L.R. 38 M. 738 : 25 M.L.J. 578 and Seshayya v. Rajah of Pittapur (1916) 31 M.L.J. 214 could not be accepted for all purposes without qualification. If we look into the recognised dictionaries as to the meaning of the word "agriculture", all that we find is that "agriculture" means "field cultivation" and "cultivation" is said to be "tillage or breaking up the soil".
Madras High Court Cites 9 - Cited by 16 - Full Document

Devaraja Naicken vs Ammani Ammal on 16 December, 1915

However, so far as the Transfer of Property Act is concerned, it must be remembered that in Devaraja Naicken v. Ammani Animal (1915) 3 L.W. 319, another Bench of this Court, Seshagiri Aiyar and Kumaraswami Sastri, JJ., held that a lease for planting casuarina trees is not a lease for agricultural purposes within the meaning of that Act. That shows that even in regard to the Transfer of Property Act the question is not a very easy one to decide. But what we are concerned here with is, not the Transfer of Property Act, but the Madras Estates Land Act; and, as I think it cannot be denied that in different Acts "agriculture" is used with varying contents and as ordinary educated people use "agriculture" in different senses, the only safe course for us is to try by examining the Madras Estates Land Act itself to ascertain in what sense that word has been used in that Act.
Madras High Court Cites 4 - Cited by 4 - Full Document

Commissioner Of Income-Tax vs T. Manavedan Tirumalpad on 11 April, 1930

If the Legislature meant that the term 'agriculture" should also include "forestry," or "rearing of trees", it seems to me that it would have expressly said so, when it expressly included "horticulture" within the purview of the word "agriculture" for the purposes of this Act. I do not propose to attempt a positive definition of the word "agriculture". It is enough for the disposal of this case to say that letting lands for rearing casuarina trees does not come within the scope of "agriculture" as the term is used in the Madras Estates Land Act. As I said, it is not safe to draw any sort of conclusive inference from the meaning of the word "agriculture" used in one Act, when we have to construe another Act; but, so far as they go, the observations in Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras v. Manavedan Tirumalpad (1930) I.L.R. 54 M. 21 : 59 M.L.J. 265 at 267 (F.B.)-a case that arose under the Income-tax Act--seem to support the contention of the appellant in the present case.
Madras High Court Cites 1 - Cited by 15 - Full Document

Sree Venugopala Rice Mill Represented ... vs Rajah Of Pithapuram And Ors. on 13 December, 1929

16. For the purpose of disposing of this appeal it is necessary only to consider the question whether assuming the land to be ryoti land, the defendant holds the land for "purposes of agriculture". As was held in Venugopala Rice Mill v. Rajah of Pitlapuram (1929) I.L.R. 53 M. 367 : 59 M.L.J. 74 if by agreement between the parties, a ryoti land is no longer held for agricultural purposes but is held for non-agricultural purposes, then, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to decide the rights of the parties thereto would not be ousted by the Estates Land Act. Therefore, the argument in second appeal really centred on the question whether letting "land for rearing casuarina trees" is letting it "for agricultural purposes". This leads naturally to the discussion as to what exactly is the meaning to be attacked to the expression "agricultural purposes" occurring in the Act. Our attention was drawn to various definitions of the term "agriculture" which learned Judges have given on various occasions.
Madras High Court Cites 14 - Cited by 2 - Full Document

B. Rangiah Chetty vs B. Subramania Chetty And Ors. on 20 October, 1910

All learned Judges are agreed that the word has to be construed with reference to the context, and, for reasons I have already given, it seems to me that the indications given not only by the definition (rather description) of the word "agriculture" but by the other provisions of the Madras Estates Land Act, to which my learned brother has elaborately referred, lead us to the conclusion that the contention of the learned advocate for the respondent should not be upheld by us. There is a decision in Vellaypppa Chetty v. Subramaniam Chetty (1926) I.L.R. 50 M. 482 : 51 M.L.J. 880 where Devadoss and Wallace, JJ., had to consider the question whether cocoanut trees would be "improvements" within the meaning of the Madras Estates Land Act. The learned Judges held that they were not improvements, though they held so with great hesitation. The exact question is not before us. The question before us is with reference to casuarina trees. I gather that it takes about 8 or 10 years for casuarina trees to mature, that the fruits of these trees (nor the trees) are not fit for consumption either by man or beast, that they are used for firewood purposes, and that after they are cut, the stumps remaining on the ground would seriously impede cultivation unless great expense is incurred in removing the same. There is also the idea of periodically raising crops, and preparing the land--though it need not necessarily be at the end of every year--and of care and supervision involved in operations relating to agriculture; and from what I am able to gather, the planting of casuarina trees in no way conforms to these ideas.
Madras High Court Cites 18 - Cited by 22 - Full Document

Kunnigarath Kunhayen Haji vs Athilan Mayan on 8 August, 1893

17. The learned Judge thus practically limited the application of the word "agriculture" to the procuring of vegetables and fruits which are useful as food for man or beast and other products fit for human consumption by way of luxury if not as an article of diet. Shephard, J., who agreed that the lease of land for the cultivation of betel is an agricultural lease, was evidently not prepared to accept the definition of the word "agriculture" given by Bhashyam Aiyangar, J. The learned Judge says that neither the man who planted fruit trees or bushes in an enclosed space, nor still less one who planted and maintained trees for firewood or other such purpose, could be called an agriculturist. The term "agriculture" however is capable of being applied to tillage of the soil in the widest sense. The learned Judge considered the context in which the expression "agricultural purpose" occurred in the Transfer of Property Act, and came to the conclusion that a lease of land for cultivating betel was an agricultural lease. The learned Judge also took occasion to say that the view expressed by him in an earlier case, Kunhayen Haji v. Mayan (1893) I.L.R. 17 M. 98 : 4 M.L.J. 21, that a lease of coffee garden was not an agricultural lease, was not one to which he was inclined to adhere, after hearing further arguments upon the question.
Madras High Court Cites 2 - Cited by 12 - Full Document

King-Emperor vs Alexander Allan on 18 October, 1901

In King-Emperor v. Alexander Allan (1901) I.L.R. 25 M. 627 Davies and Moore, JJ., referred to various dictionaries as to the definition of the word "agriculture". They referred to the Oxford Dictionary by Dr. Murray, and held in connection with a case arising under the Madras District Municipalities Act, that lands let for pasture for cattle were lands let for agricultural purposes, in the absence of a definition of the word "agriculture" in that Act.
Madras High Court Cites 6 - Cited by 10 - Full Document
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