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Sheopat Singh vs Ram Pratap on 28 August, 1964

In Sheopat Singh v. Ram Pratap, [1965] 1 SCR 175, one of the questions that directly arose for consideration was of the burden of proving the ingredients of the corrupt practice under Section 123(4). The facts were that an alle- gation was made against the personal character and conduct of one of the candidates in the election, viz., that a cinema theatre of Rs.7 lakhs in Ganganagar was the barkat of the cement of the Rajasthan Canal. The candidate concerned was at the crucial time the Minister-in-charge of the Rajas- than Canal Project. During the election, a cinema theatre known as Adarsh Theatre was being put up at Ganganagar. There was no dispute that the theatre referred to in the poster was the said Adarsh Theatre and it belonged to the concerned candidate and his sons. In that context, there- fore, it was manifest that the poster meant to convey the idea that the candidate had misappropriated the cement of the Rajasthan Canal of which he was in-charge and built a big theatre in the name of his sons. Hence, it was a clear reflection on the candidate's personal character and con- duct. The argument advanced on behalf of the returned candi- date was that there was no evidence in the case that the said statement was one reasonably calculated to prejudice the prospects of the election of the candidate against whom the said statement was meant, viz., Ramchander Chowdhary. In that connection, it was argued that if the voters did not know that the cinema theatre which was being built in Ganga- nagar belonged to Ramchander Chowdhary or his sons, the statement concerned would not deflect the voters from voting in favour of Chowdhary. It was also argued that there was no evidence in the case that all or any of the voters knew the fact that the cinema theatre belonged to Chowdhary or his sons.
Supreme Court of India Cites 6 - Cited by 16 - M Hidayatullah - Full Document

Kumara Nand vs Brijmohan Lal Sharma on 29 November, 1966

In Kumara Nand v. Brijmohan Lal Sharma. [1967] 2 SCR 127 the 741 facts were that the complaining candidate was called "the greatest of the thieves" in a poem recited at a public meeting in the presence of the returned candidate. It was held that it was not a mere expression of opinion but was a statement of fact. It was further held that in such circum- stances, particulars are not necessary before a bald state- ment with respect to personal character or conduct of the candidate can be said to be a statement of fact. It was also observed that whether particulars are necessary will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. We may state here that the discussion in that case mainly centered around the question whether the particular statement was a state- ment of fact or an expression of opinion.
Supreme Court of India Cites 11 - Cited by 19 - K N Wanchoo - Full Document

Habib Bhai vs Pyarelal And Ors. on 26 September, 1963

In Habib Bhai v. Pyarelal & Ors., AIR 1964 MP 62 dealing with the question of innuendo the High Court referred to certain English cases on the point and held that "in view of these decisions, it is obvious that an innuendo is simply an averment that such a one, means such a particular person; or that such a thing, means such a particular thing: and, when coupled with the introductory matter, it is an averment of the whole connected proposition by which the charge may be brought home to the person concerned. The whole attempt of the learned counsel for the appellant before us was to suggest that the words, though not per se defamatory of the third respondent, were definitely so in their secondary meaning read in the context of circumstances. But, as no attempt was made in the pleadings to plead the extrinsic facts to show by those facts as to how the allegations contained in annexure I were related to the third respond- ents, we are of opinion that it must he held that by refer- ring to any possible meaning of the words used, no imputa- tion could be read in the words as against him." It can, therefore, be said that in this case the Court had insisted that it was necessary to plead the extrinsic facts to show all those facts as to how allegations were related to the defamed or complaining candidate.
Madhya Pradesh High Court Cites 12 - Cited by 5 - Full Document

Manmohan Kalia vs Yash & Others on 2 April, 1984

In Manmohan Kalia v. Yash & Ors., [1984] 3 SCR 383 which is more or less on par with the present case, it was alleged by the election petitioner that the returned candidate through speeches either made by him or his friends had carried on a vilifying campaign to show that the complaining candidate was directly connected with the murder of one Asa Ram, a Harijan and one of the supporters of Congress (I) Party so as to wean away the votes of the harijans of the locality and members of the Congress (I) Party. The High Court had disbelieved oral evidence and found no nexus with the news items etc. and had 742 dismissed the petition. This Court held that where the doctrine of innuendo is applied, it must be clearly proved that the defamatory allegation was made in respect of a person though not named, yet so fully described that the allegation would refer to that person and that person alone. Innuendo cannot be proved merely by inferential evidence which may be capable of two possibilities. On the facts, the Court held that after having gone through the evidence, statement of witnesses and the documents placed before the Court, it was difficult to find any close connection or direct link between the imputations made against the appel- lant in 1978 and those made in 1980. In none of the docu- ments produced by the complaining candidate which referred to the activities of the returned candidate, there was the slightest possibility that the appellant had anything to do with the murder of Asa Ram.
Supreme Court of India Cites 4 - Cited by 26 - S M Ali - Full Document

W. Hay And Ors. vs Aswini Kumar Samanta on 15 April, 1957

In W. Hay & Ors. v. Aswini Kumar Samanta, AIR 1958 Cal. 269 a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court held that it is well-settled that in a "libel action" the ordinary defam- atory words must be set out in the plaint. Where the words are per se or prima facie defamatory only the words need be set out. Wherever the defamatory sense is not apparent on the face of the words, the defamatory meaning or as it is technically known in law, the innuendo must also be set out and stated in clear and specific terms. Where again the offending words would be defamatory only in the particular context in which they were used, uttered or published, it is necessary also to set out except where as in England, the law is or has been made expressly otherwise, the offending context (colloquium) in the plaint, and to state or ever further that this context or the circumstances constituting the same, were known to the persons to whom the words were published, or, at least, that they understood the words in the defamatory sense. In the absence of these necessary averments, the plaint would be liable to be rejected on the ground that it does not disclose any cause of action.
Calcutta High Court Cites 0 - Cited by 16 - Full Document
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