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41 - 50 of 64 (0.29 seconds)Section 6 in The Specific Relief Act, 1963 [Entire Act]
The Companies Act, 1956
Section 5 in The Arbitration And Conciliation Act, 1996 [Entire Act]
Indian Companies Act, 1913
Patel Field Marshal Agencies And Anr. vs P.M Diesels Ltd. And Ors. on 29 November, 2017
32.3 That said, the issue before the learned Single Judge, to our minds, was
whether the rectification applications should have been dismissed, or kept in
abeyance till such time the concerned court took a decision as to whether or
not, prima facie, a tenable issue arose concerning the validity of the
trademark, and was inclined to frame it as an issue in the suit. There is
nothing in Section 124 of the 1999 (Amended) TM Act that says that a
rectification application ought to be dismissed in limine, in a situation such
as the one which arose in the instant case. As a matter of fact, the following
observations of the Supreme Court in the Patel Field Marshal case, shed, to
our minds, some light on the aspect:
Section 299 in The Indian Succession Act, 1925 [Entire Act]
Dipak Chandra Ruhidas vs Chandan Kumar Sarkar on 31 July, 2003
15.1 Dipak Chandra Ruhidas' case dealt with the provisions of the
Representation Of People Act 1951 [hereafter referred to as the "RPA"].
Upadhyaya Hargovind Devshanker vs Dhirendrasinh Virbhadrasinhji ... on 17 February, 1988
16. Upadhyaya Hargovind Devshanker's case was also a matter concerning
the RPA, in which the court ruled that an intra-court appeal under clause 15
of the Letters Patent, as applicable to the Gujrat High Court, would not lie,
against an interlocutory order passed by the Single Judge of the High Court
RFA(OS)(COMM) 8/2021 & connected matters Page 21 of 48
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:VIPIN KUMAR RAI
Signing Date:19.05.2023
13:34:08
2023:DHC:3426-DB
while dealing with an election petition. In this context, the court, quite
categorically, observed that the Single Judge of the High Court while
adjudicating the election petition, is exercising a special jurisdiction, which
is conferred on the High Court under Article 329(b) of the Constitution. The
court, thus, observed that the RPA was enacted under the aforementioned
provision in the Constitution to deal with election disputes. Based on the
scheme of the RPA, the Supreme Court concluded that it was a self-
contained enactment.
Union Of India vs A.S. Dhupia And Anr. on 2 March, 1972
16.6 We may also note that the judgment in A.S. Dhupia's case and Hafiz
Mohd's case was also noticed by a Full Bench of this court in Jaswinder
Singh v Mrigendra Pratap Vikram Singh Steiner and Ors. (2013) 196 DLT
1 (FB). The Full Bench, which included three judges, also included one of
us i.e., Rajiv Shakdher J. Interestingly, in this judgement, the court was
called upon to decide whether an intra-court appeal against an order passed
by a Single Judge while exercising ordinary original civil jurisdiction [which
is not appealable under Section 104(1) read with Order 43 Rule 1 of the
CPC] would lie under Section 10(1) of the DHC Act or Clause 10 of the
Letters Patent as applicable to this Court, (i.e., the Delhi High Court). The
Court ruled that an appeal would lie under Section 10 of the DHC Act, as
against Clause 10 of the Letters Patent, when a Single Judge of this court
exercises ordinary original civil jurisdiction. In this context, the Court also
made observations concerning the difference between the Letters Patent of
1919 granted to the Lahore High Court, of which the Delhi High Court was
the successor, as against the Letters Patent of 1862 granted to the erstwhile
RFA(OS)(COMM) 8/2021 & connected matters Page 24 of 48
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:VIPIN KUMAR RAI
Signing Date:19.05.2023
13:34:08
2023:DHC:3426-DB
Presidency Courts i.e., Calcutta, Bombay and Madras. It is based on this
view that the Court observed that an intra-court appeal lay under Clause 10
of the Letters Patent when a Single judge exercised writ jurisdiction, which
is categorized as extraordinary civil jurisdiction.