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The Hershey Company vs Dilip Kumar Bacha, Trading As Shree ... on 9 February, 2024 cites

Dr. Reddys Laboratories Limited vs Fast Cure Pharma on 16 August, 2023

Although the ld. Single Judge in Dr. Reddys Laboratories Ltd. v. Fast Cure Pharma (supra) acknowledges the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius (meaning: the express mention of one thing excludes all others), the application of the dynamic effect concept seems to contradict this legal maxim. The said approach potentially expands the scope beyond the explicit provisions, indirectly filling gaps that the Legislature did not address.
Delhi High Court Cites 3 - Cited by 0 - C H Shankar - Full Document

Dr. Reddys Laboratories Limited & Anr. vs The Controller Of Patents & Ors. on 10 November, 2022

It is to be noted that the said decision in Girdhari Lal Gupta (supra) has also been followed by this Court in Dr. Reddys Laboratories v. Controller of Patents (supra) the context of the Patents Act, 1970, after enactment of the TRA. However, unlike the 1999 Act, the both the Patents Act, 1970 and the Designs Act, 2000, the term 'High Court' has been defined. In both these statutes, the term 'High Court' is defined as under:
Delhi High Court Cites 102 - Cited by 1 - P M Singh - Full Document

Indian Performing Rights Society Ltd vs Sanjay Dalia & Anr on 1 July, 2015

xiii) The principle from Heydon's Case, as applied in the Indian Performing Rights Society Limited v. Sanjay Dalia (supra), suggests that the Court should interpret the 1999 Act by considering its overall scheme and purpose, and to prevent any mischief that was sought to be curtailed. Applying this principle to the 1999 Act, especially after its amendment by the TRA, would mean interpreting it in a way that, upholds the practical Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 179/2023 & connected matters Page 64 of 70 By:RAHUL Signing Date:09.02.2024 19:16:40 utility of trade mark law and ensure that trade mark rights are effectively protectable.
Supreme Court of India Cites 57 - Cited by 157 - A Mishra - Full Document

M/S. Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd vs Union Of India And Anr on 28 April, 2004

30.7 Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd v. U.O.I.- which is considered a watershed decision in territorial jurisdiction jurisprudence in the context of writ petitions - examined the issue of whether a writ petition, challenging a legislative enactment which had been applied by a judicial or executive authority to the prejudice of the petitioner, could be filed at Delhi, even though the petitioner was not located within the jurisdiction of this Court and had felt no effect of the legislation within such jurisdiction, merely because the situs of the Union legislature, which enacted the legislation, was in Delhi. Answering the issue in the negative, the Supreme Court held that a writ petition would lie, not before the High Court having jurisdiction over the legislature which enacted the legislation, but over the location of the litigant who felt the effect of the legislation by the passing of the Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 179/2023 & connected matters Page 46 of 70 By:RAHUL Signing Date:09.02.2024 19:16:40 judicial or executive order based on the impugned legislation - which is what Girdhari Lal Gupta terms "the dynamic effect". The intrinsic relationship between the situs of a litigation, or an executive action under challenge, and its dynamic effect as felt by the litigant is, therefore, fossilized in the law."
Supreme Court of India Cites 13 - Cited by 856 - S B Sinha - Full Document

Sri Chamundeeswari Weaving And Trading ... vs The Mysore Spinning And Manufacturing ... on 6 October, 1961

• Further, the definition of 'High Court' under Article 366(14)(a) of the Constitution of India, merely, means that a High Court could be any High Court, located in any territory as constituted under the Constitution of India. Further, Article 214 of the Constitution of India is, merely a listing of all the High Courts. The broad listing of High Courts under the Constitution of India does not automatically grant 3 2017 8 SCR 33, paragraph 53 at page 103 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 179/2023 & connected matters Page 13 of 70 By:RAHUL Signing Date:09.02.2024 19:16:40 jurisdiction to every High Court. Even under the Trade Marks Act, 1940 (hereinafter, '1940 Act') which referred to Section 219 of the Government of India Act, 1935 (hereinafter, 'GoI Act'), confusion prevailed between decisions rendered by various High Courts. The same was considered by the 'Report of Shri. Justice N. Rajagopala Ayyangar on Trade Marks Law Revision, 1995 (Government of India, Ministry of Commerce and Industry)' (hereinafter, '1955 Ayyangar Committee Report'). He submits that the said Ayyangar Report, clearly opined that this jurisdictional conflict required that 'High Court' ought to be defined, and clarity ought to be given. As a result of this recommendation, 'High Court' was defined in the 1958 Act under Section 2(h), which no longer exists under the 1999 Act. To support this submission, reference is made to paragraphs 41 to 43 of the 1955 Ayyangar Committee Report. Further, to illustrate the nature of the conflict that led to the revision of the 1940 Act, reliance is placed on Chamundeeswari Weaving and Trading Co., (Pte) Ltd. v. Mysore Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd.4 and Watkins Mavor & Co. v. Registrar of Trade Marks Bombay5.
Madras High Court Cites 15 - Cited by 2 - Full Document

Watkins Mayor & Co. vs Registrar Of Trade Marks, Bombay And ... on 30 November, 1951

• Further, the definition of 'High Court' under Article 366(14)(a) of the Constitution of India, merely, means that a High Court could be any High Court, located in any territory as constituted under the Constitution of India. Further, Article 214 of the Constitution of India is, merely a listing of all the High Courts. The broad listing of High Courts under the Constitution of India does not automatically grant 3 2017 8 SCR 33, paragraph 53 at page 103 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 179/2023 & connected matters Page 13 of 70 By:RAHUL Signing Date:09.02.2024 19:16:40 jurisdiction to every High Court. Even under the Trade Marks Act, 1940 (hereinafter, '1940 Act') which referred to Section 219 of the Government of India Act, 1935 (hereinafter, 'GoI Act'), confusion prevailed between decisions rendered by various High Courts. The same was considered by the 'Report of Shri. Justice N. Rajagopala Ayyangar on Trade Marks Law Revision, 1995 (Government of India, Ministry of Commerce and Industry)' (hereinafter, '1955 Ayyangar Committee Report'). He submits that the said Ayyangar Report, clearly opined that this jurisdictional conflict required that 'High Court' ought to be defined, and clarity ought to be given. As a result of this recommendation, 'High Court' was defined in the 1958 Act under Section 2(h), which no longer exists under the 1999 Act. To support this submission, reference is made to paragraphs 41 to 43 of the 1955 Ayyangar Committee Report. Further, to illustrate the nature of the conflict that led to the revision of the 1940 Act, reliance is placed on Chamundeeswari Weaving and Trading Co., (Pte) Ltd. v. Mysore Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd.4 and Watkins Mavor & Co. v. Registrar of Trade Marks Bombay5.
Punjab-Haryana High Court Cites 8 - Cited by 7 - Full Document

Terapalli Dyvasahata Kumar vs S.M.Kantha Raju (Dead) Thr. Lr. on 16 August, 2017

• Thus, the position prevalent under the 1940 Act would, in fact, be similar to the present position except the two decisions which, according to him, have a bearing under 1999 Act while deciding as to what would be the High Court for exercising jurisdiction. The first decision relied upon is Terapalli Dyvasahata Kumar v. S. Kanthu 4 AIR 1959 Mad. 251 5 AIR 1952 Punj. 266 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 179/2023 & connected matters Page 14 of 70 By:RAHUL Signing Date:09.02.2024 19:16:40 Raju6. The said decision is asserted to be applicable in the present case, where the term 'the High Court' is used in the 1999 Act, without a specific definition within the Act, suggesting that it should be construed based on its general meaning as understood in law.
Supreme Court of India Cites 25 - Cited by 6 - R F Nariman - Full Document

Midas Hygiene Industries P. Ltd. And ... vs Sudhir Bhatia And Ors. on 22 January, 2004

2018 (11) SCC 769, paragraphs 13, 18 7 2022/DHC/4746, paragraph 83 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 179/2023 & connected matters Page 15 of 70 By:RAHUL Signing Date:09.02.2024 19:16:40 • The last submission is that even under the 1999 Act when Section 3 of the 1958 Act was not retained, the constitution of the IPAB was contemplated by the legislature to be only one forum for the entire country. In fact, Section 84 of the 1999 Act makes it very clear that it was up to the Central Government to notify only for the purposes of sittings and distribution of work, but never for the purposes of conferring territorial jurisdiction. The notifications issued under the 1999 Act when the IPAB was functioning are relied upon to argue that the only notification which was issued was under Section 84(2) of the 1999 Act, and not under Section 84(4) of the 1999 Act. The distribution of work was never considered necessary even under the 1999 Act by the legislature and thus, even today, the same position ought to prevail. Any distribution of work by the IPAB itself as part of its practice for the purpose of administrative convenience cannot override the parliamentary intent of the legislature. Practice of the IPAB, as referred to in Midas Hygiene Industries Ltd. v. Sudhir Bhatia (IPAB) 8 and Girdhari Lal (supra) is relied upon.
Supreme Court of India Cites 1 - Cited by 411 - Full Document
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