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Gopalji Prasad vs State Of Sikkim And Ors. on 9 November, 1979 cites

State Of Bihar vs K. K. Misra & Ors on 29 October, 1969

3. It may be noted that the provisions of this Section 144, Criminal Procedure Code had to meet the challenge on the ground of constitutionality before the Supreme Court more than once on the ground that they put unreasonable restrictions on and were, therefore, violative of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution and one of the main grounds on which this challenge was repelled by the Supreme Court was that the orders passed under the section are judicial orders and being so, could "be challenged in revision before the High Court under Section 435 read with Section 439, Criminal Procedure Code". (See, State of Bihar v. K.K. Misra ; Babulal Parate v. State of Maharashtra and Madhu Limaye v. Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Monghyr . If this amenability to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court is, as held by the Supreme Court in the decisions noted above, what, inter alia, saves the provisions of Section 144, Criminal Procedure Code from constitutional attack, then such amenability cannot be, as a matter of law, made dependent on the fact as to whether the impugned order is still in operation or has spent its force on the day when the High Court proceeds to review the same in the exercise of its revisional power.
Supreme Court of India Cites 23 - Cited by 19 - J C Shah - Full Document

Babulal Parate vs State Of Maharashtra And Others on 12 January, 1961

11. The material portion of the impugned order has been quoted hereinbefore wherein the alleged forcible entry by the petitioner before me in the room alleged to be in the occupation and possession of the respondent No. 2 was sought to be restrained. Assuming the allegations to be true, there is nothing in the impugned order or anywhere in the record to show that such entry by the petitioner in the room in the possession of the respondent was likely to assume such "grave proportions to bring the matter within the interests of public order" or the general public. The impugned order aiming to affect and restrict the right of the petitioner to move freely as conferred by Sub-clause (d) of Article 19(1), can be sustained only if it was passed in the interest of the general public or of any Scheduled Tribe as provided in Clause (5) of Article 19. In the absence of any such indication, the user of the provisions of Section 144, Criminal Procedure Code by the Magistrate was improper. The Supreme Court in Babulal Parate's case AIR 1961 SC 884 : 1961 (2) Cri LJ 16 and Madhu Limaye's case AIR 1971 SC 2486 : 1971 Cri LJ 1721 was fully alive to the fact that this Section 144 could be improperly applied by those who are not alive to the provision of the Constitution and observed AIR 1971 SC 2486 at p. 2497 : 1971 Cri LJ 1721 that "Section 144 is not unconstitutional if properly applied". It is, therefore, clear that when improperly applied, what shall be struck down is such improper application and not the provisions of the section.
Supreme Court of India Cites 21 - Cited by 63 - J R Mudholkar - Full Document

Madhu Limaye vs Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Monghyr & ... on 28 October, 1970

11. The material portion of the impugned order has been quoted hereinbefore wherein the alleged forcible entry by the petitioner before me in the room alleged to be in the occupation and possession of the respondent No. 2 was sought to be restrained. Assuming the allegations to be true, there is nothing in the impugned order or anywhere in the record to show that such entry by the petitioner in the room in the possession of the respondent was likely to assume such "grave proportions to bring the matter within the interests of public order" or the general public. The impugned order aiming to affect and restrict the right of the petitioner to move freely as conferred by Sub-clause (d) of Article 19(1), can be sustained only if it was passed in the interest of the general public or of any Scheduled Tribe as provided in Clause (5) of Article 19. In the absence of any such indication, the user of the provisions of Section 144, Criminal Procedure Code by the Magistrate was improper. The Supreme Court in Babulal Parate's case AIR 1961 SC 884 : 1961 (2) Cri LJ 16 and Madhu Limaye's case AIR 1971 SC 2486 : 1971 Cri LJ 1721 was fully alive to the fact that this Section 144 could be improperly applied by those who are not alive to the provision of the Constitution and observed AIR 1971 SC 2486 at p. 2497 : 1971 Cri LJ 1721 that "Section 144 is not unconstitutional if properly applied". It is, therefore, clear that when improperly applied, what shall be struck down is such improper application and not the provisions of the section.
Supreme Court of India Cites 36 - Cited by 292 - M Hidayatullah - Full Document

S.S. Venkataramana Aiyar vs Emperor on 21 September, 1917

However wide the powers conferred by this section may be, the authority of the Magistrates exercising such powers is neither absolute nor supreme but is subject to supervision and revision by the higher Courts and therefore, the Magistrates in order to act legally and with propriety, must, as observed by Sadasiva Aiyar, J. in S.S. Venkataramana v. Emperor AIR 1919 Mad 1004 at p. 1007 : 1918-19 Cri LJ 56, indicate with reasonable fullness the materials on which they conclude that there was some emergency justifying their actions, so that the higher Courts may check and brake them and put them back on rails when they go off.
Madras High Court Cites 12 - Cited by 7 - Full Document

Emperor vs Bhola Giri Mohunt on 18 February, 1936

That section contemplates the passing of an absolute order directing any person to abstain from any act or take certain order with certain property in his possession or under his enjoyment. The order can be passed either ex parte in case of emergency under the provisions of Sub-section (2) or it may be passed after giving an opportunity to the person against whom an order is proposed to be passed. But the order must be an order which is absolute and definite in terms. Section 144, Clauses (a) and (b) do not contemplate the passing of a conditional order to be made absolute later on. As I read these provisions the order for injunction under Section 144 must be an absolute and definite order, and it must be left to the party to apply for rescinding the order by having recourse to the procedure laid down in sub-ss. (4) and (5) of the said section. In the present case the order is in the following terms; "...either to refrain from doing any of the acts set forth above... or to show cause, if any, against the said order.
Calcutta High Court Cites 1 - Cited by 2 - Full Document
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