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1 - 10 of 34 (0.29 seconds)Section 114 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
The Indian Evidence Act, 1872
Section 27 in The General Clauses Act, 1897 [Entire Act]
Section 20 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
Section 106 in The Transfer Of Property Act, 1882 [Entire Act]
Mahboob Bi vs Alvala Lachmiah on 12 February, 1962
In Mahboob Bi v. Alvala
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Lachmiah, an almost identical question figured before the
Andhra Pradesh High Court. In that case the Rent Controller
issued a notice in respect of the proceedings initiated
before him by the landlord for the eviction of the tenant,
to the tenant by registered post and the envelope was
returned with the endorsement of refusal and the Rent
Controller set down the proceedings for ex parte hearing and
passed a decree for eviction. The tenant under the decree of
eviction preferred an appeal in the City Small Causes Court.
A preliminary objection was raised by the respondent-
landlord that the appeal was barred by limitation as it was
filed six days after the time allowed for filing the appeal.
The appellant-tenant countered this by saying that he had no
knowledge of the proceedings before the Rent Controller and
that he was never served with the notice of proceedings
before the Rent Controller. The relevant rule permitted
service of notice by registered post. After examining the
relevant rule the Court accepted the contention of the
tenant observing as under:
Hanuman Prasad Narain Singh vs Mathura Prasad Narain Singh on 11 July, 1928
Section 3 of the
Repealed Act enumerated grounds on which a tenant could be
evicted. Sub-clause (a) of s. 3 provided that the landlord
would be entitled to eviction of a tenant if the tenant was
'in arrears of rent for more than three months' and had
failed to pay the same to the landlord within one month of
the service upon him of the notice of demand. The language
employed in the repealed provision led
978
the Court to hold that whatever be the default in payment of
rent, a period of three months should have expired from the
date of default whereafter alone the landlord would be
entitled to serve a notice as provided in the relevant sub-
clause. It was so held by the Allahabad High Court in Ram
Saran Das v. L. Bir Sain, but this decision was overruled in
Jitendra Prasad v. Mathur Prasad. In order to avoid ally
such controversy, in the Repealing statute the expression
'arrears of rent for more than three months' has been
substituted by the expression 'arrears of rent for not less
than four months'. This is contemporaneous legislative
exposition which clearly brings out the legislative
intention that the landlord would be entitled to evict the
tenant if the rent is in arrears for not legs than four
months. Therefore, it would clearly imply that before the
landlord can commence action under sub-clause (a), the
tenant must have committed default in payment of rent for a
period of four months. Therefore, the first suggested
construction is not borne out by the language employed in
the section.
R. Ramachandran Ayyar vs Ramalingam Chettiar on 10 August, 1962
When this appeal was heard, section 100 of the Civil
Procedure Code after its amendment of 1976 was in force. It
restricted the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain a
second appeal only if the High Court was satisfied that the
case involved a substantial question of law. Sub-section 4
cast a duty on the court to formulate such a substantial
question of law and the appeal has to be heard on the
question so formulated. It would also be open to the
respondent
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at the hearing of the appeal to contend that the case does
not involve such a question. Even prior to the amendment of
Section 100, the High Court ordinarily did not interfere
with the concurrent findings of fact. This position has been
repeatedly asserted and one need not go in search of
precedent to support the proposition. However one can
profitably refer to R. Ramachandran Ayyar v. Ramalingam
Chettiar. After examining the earlier decisions and the
decision of the Privy Council in Mst.
Appabhai Motibhai vs Laxmichand Zaverchand And Co. on 9 July, 1953
To answer it in the affirmative
is to wholly ignore the Indian society. And this concept
that the registered envelope properly addressed and returned
with an endorsement of refusal must permit a rebuttable
presumption that the addressee refused it with the knowledge
of the contents is wholly borrowed from the western
jurisprudence. I believe it is time that we ignore the
illusion and return to reality. Reference was also made to
Appabhai Motibhai v. Laxmichand Zaverchand & Co., but that
case does not touch the point.