Search Results Page
Search Results
1 - 10 of 22 (1.31 seconds)Section 97 in The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [Entire Act]
Section 18 in The Limitation Act, 1963 [Entire Act]
Ittavira Mathai vs Varkey Varkey And Another on 15 January, 1963
cannot be treated as one which was passed without
jurisdiction. For, it is well settled that while it is the
duty of a court to decide right it may well happen that it
decides wrong. Whichever way it decides, it acts within its
jurisdiction and not beyond it, as was observed by the Privy
Council in Malkarjun v. Narhari(1) which was followed by
this Court in Ittyavira Mathai's case(2). A wrong decision
is no doubt vulnerable but it does not automatically become
unenforceable. Unless corrected in the manner provided for
in the Code it will operate as res judicata between the
parties in all subsequent stages of the lis.
I have not thought it necessary to discuss the various
decisions cited at the Bar and noted by my learned brother
because the decrees construed in them were found to be vague
or incomplete. To my mind it would not be right for a court
to characterise a term of a decree which upon its face
appears to be clear and complete, as being vague or
incomplete merely because in its view that term is erroneous
and then proceed to interpret it. So far as a Court whose
duty it is to give effect to a decree of a Court of
competent jurisdiction is concerned it is immaterial whether
the term or direction as it stands is contrary to law. So
long as it is, on its face, complete and capable of
enforcement it has no power to go behind. For these reasons
I am of opinion that the first contention raised on behalf
of the appellant must fail.
Yeswant Deorao Deshmukh vs Walchand Ramchand Kothari on 1 December, 1950
I am aware that in Yeswant Deorao Deshmukh v. Walchand
Ramchand Kothari(1) this Court has quoted with approval at
pp. 861-2 the following passage from the decision in
Connecticut Fire Insurance Co. v. Kayanagh (2) :
Rehmat-Un-Nissa Begum vs John Price on 13 December, 1917
We would be going against all precedents as for instance the
decision of the Privy Council in Rehmat-un-Nisa Begum v.
Price() and our recent judgment in lttyavira Mathai v.
Varkey Yarkey(2) if we say that despite what the High Court
did, we shall go into the question ourselves. In that case
we have observed in col. 2 page 911 :
Kumar Jagdish Chandra vs Bulaqi Das And Anr. on 13 August, 1958
Lastly, we may draw attention to a possibility of the
decreeholder gaining by his own default, if he did not take
possession for a period longer than 3 years after the date
of the decree, when the decree did not specify the period
for which mesne profits would be allowed or merely stated
that mesne profits would be paid until delivery of
possession. The law did not contemplate such a case and
therefore clearly provided the maximum period for which
mesne profits would be allowed to the decree-holder after
the passing of the decree. Such a case was Kunwar Jagdish
Chandra v. Bulaqi Das(1).