The same Item 21 in List II (Provincial List) of the Seventh
Schedule to the Constitution Act of 1935, came up for
consideration before the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council on appeal from the Federal Court of India in Megh
Raj v. Allah Rakhi (1), affirming the judgment of the Lahore
High Court. In that case, the Punjab Restitution of
Mortgaged Lands Act (Punj. IV of 1938) had been challenged
as ultra vires. By that Act, the Legislature had provided
for redemption of mortgages on terms much less onerous than
the terms of the mortgage-deeds. Their Lordships of the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council repelled the
contention raised on behalf of the appellants that the words
of Item No. 21, were not wide enough to comprehend the
relationship of mortgagor and mortgagee in respect of
agricultural land. Their Lordships observed that Item 21
aforesaid, forming a part, as it did, of the Constitution,
should, on ordinary principles, receive the widest
construction, unless, for some reasons, it is cut down
either by the terms of that item itself, or by other parts
of the Constitution, which have, naturally, to be read as a
whole; and then proceeded to make the following very
significant observations :-
In this connection,
our attention was invited to the decision of a Full Bench of
the Punjab High Court in the case of State of Punjab v. S.
Kehar Singh (1), to the effect that a holding being a part
of an estate, was not within the purview of Art. 31A of the
Constitution. In this connection, it is necessary to state
the conflict of views in that High Court itself.
In the
case of Bhagirath Ram Chand v. State of Punjab (2), the
validity of the very Act impugned before us, was challenged
on grounds based upon Articles 14, 19 and 31 of the
Constitution. The learned Judges constituting the Full
Bench, unanimously held that the impugned Act did not
infringe those provisions of the Constitution, and the
restrictions on the right of land-holding, imposed by the
Act, were reasonable, and that the classification did not
exceed the permissible limit. But they also held that the
Act was saved by Art. 31A of the Constitution, which applied
equally to an entire estate or to a portion thereof.
Besides giving other reasons, which may not bear close
scrutiny, they made specific reference to the doctrine that
the whole includes the part. Thus, the Full Bench
specifically held that Art. 31A of the Constitution applied
equally to portions of estates also.