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Rajitram Shukla And 2 Others vs State Of U.P. And Another on 29 September, 2021 cites

Sarah Mathew vs Inst., Cardio Vascular Diseases & Ors on 26 November, 2013

8. We have considered the aforesaid contention advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the appellant. It is apparent from the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant, that he is calculating limitation by extending the same to the order passed by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nalagarh, on 06.02.2009. The instant contention is wholly misconceived on account of the legal position declared by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Sarah Mathew vs. Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases, wherein in para 51, this Court has held as under : (SCC p.102) "51. In view of the above, we hold that for the purpose of computing the period of limitation under Section 468 CrPC the relevant date is the date of filing of the complaint or the date of institution of prosecution and not the date on which the Magistrate takes cognizance. We further hold that Bharat Kale which is followed in Japani Sahoo lays down the correct law. Krishna Pillai will have to be restricted to its own facts and it is not the authority for deciding the question as to what is the relevant date for the purpose of computing the period of limitation under Section 468 CrPC."
Supreme Court of India Cites 81 - Cited by 234 - P Sathasivam - Full Document

Assistant Collector Of Customs & Anr vs U.L.R. Malwani And Anr on 16 October, 1968

"19. To address the questions which arise in this reference, it is necessary to have a look at the legislative history of Chapter XXXVI CrPC. The Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 contained no general provision for limitation. Though under certain special laws like the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, the Police Act, 1861, The Factories Act, 1948 and the Army Act, 1950, there are provisions prescribing period of limitation for prosecution of offences, there was no general law of limitation for prosecution of other offences. The approach of this Court while dealing with the argument that there was delay in launching prosecution, when in the Criminal Procedure Code (1898), there was no general provision prescribing limitation, could be ascertained from its judgment in Collector of Customs v. L.R. Melwani. It was urged before the High Court in that case that there was delay in launching prosecution. The High Court held that the delay was satisfactorily explained. While dealing with this question, this Court held that in any case prosecution could not have been quashed on the ground of delay because it was not the case of the accused that any period of limitation was prescribed for filing the complaint. Hence the complaint could not have been thrown out on the sole ground that there was delay in filing the same. This Court further observed that the question of delay in filing complaint may be a circumstance to be taken into consideration in arriving at the final verdict and by itself it affords no ground for dismissing the complaint. This position underwent a change to some extent when Chapter XXXVI was introduced in the Criminal Procedure Code as we shall soon see.
Supreme Court of India Cites 24 - Cited by 139 - K S Hegde - Full Document

Jamuna Singh And Others vs Bhadai Sah on 4 October, 1963

10. The term 'cognizance' in the context of the provisions of the Code and the earlier decisions in the case of Jamuna Singh Vs. Bhadai Shah6, R.R.Chari Vs. State of U.P.7, Gopal Das Sindhi Vs. State of Assam8, and Chief Enforcement Officer Vs. Videocon International Ltd.9, was discussed and it was observed that 'taking cognizance' is entirely an act of the Magistrate and that the same may be delayed because of several reasons including systematic reasons. The conflicting view points as to whether the date of taking cognizance or the date of filing complaint is material for computing limitation was considered and it was observed as follows:-
Supreme Court of India Cites 15 - Cited by 162 - K C Gupta - Full Document

R. R. Chari vs State Of U.P on 28 March, 1962

10. The term 'cognizance' in the context of the provisions of the Code and the earlier decisions in the case of Jamuna Singh Vs. Bhadai Shah6, R.R.Chari Vs. State of U.P.7, Gopal Das Sindhi Vs. State of Assam8, and Chief Enforcement Officer Vs. Videocon International Ltd.9, was discussed and it was observed that 'taking cognizance' is entirely an act of the Magistrate and that the same may be delayed because of several reasons including systematic reasons. The conflicting view points as to whether the date of taking cognizance or the date of filing complaint is material for computing limitation was considered and it was observed as follows:-
Supreme Court of India Cites 22 - Cited by 229 - P B Gajendragadkar - Full Document

Gopal Das Sindhi And Ors. vs State Of Assam And Anr. on 20 January, 1961

10. The term 'cognizance' in the context of the provisions of the Code and the earlier decisions in the case of Jamuna Singh Vs. Bhadai Shah6, R.R.Chari Vs. State of U.P.7, Gopal Das Sindhi Vs. State of Assam8, and Chief Enforcement Officer Vs. Videocon International Ltd.9, was discussed and it was observed that 'taking cognizance' is entirely an act of the Magistrate and that the same may be delayed because of several reasons including systematic reasons. The conflicting view points as to whether the date of taking cognizance or the date of filing complaint is material for computing limitation was considered and it was observed as follows:-
Gauhati High Court Cites 25 - Cited by 196 - Full Document
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