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T.S. Baliah vs T.S. Rangachari, Income-Tax Officer on 14 February, 1968 cites

Commissioner Of Income-Tax,Andhra ... vs Mis. Bhikaji Dadabhai & Co on 22 February, 1961

55. Taking into consideration that the institution of prosecution is not a part of the levy and assessment of tax, but a consequence of failure to do certain things provided in the Act, I do not think, any doubt can be entertained in respect of the interpretation of the saving clause. Thus, offences during the continuance of a statute can be prosecuted and punished even after its repeal as the repealing Act had not obliterated the offences committed when the earlier statute was in force. I am, therefore, of the view that the prosecution under Section 52 of the Income-tax Act, 1922 is not taken away by the repealing Act and the prosecution under that section is competent and sustainable in law. It was also contended by the learned Counsel that the repealing Act had provided under Section 279 of the said Act that the Commissioner of Income-tax alone could sanction prosecution for the offence under Section 277 of the Act, and that the prosecution in the present cases was sanctioned by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner which would be invalid. There is no substance in his argument. It is clear that under Section 53 (1) of the old Act, the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner can institute prosecution under Section 52 of the said Act, but whereas under the new Act, the Commissioner alone can institute prosecution under Section 277 of the new Act which is similar to the offence under Section 52 of the old Act. At the commencement of the new Act, Sections 52 and 53 were in force. If that were so applying the principle laid down in the Income-tax Commissioner v. Bhikaji Dadabhai , the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner would be the competent authority to institute prosecution under Section 52 of the old Act. If prosecution is launched under the old Act which was in force at the time of repeal, the entire procedure provided under the old Act alone should be followed.
Supreme Court of India Cites 9 - Cited by 126 - J C Shah - Full Document

Om Prakash Gupta vs State Of U. P.(With Connected Appeals) on 11 January, 1957

In Om Prakash v. State of U.P. , in dealing with the point whether the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, repealed Section 409, Indian Penal Code, as far as public servants are concerned, it was observed that the Legislature would not have intended in the normal course of things that a temporary statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act should supersede an enactment of antiquity, viz., the Penal Code even if the matter covered the same field.
Supreme Court of India Cites 33 - Cited by 174 - P G Menon - Full Document

State Of Maharashtra vs Prabhakar Pandurang Sangzgiri And ... on 6 September, 1965

Therefore, in our opinion, Section 26 has application provided the same act has been constituted an offence under more than one enactment. It makes no difference to the application of Section 26 that the procedure laid down in the two enactments with regard to the prosecution of the offender is different or even if different sentences are provided under the two enactments....
Supreme Court of India Cites 15 - Cited by 41 - Full Document

State Of Punjab vs Mohar Singh on 20 October, 1954

Whenever there is a repeal of an enactment, the consequences laid down in Section 6 of the General Clauses Act will follow unless, as the section itself says, a different intention appears. In the case of a simple repeal there is scarcely any room for expression of a contrary opinion. But when the repeal is followed by fresh legislation on the same subject the Court would undoubtedly have to look to the provisions of the new Act, but only for the purpose of determining whether they indicate a different intention. The line of enquiry would be, not whether the new Act expressly keeps alive old rights and liabilities, but whether it manifests an intention to destroy them. The Court cannot, therefore, subscribe to the broad proposition that Section 6 of the General Clauses Act is ruled out when there is repeal of an enactment followed by a fresh legislation. Section 6 would be applicable in such cases also unless the new legislation manifests an intention incompatible with or contrary to the provisions of the section. Such incompatibility would have to be ascertained from a consideration of all the relevant provisions of the new law and the mere absence of a saving clause is by itself not material The provisions of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act will apply to a case of repeal even if there is simultaneous enactment unless a contrary intention can be gathered from the new enactment. Of course, the consequences laid down in Section 6 of the Act will apply only when a statute or regulation having the force of a statute is actually repealed.
Supreme Court of India Cites 16 - Cited by 312 - B K Mukherjea - Full Document

A. N. Lakshmana Shenoy vs The Income Tax Officer, Ernakulam ... on 28 April, 1958

In A. N. Lakshman v. Income-tax Officer , while considering the meaning of " assessment " as occurred in Section 13 (1) of Finance Act, 1950, it was held that the word " assessment " must be taken in its comprehensive sense and the collection of words in the said section, namely, "levy, assessment and collection" would indicate that what was meant was the entire process by which the tax is ascertained, demanded and realised.
Supreme Court of India Cites 22 - Cited by 84 - S K Das - Full Document

The Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Bihar & ... vs Maharaja Pratapsingh Bahadur Of ... on 29 November, 1960

53. The learned Counsel for the petitioner relied upon the decision in Income-tax Commissioner, Bihar and Orissa v. Pratapsingh . In that case, the Income-tax Officer issued notice to the assessee under the old Section 34 on 8th August, 1948 for assessing the escaped income. The assessment was completed on 26th August, 1948. Section 34 was amended by Act XLVIII of 1948 which came into force on 8th September, 1948. Proviso to Section 34 after amendment required that the Commissioner must be satisfied that the case was fit for the issue of notice under Section 34. It was held that the amended provision indicated a different intention which excluded the application of Clauses (b) and (c) of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. In that case, it is very significant to note, that though assent was obtained for the amendment to Section 34 on 8th September, 1948, according to the proviso to that section, it was deemed to have come into force on 30th March, 1948. It is, therefore, clear by virtue of the proviso in that case that even in August, 1948 when notice was given by the Income-tax Officer, the amendment to Section 34, namely, that the Commissioner must be satisfied that the case was fit for the issue of notice under Section 34, was in force by virtue of the deeming clause. This decision will not certainly apply to this case as the repealed Act was in force at the commencement of the repeal.
Supreme Court of India Cites 14 - Cited by 33 - M Hidayatullah - Full Document

Harish Chandra Gupta And Ors. vs State Of Uttar Pradesh And Anr. on 1 January, 1960

22. The learned Counsel also relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Harish Chandra v. State of Madhya Pradesh . The point that arose in that case was whether the extension of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 and the Indian Scrap Order of 1943 to Madhya Bharat repealed the Madhya Bharat Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1948 and the Madhya Bharat Scrap Control Order. Here also, the subject-matter of the Central Act and the State Act was substantially the same. But the Supreme Court held that the State Act was repealed by the Central Act as the provisions were not identical and could not, therefore, stand together. The Supreme Court pointed out that there were marked differences between the provisions of the two orders and found that it would not be possible for the two to stand together. The Supreme Court observed as follows at page 937:
Allahabad High Court Cites 2 - Cited by 8 - Full Document
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