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Mohd. Shahid vs State Nct Of Delhi on 4 December, 2015 cites

Aghnoo Nagesia vs State Of Bihar on 4 May, 1965

13. Section 25 of the Evidence Act has to be read with Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. as the latter provision protects an accused if a confession is made during the course of investigation. Relying upon Aghnoo Nagesia (supra), it has been held that a statement by an accused that he was present near the scene of crime could not be sufficient to discharge the burden on the prosecution and shift the burden on the accused.
Supreme Court of India Cites 31 - Cited by 351 - R S Bachawat - Full Document

Khatri Hemraj Amulakh vs The State Of Gujarat on 7 February, 1972

In Khatri and Hemraj v. State of Gujarat AIR 1972 SC 922, the Supreme Court has elucidated that where an accused gives first information to the police, this fact of his giving the information was relevant under Section 8 of the Evidence Act. If the statement made was not a confessional statement, it would be admissible under Section 21 of the Evidence Act. However, if the statement was Crl.A.Nos.32, 373 & 587/2015 Page 14 of 43 confessional, it cannot be used against the accused in terms of Section 25, except to the extent permitted under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. In case of confessional statement resulting in registration of the FIR, the same could be also used for identifying the accused as the maker of the statement.
Supreme Court of India Cites 5 - Cited by 70 - H R Khanna - Full Document

Palvinder Kaur vs The State Of Punjab(Rup ... on 22 October, 1952

In a later case of A. Nagesia v. Bihar, Bachawat, J., after referring to Lord Atkin's observations in Pakala Narayana Swami case and their approval in Palvinder Kaur case defined a confession as ―an admission of the offence by a person charged with the offence‖. It is thus clear that an admission of a fact, however incriminating, but not by itself establishing the guilt of the maker of such admission, would not amount to confession within the meaning of Sections 24 to 26 of the Evidence Act.
Supreme Court of India Cites 8 - Cited by 189 - M C Mahajan - Full Document

Om Prakash & Anr vs State Of U.P. & Ors on 15 July, 1998

In Om Prakash v. U.P., the appellant was convicted under Section 161 read with Section 109 of the Penal Code. Two statements made by him, Exs. P-3 and P-4, to the Assistant Agricultural Engineer, Aligarh were relied upon as confessions of bribery having been given by him to public servants and upon which the High Court had based his convection. This Court set aside the conviction holding that neither of the two documents amounted to a plenary acknowledgement of the offence, that the statements were capable of being construed as complaints by him of having been cheated by the public servants named therein and that at best they might arouse suspicion that he had bribed them.
Supreme Court of India Cites 34 - Cited by 725 - S B Majmudar - Full Document

State Of U. P vs Deoman Upadhyaya on 6 May, 1960

In U.P. v. Deaman Upadhyaya, Shah, J., (as he then was) referred to a confession as a statement made by a person ―stating or suggesting the inference that he had committed a crime‖. From that isolated observation, it is difficult to say whether he widened the definition than the one given by the Privy Council. But he did not include in the expression ―confession‖ an admission of a fact, however incriminating, which by itself would not be enough to prove the guilt of the crime in question, although it might, together with the other evidence on record, lead to the conclusion of the guilt of the accused person.
Supreme Court of India Cites 34 - Cited by 338 - J C Shah - Full Document

State Of Punjab vs Karnail Singh on 14 August, 2003

―14. If an offence takes place inside the privacy of a house and in such circumstances where the assailants have all the opportunity to plan and commit the offence at the time and in circumstances of their choice, it will be extremely difficult for the prosecution to lead evidence to establish the guilt of the accused if the strict principle of circumstantial evidence, as noticed above, is insisted upon by the Courts. A Judge does not preside over a criminal trial merely to see that no innocent man is punished. A Judge also presides to see that a guilty man does not escape. Both are public duties. (See Stirland v. Director of Public Prosecution 1944 AC 315 quoted with approval by Arijit Pasayat, J. in State of Punjab v. Karnail Singh 2003 Cri LJ 3892). The law does not enjoin a duty on the prosecution to lead evidence of such character which is almost impossible to be led or at any rate extremely difficult to be led. The duty on the prosecution is to lead such evidence which it is capable of leading, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. Here it is necessary to keep in mind Section 106 of the Evidence Act which says that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. Illustration (b) appended to this section throws some light on the content and scope of this provision and it reads:
Supreme Court of India Cites 18 - Cited by 570 - A Pasayat - Full Document
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