26. The learned counsel for the accused has relied
Crl.A.No.1095 of 2001 -: 29 :-
upon the decision in Panalal Damodar Rathi v. State of
Maharashtra [(1979) 4 SCC 526] to fortify his submission
that there is no evidence regarding the demand alleged to
have been made by the accused. In the aforesaid decision it
was held that when there is no corroboration of testimony of
the complainant regarding the demand of bribe by the
accused it has to be accepted that the version of the
complainant is not corroborated and therefore, it cannot be
relied on. Here, though PWs.1 and 2 did not fully support
the prosecution the evidence given by PW1 and the
contemporaneous records prepared by PW20 and the
circumstances detailed earlier are sufficient to hold that the
accused voluntarily accepted the bribe money. The
circumstances would justify the court to draw the inference
that the accused obtained the pecuniary advantage
voluntarily and on demand. There was no case for the
accused that he happened to receive the currency notes
inadvertently or mistakenly. That apart, the conduct of the
Crl.A.No.1095 of 2001 -: 30 :-
accused as has been narrated earlier would also negative
the plea raised by the defence.
28. The learned Prosecutor would submit that since
the witness was undergoing treatment as a mentally ill
person there was no purpose in sending notice again and
hence the court below found that it was only a delaying
tactics. Seeking examination of a witness for which no
foundation was actually laid by the accused would be of no
help since the credibility or acceptability of the evidence led
by the prosecution had already been tested by the incisive
cross examination made by the defence counsel. Therefore,
the fact that on getting the report that the witness was lying
ill as a mentally ill person the summons was not repeated
will not in any way come to the rescue of the accused. The
decision in Hari Dev Sharma v. State (Delhi
Administration) [(1977) 3 SCC 352] is also not applicable
Crl.A.No.1095 of 2001 -: 32 :-
to the facts of this case since here the court has not
disbelieved the essential and vital part of the prosecution
case. There is the uncontroverted evidence that when the
accused dipped his fingers in lime water it turned pink in
colour. The accused himself showed gestures that the
currency notes were kept by him in the drawer of his office
table and it was from there the notes were taken out by
PW3, the Tahasildar as directed by PW20. Hence the
learned Special judge was impressed by that evidence to
hold that the bribe money was voluntarily accepted by the
accused.
30. The decision in Lachman Dass v. State of
Punjab [AIR 1970 SC 450] is also to be distinguished since
in this case the circumstantial and documentary evidence
created no room for doubt and the defence version was
found to be improbable unlike in the case cited supra.
The
decision in Banarsi Dass v. State of Haryana [AIR 2010
SC 1589] is also to be distinguished since there is evidence
and circumstances in this case to hold that there was
demand and voluntary acceptance of the bribe. In the case
Crl.A.No.1095 of 2001 -: 34 :-
cited supra there was no cogent and reliable evidence to
support the charge against the accused and even the
recovery was not proved in accordance with law. Here each
link of the chain of events is established pointing towards
the guilt of the accused. The offence charged could be
proved beyond reasonable doubt, by circumstantial
evidence.
"Indisputably, the demand of illegal gratification is a sine
qua non for constitution of an offence under the provisions
of the Act. For arriving at the conclusion as to whether all
the ingredients of an offence viz. demand, acceptance and
recovery of the amount of illegal gratification have been
satisfied or not, the court must take into consideration the
facts and circumstances brought on the record in their
entirety. For the said purpose, indisputably, the
Crl.A.No.1095 of 2001 -: 35 :-
presumptive evidence, as is laid down inSection 20 of the
Act, must also be taken into consideration but then in
respect thereof, it is trite, the standard of burden of proof
on the accused vis-a-vis the standard of burden of proof on
the prosecution would differ. Before, however, the
accused is called upon to explain as to how the amount in
question was found in his possession, the foundational
facts must be established by the prosecution. Even while
invoking the provisions of Section 20 of the Act, the court
is required to consider the explanation offered by the
accused, if any, only on the touchstone of preponderance
of probability and not on the touchstone of proof beyond
all reasonable doubt."
In Narsinga Rao's case the decision in
Hazari Lal v. State (Delhi Admn.) [(1980) 2 SCC 390]
was followed where it was held that it is not necessary that
the passing of money should be proved by direct evidence.
It can also be proved by circumstantial evidence. The
events which followed in quick succession in the present
case lead, as was held in that case, to the only inference
that the money was obtained by the accused from PW3.
It was held by the Apex Court in Raghubir
Singh v. State of Haryana [1974 SCC (Cri) 596] the three
Judges Bench observed that the very fact that the accused
was in possession of the marked currency notes against the
allegation that he demanded and received that amount is
Crl.A.No.1095 of 2001 -: 37 :-
"res ipsa loquitur".