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Chintaman Sukhdeo Kaklij And Ors. vs Shivaji Bhausaheb Gadhe And Ors. on 12 August, 2004 cites

Sangramsingh vs Election Tribunal, Kotah on 17 July, 1953

21. In light of the decisions cited above, it is clear that even if the word "shall" is used in the Code it need not be construed that the time limit prescribed in Order 8, Rule 1 of the Code is mandatory. Before proceeding further it would be necessary to bear in mind the observations of Bose J., in Sangramsingh v. Election Tribunal Kotah and Anr. (supra) that, "Code of Procedure.... is "procedure" something designed to facilitate justice and further its ends not a penal enactment for punishment and penalties, not a thing designed to trip people up. Too technical a construction of sections that leaves no room for reasonable elasticity of interpretation should therefore be guarded against (provided always that justice is done to both sides) lest the very means designed for the furtherance of justice be used to frustrate it. Our laws of procedure are grounded on a principle of natural justice which requires that men should not be condemned unheard, that decisions should not be reached behind their backs, that proceedings that affect their lives and property should not continue in their absence and that they should not be precluded from participating in them. Of course, there must be exception and where they are clearly defined they must be given effect to. But taken by and large, and subject to that proviso, our laws of procedure should be construed, wherever that is reasonably possible, in the light of that principle".
Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur Cites 4 - Cited by 5 - Full Document

Prabhakar Madhavrao Mule vs Bhagwan Mitharam Choudhari on 24 February, 2004

In Prabhakar Madhavrao Mule v. Bhagwan Mitharam, 2004(2) Mh.L.J. 1058, Vagyani J., held that by virtue of recent amendment to the Civil Procedure Code by Act 22 of 2002, there is no alternative for the defendant to file written statement within 30 days from the date of service of suit summons and by virtue of proviso to Rule 1, Order 8 of the Civil Procedure Code, the written statement can be allowed to be filed on such other day for reason to be recorded in writing, but in any case not later than 90 days from the date of service of suit summons. Rule 1, Order 8 of Civil Procedure Code is mandatory in nature and it requires strict compliance. The time cannot be extended under Order 8, Rule 9 of the Civil Procedure Code as filing of written statement is governed exclusively by Order 8, Rule 1 and on failure to file written statement within 90 days under amended Rule 1, Order 8, the right to file written statement is lost and the defendant cannot bank upon Rule 9, Order 8 of the Civil Procedure Code to wipe out his default.
Bombay High Court Cites 11 - Cited by 2 - B B Vagyani - Full Document

Iridium India Telecom Limited vs Motorola Inc. A Corporation And Anr. on 8 August, 2003

32. In Iridium India Telecom. Ltd, (supra) the Division Bench of this Court, to which one of us (Shah, J.) was a party, was dealing with an appeal arising from the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court. The learned Single Judge by exercising inherent powers under section 148 of the Civil Procedure Code had extended time for filing written statement holding that section 148 could be invoked to extend the period prescribed under Order 8, Rule 1, notwithstanding the proviso to Order 8, Rule 1 which curtails the power of the Court to extend the time only upto 90 days. The Division Bench held that the provision of section 148 cannot be resorted to where the time is fixed by the Code. The Division Bench then proceeded to consider the principle issue whether the provisions of Order 8, Rule 1 would apply to suits on the Original Side. That issue has ultimately answered in the negative holding that Order 8, Rule 1 would not apply to suits on the Original Side and such suits on the Original Side will continue to be governed by the Original Side Rules. The issue as to whether the Order 8, Rule 1 is mandatory or directory was not decided by the Division Bench. In fact the Court's attention was not drawn to Rules 9 and 10 of Order 8 of Civil Procedure Code.
Bombay High Court Cites 20 - Cited by 13 - S A Bobde - Full Document

Shailaja A. Sawant (Dr.) vs Sayajirao Ganpatrao Patil on 19 December, 2003

3. As against this in Shailaja A. Sawant (Dr.) v. Sayajirao Ganpatrao Patil, 2004(2) Mh.LJ. 419, Bhosale J., took a view that the provisions of Order 8, Rule 1, Civil Procedure Code as amended by Act of 22 of 2002 are directory in nature. Rule 10 of Order 8, Civil Procedure Code governs both situations where the written statement is required under Rule 1, Order 8 as also where it has been demanded under Rule 9. In both situations if a written statement has not been filed by the defendant, it will be open for the Court to pronounce the judgment against him or make such order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit under Rule 10, Order 8. If a written statement is not filed, the Court is required to pronounce the judgment against him. This also gives discretion either to pronounce the judgment to "make such order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit". In other words, it is open for the Court to allow the defendant to file a written statement even at that stage. Rules 9 and 10 of Order 8 give discretion to the trial Court to allow the defendant to file a written statement at any stage prior to the pronouncement of the judgment.
Bombay High Court Cites 33 - Cited by 15 - D B Bhosale - Full Document

Raza Buland Sugar Co. Ltd vs Municlpal Board, Rampur on 30 October, 1964

In Raza Buland Sugar Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Board, , a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court had to consider the question whether Section 135(3) read with Section 94(3) of the U.P. Municipalities Act was mandatory or directory. The facts were that Rampur Municipality, by a special resolution, proposed to levy property tax on persons or a class of persons. Section 131(3) required that the Board shall pass a resolution and have it published in the manner prescribed in section 94 of such proposed tax. Section 135(3) declared that a notification of the imposition of the tax under sub-section (2) thereof shall be conclusive proof that the tax has been imposed in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Under Section 94(3), every resolution passed by the Board shall be published in a local Hindi newspaper or in its absence by general or special order as may be directed by the State Government. The Municipality had contended that it had followed that procedure. The appellants contended that there was infraction in that behalf. While considering that question, per majority it was held that:
Supreme Court of India Cites 33 - Cited by 230 - K N Wanchoo - Full Document

Topline Shoes Ltd vs Corporation Bank on 8 July, 2002

In recent decision in Topline Shoes Ltd. v. Corporation Bank, , the Supreme Court, while dealing with the interpretation of the provisions of Consumer Protection Act, 1986 formulated following question for determination -- whether or not the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, could grant time to the respondent to file his reply, beyond a total period of 45 days, in view of Section 13(2) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. The Supreme Court after considering the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the said Act held thus:
Supreme Court of India Cites 12 - Cited by 405 - B Kumar - Full Document
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