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Prabhu Dayal vs State Of Rajasthan And Ors. on 4 November, 1993 cites

Prem Cables Pvt. Ltd. vs Assistant Collector (Principal ... on 6 September, 1978

6. The first preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondents relate to the territorial jurisdiction of the Jaipur Bench of the High Court. According to the respondents since the petitioner was posted in District Nagaur and he has been punished by the Superintendent of Police, Nagaur, Jaipur Bench of the High Court does not have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition against the order of punishment dated 31.12.91. After having given my thoughtful consideration to this preliminary objection I find myself unable to accept the same. Affidavit filed by the petitioner today shows that the order of punishment dated 31.12.91 had been served upon him at his Village Karnawar District Dausa. This Village falls within the territorial jurisdiction of Jaipur Bench of the High Court. When order of dismissal has been served on the petitioner at a place which falls within the territorial jurisdiction of the Jaipur Bench of the High Court, it can be said that part of cause of action for filing of the writ petition arose within the territorial jurisdiction of Jaipur Bench of the High Court. This being the position it is clear that Jaipur Bench of the High Court has got jurisdiction to entertain, hear and decide the writ petition of petitioner notwithstanding the fact that the order of punishment has been issued by the Superintendent of Police, Nagaur. I am fortified in taking this view by a decision of Division Bench of this Court in Prem Cables (P) Ltd. v. The Asstt. Collector, Customs, 1978 WLN 481, and also by the decision of another Division Bench in Virendra Dangi v. Union of India and Ors., 1992(1) WLC 419. In that decision the Division Bench has declared that the explanation to the Notification dated 23.12.76 as modified vide Notification dated 12.1.77 of Hon'ble Chief Justice is without jurisdiction being against the presidential order and also against Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India.
Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur Cites 78 - Cited by 13 - Full Document

Hirday Narain vs Income-Tax Officer, Bareilly on 21 July, 1970

7. Coming to the second preliminary objection regarding the failure of petitioner to avail the alternative remedy of appeal, it is to be noted that the writ petition was admitted by the Court on 18.7.92. The factum of admission of the writ petition shows that this Court was prima facie satisfied that the claim made by the petitioner in the writ petition deserves to be adjudicated by this Court on merits. It will have to be presumed that at the stage of passing an order for admission of the writ petition the Court was aware of the fact that an alternative remedy of appeal was available to the petitioner under Rule 23 of 1958 Rules. Having overlooked the availability of alternative remedy at that stage it will be unjust for this Court to now non-suit the petitioner after a period of one year and almost four months. Moreover after the admission of writ petition, reply has been filed and the case has been heard on merits. Having heard the parties on merits of the case, I do not find any justification for denying relief to the petitioner on the technical ground of failure of the petitioner to avail the alternative remedy of appeal IN L. Hirday Narain v. Income-Tax Officer, Bareilly , their Lordships of the Supreme Court have unequivocally laid down a principle of law that once a court hears the petition on merits, it is unreasonable to dismiss the writ petition only on the ground that the petitioner has failed to avail an alternative remedy available to him.
Supreme Court of India Cites 13 - Cited by 318 - J C Shah - Full Document

Manoj Kumar Bansal vs State Of Rajasthan And Anr. on 12 August, 1993

In S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 5147/92 Manoj Kumar Bansal v. State of Rajasthan and Anr. decided on 12.8.93, I had an occassion to examine a similar objection raised by the respondents that writ petition be not entertained by the High Court because of the availability of alternative remedy. In that case objection was in the. context of availability of remedy of appeal before the Rajasthan Civil Service Appellate Tribunal and also availability of remedy under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur Cites 41 - Cited by 6 - Full Document

S.N. Mukherjee vs Union Of India on 28 August, 1990

In S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India , a constitution Bench of the Supreme Court has referred to the legal position regarding the requirement of passing of a speaking orders as obtaining in Australia, England, United States of America as also in India and after making reference to almost all other decided cases on the subject, the Supreme Court has held that quasi judicial authority is duty bound to record reasons in support of its order as a part of its obligation to follow the principles of natural justice. The matter has been examined by this Court also in a recent decision in Vijay Singh V.R.S.R.T.C. 1993 (1) WLC 577, and it has been held that a mandatory duty is cast on the competent authority to record reasons in support of its order. The scheme of the Rules of 1958 reinforces the necessity of giving of good and sufficient reasons which is certainly over and above the basic requirement of passing of a speaking order. The rule making authority has designedly thought it proper to incorporate the requirement of recording good and sufficient reasons. This requirement, contained in Rule 14, carries with it another requirement of communicating those reasons to the affected person. Requirement of communication of reasons can be read as implicit in the Rule from the fact that an aggrieved government servant not only has a right to file appeal or review under the Rules of 1958 but has a constitutional right to challenge the order of punishment before the High Court by way of writ under Article 226 of the Constitution. Neither the appellate authority nor the reviewing authority nor the High Court will be in a position to make an adjudication on the merits of the punishment awarded to a delinquent employee if it was not in a position to know as to what are the reasons for imposition of a penalty. When the rule requires that reasons to be recorded in support of an order of punishment must be good and sufficient, it is open to the court to examine those reasons and consider for itself whether the reasons are good and sufficient. Thus, even the sufficiency of reasons is open to scrutiny not only by the appellate and reviewing authorities but also by the courts of law. The order passed by the disciplinary authority is, however, singularly laconic. In this respect there is a total absence of reasons as to why the disciplinary authority has chosen to impose the extreme penalty of removal from service on the petitioner. The order passed by the disciplinary authority does not make any reference to the service record of the petitioner, entries in his service roll etc. It has not been shown that the petitioner has been punished in the past for an act of delinquency. Thus, the order of the disciplinary authority depicts a total non-application of mind on this aspect of the matter.
Supreme Court of India Cites 37 - Cited by 1274 - S C Agrawal - Full Document
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