34.
Again in Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. and another vs. State of
Orissa and another [AIR 1983 SC 603] in the background of taxation
laws, a three judge Bench of this Court apart from
reiterating the principle of exercise of writ jurisdiction with
the time-honoured self imposed limitations, focused on another legal
principle on right and remedies. In paragraph 11, at page 607 of the
report, this Court laid down:
"There
are three classes of cases in which a liability may be established
founded upon statute.... But there is a third class, viz., where a
liability not existing at common law is created by a statute which
at the same time gives a special and particular remedy for
enforcing it...the remedy provided by the statute must be followed,
and it is not competent to the party to pursue the course
applicable to cases of the second class. The form given by the
statute must be adopted and adhered to." The rule laid
down in this passage was approved by the House of Lords in Neville
v. London Express Newspaper Ltd. [1919] AC 368 and has been
reaffirmed by the Privy Council in Attorney-General of
Trinidad and Tobago v. Gordon Grant and Co. [1935] 532 and
Secretary of State v. Mask and Co. AIR 1940 PC 105. It has also been
held to be equally applicable to enforcement of rights, and has
been followed by this Court throughout. The High Court was
therefore justified in dismissing the writ petitions in limine".
36.
Again another Constitution Bench of this Court
in Mafatlal Industries Ltd. and others vs. Union of India
and other [(1997) 5 SCC 536], speaking through Justice B.P. Jeevan
Reddy, delivering the majority judgment, and dealing with
a case of refund of Central Excise Duty held:
In the instant case none of the
aforesaid situations are present. Therefore, principle laid down
in the Ratan's case (supra) applies in the facts and circumstances
of this case. If the appellant in this case is allowed to file a
writ petition despite the existence of an efficacious remedy by way
of appeal under Section 35 of FEMA this will enable
him to defeat the provisions of the Statute which
may provide for certain conditions for filing the appeal, like
limitation, payment of court fees or deposit of some amount of
penalty or fulfillment of some other conditions for entertaining
the appeal. (See para 13 at page 408 of the report). It is obvious
that a writ court should not encourage the aforesaid trend of
by-passing a statutory provision.
41.
Learned Advocate Mr. Tolia has vehemently emphasized by relying upon
section 95 of the Act that immediate interim relief is not available
because appellate board must have to hear other side after supplying
copy of appeal and interim relief application to other side and,
therefore, it is very difficult for petitioner to get immediate
interim order ex parte from appellate board. For that, learned
Senior Advocate Mr. Joshi has emphasized negligence on the part of
petitioner or lapse or deliberate delay or conduct on the part of
petitioner as such which otherwise also disentitle petitioner from
interim relief immediately either from this Court or from appellate
board under section 95 of the Act. Order in question has been passed
by Deputy Registrar of Trade Marks on 17.5.2010. This order has not
been received by petitioner as per his contention, therefore, on
24.6.2010, documents and copy of order were demanded by petitioner
from Registrar of Trade Marks after making payments. So, application
was made on 24.6.2010 and documents including order in question were
supplied to petitioner on 21.7.2010 and thereafter affidavit has
been affirmed on 25.7.2010 and matter was filed in Registry of this
Court on 16.8.2010 and thereafter, it came to be circulated before
this Court for admission on 30.8.2010 and, therefore, considering
these factual aspects of delay, which
are not in dispute between the parties, mere ex parte order is not
to be passed by Appellate Board as per conditions incorporated in
section 95 of the Act, that cannot give right to petitioner to
directly approach this Court by way of this writ petition under
Article 226 of Constitution of India. This aspect has been examined
by apex court in case of Secretary,
Minor Irrigation and Rural Engineering Services, UP and others
versus Sahngoo Ram Arya and another, 2002 SCC (L&S) 775.
Relevant observations made in para 11 and 12 are quoted as under: