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The Authorised Officer, Thanjavur & Anr vs S. Naganatha Ayyar on 4 May, 1979

(i) Firstly, even while challenging the constitutional validity, the petitioners did not make any consequential prayer to challenge the order dated 25.08.2001. The appellants had specifically obtained stay of the operation of the said order. Even after the dismissal of the appeal in L.T.C.M.A.No.4 of 2022 as sub-judice, no prayer was made to amend the consequential relief on the other hand the appellant had thought it fit to https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 20/25 W.P.No.26079 of 2001 and W.A.No.1215 of 2005 challenge the order by way of Writ Petition. Even though the above Writ Petition was pending, as pointed out by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents 3 to 8, the authorities proceeded to publish the draft statement under Section 10(5) of the Act and also published final statement under Section 12 of the Act. The petitioners had challenged the same by filing two Writ Petitions in W.P.Nos.8598 and 8599 of 2004 and by the judgment, dated 07.06.2011, a learned Judge had in detail considered the entire proceedings and by relying upon the aforementioned judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court Authorised Officer, Thanjavur and Another Vs. S.Naganatha Ayyar and Others (cited supra), held that all along due notices were served on the petitioners and their transactions are void and upheld the statements. The petitioners have not filed any appeal whatsoever as against the said judgment and the same has become final.
Supreme Court of India Cites 9 - Cited by 86 - V R Iyer - Full Document

S. Naganatha Ayyar And Ors. vs The Authorised Officer And Ors. on 11 December, 1970

9. From the above discussed points, it is clearly and beyond any say of doubt understood that the petitioners have no other document to https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 17/25 W.P.No.26079 of 2001 and W.A.No.1215 of 2005 produce except document 582/70 registered on 18.4.70 which is void, under Section 22(2) and (3) of the Amended Act 11/96 and order that the extent noted in the schedule below be included in the holdings of the deceased landowner V.K.Babu @ Palanisamy for the purpose of determination of his holding.” Thus, it may be seen that the prophetic pronouncement of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Naganatha Ayyar case (cited supra) that the parties would defeat the purposes of the Act, came true in this very case.
Madras High Court Cites 60 - Cited by 22 - Full Document

M/S. West Ramnad Electric Distribution ... vs State Of Madras on 2 May, 1962

Sometimes the legislature gives its own meaning and interpretation of the law under which the tax was collected and by legislative fiat makes the new meaning binding upon courts. The legislature may follow any one method or all of them and while it does so it may neutralise the effect of the earlier decision of the court which becomes ineffective after the change of the law.” The same view was reiterated in the cases of West Ramnad Electric Distribution Co. Ltd. v. State of Madras [(1963) 2 SCR 747 : AIR 1962 SC 1753] ; Udai Ram Sharma v. Union of India [(1968) 3 SCR 41 : AIR 1968 SC 1138] ; Tirath Ram Rajindra Nath v. State of U.P. [(1973) 3 SCC 585 : 1973 SCC (Tax) 300] ; Krishna Chandra Gangopadhyaya v. Union of India [(1975) 2 SCC 302] ; Hindustan Gum & Chemicals Ltd. v. State of Haryana [(1985) 4 SCC 124] ; Utkal Contractors and Joinery (P) Ltd. v. State of Orissa [1987 Supp SCC 751] ; D. https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 15/25 W.P.No.26079 of 2001 and W.A.No.1215 of 2005 Cawasji & Co v. State of Mysore [1984 Supp SCC 490 : 1985 SCC (Tax) 63] and Bhubaneshwar Singh v. Union of India [(1994) 6 SCC 77] . It is open to the legislature to remove the defect pointed out by the court or to amend the definition or any other provision of the Act in question retrospectively. In this process it cannot be said that there has been an encroachment by the legislature over the power of the judiciary. A court's directive must always bind unless the conditions on which it is based are so fundamentally altered that under altered circumstances such decisions could not have been given. This will include removal of the defect in a statute pointed out in the judgment in question, as well as alteration or substitution of provisions of the enactment on which such judgment is based, with retrospective effect. This is what has happened in the present case. The judgment of the High Court in Writ Petition No. 1464 of 1974, dated 8-10-1976 was solely based on the amendments which had been introduced by Act 7 of 1974. If those amendments so introduced have been effaced by Act 25 of 1978 with retrospective effect saying that it shall be deemed that no such amendments had ever been introduced in the Principal Act, then full effect has to be given to the provisions of the later Act unless they are held to be ultra vires or unconstitutional.” Therefore, we do not find any infirmity whatsoever in the impugned amendment act especially when the same being brought out with the avowed purposes of giving effect to the Directive Principles of State Policy laid down in Article 39 (b) and (c) of the Constitution of India. https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 16/25 W.P.No.26079 of 2001 and W.A.No.1215 of 2005
Supreme Court of India Cites 45 - Cited by 46 - P B Gajendragadkar - Full Document

State Of Haryana And Ors vs Karnal Co-Op. Farmers'S Society ... on 4 March, 1993

6. It is the further submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioners that even though the impugned amendment passed in the guise of giving effect in the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in S.L.P.(c).Nos.2542 to 2544 of 1972, the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India was passed in the year 1979, but, however, only after 17 years, the impugned amendment is brought out in 1996 and as such, the same is illegal and especially while deciding above matters, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India had not expressly given power to the State Government to bring in any such amendment. For the proposition that the legislative action cannot have the effect of nullifying judicial decisions, the learned Counsel also relied upon the judgment in State of Haryana & Others Vs. Karnal Co-op., Farmers Society Ltd & Others2 and would pray that the impugned amendment should be struck down.
Supreme Court of India Cites 24 - Cited by 51 - N Venkatachala - Full Document

Tirath Ram Rajindra Nath, Lucknow vs State Of U.P. And Anr. on 5 December, 1972

Sometimes the legislature gives its own meaning and interpretation of the law under which the tax was collected and by legislative fiat makes the new meaning binding upon courts. The legislature may follow any one method or all of them and while it does so it may neutralise the effect of the earlier decision of the court which becomes ineffective after the change of the law.” The same view was reiterated in the cases of West Ramnad Electric Distribution Co. Ltd. v. State of Madras [(1963) 2 SCR 747 : AIR 1962 SC 1753] ; Udai Ram Sharma v. Union of India [(1968) 3 SCR 41 : AIR 1968 SC 1138] ; Tirath Ram Rajindra Nath v. State of U.P. [(1973) 3 SCC 585 : 1973 SCC (Tax) 300] ; Krishna Chandra Gangopadhyaya v. Union of India [(1975) 2 SCC 302] ; Hindustan Gum & Chemicals Ltd. v. State of Haryana [(1985) 4 SCC 124] ; Utkal Contractors and Joinery (P) Ltd. v. State of Orissa [1987 Supp SCC 751] ; D. https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 15/25 W.P.No.26079 of 2001 and W.A.No.1215 of 2005 Cawasji & Co v. State of Mysore [1984 Supp SCC 490 : 1985 SCC (Tax) 63] and Bhubaneshwar Singh v. Union of India [(1994) 6 SCC 77] . It is open to the legislature to remove the defect pointed out by the court or to amend the definition or any other provision of the Act in question retrospectively. In this process it cannot be said that there has been an encroachment by the legislature over the power of the judiciary. A court's directive must always bind unless the conditions on which it is based are so fundamentally altered that under altered circumstances such decisions could not have been given. This will include removal of the defect in a statute pointed out in the judgment in question, as well as alteration or substitution of provisions of the enactment on which such judgment is based, with retrospective effect. This is what has happened in the present case. The judgment of the High Court in Writ Petition No. 1464 of 1974, dated 8-10-1976 was solely based on the amendments which had been introduced by Act 7 of 1974. If those amendments so introduced have been effaced by Act 25 of 1978 with retrospective effect saying that it shall be deemed that no such amendments had ever been introduced in the Principal Act, then full effect has to be given to the provisions of the later Act unless they are held to be ultra vires or unconstitutional.” Therefore, we do not find any infirmity whatsoever in the impugned amendment act especially when the same being brought out with the avowed purposes of giving effect to the Directive Principles of State Policy laid down in Article 39 (b) and (c) of the Constitution of India. https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 16/25 W.P.No.26079 of 2001 and W.A.No.1215 of 2005
Supreme Court of India Cites 3 - Cited by 46 - K S Hegde - Full Document

Krishna Chandra Gangopadhyaya Etc vs Union Of India & Ors on 18 April, 1975

Sometimes the legislature gives its own meaning and interpretation of the law under which the tax was collected and by legislative fiat makes the new meaning binding upon courts. The legislature may follow any one method or all of them and while it does so it may neutralise the effect of the earlier decision of the court which becomes ineffective after the change of the law.” The same view was reiterated in the cases of West Ramnad Electric Distribution Co. Ltd. v. State of Madras [(1963) 2 SCR 747 : AIR 1962 SC 1753] ; Udai Ram Sharma v. Union of India [(1968) 3 SCR 41 : AIR 1968 SC 1138] ; Tirath Ram Rajindra Nath v. State of U.P. [(1973) 3 SCC 585 : 1973 SCC (Tax) 300] ; Krishna Chandra Gangopadhyaya v. Union of India [(1975) 2 SCC 302] ; Hindustan Gum & Chemicals Ltd. v. State of Haryana [(1985) 4 SCC 124] ; Utkal Contractors and Joinery (P) Ltd. v. State of Orissa [1987 Supp SCC 751] ; D. https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 15/25 W.P.No.26079 of 2001 and W.A.No.1215 of 2005 Cawasji & Co v. State of Mysore [1984 Supp SCC 490 : 1985 SCC (Tax) 63] and Bhubaneshwar Singh v. Union of India [(1994) 6 SCC 77] . It is open to the legislature to remove the defect pointed out by the court or to amend the definition or any other provision of the Act in question retrospectively. In this process it cannot be said that there has been an encroachment by the legislature over the power of the judiciary. A court's directive must always bind unless the conditions on which it is based are so fundamentally altered that under altered circumstances such decisions could not have been given. This will include removal of the defect in a statute pointed out in the judgment in question, as well as alteration or substitution of provisions of the enactment on which such judgment is based, with retrospective effect. This is what has happened in the present case. The judgment of the High Court in Writ Petition No. 1464 of 1974, dated 8-10-1976 was solely based on the amendments which had been introduced by Act 7 of 1974. If those amendments so introduced have been effaced by Act 25 of 1978 with retrospective effect saying that it shall be deemed that no such amendments had ever been introduced in the Principal Act, then full effect has to be given to the provisions of the later Act unless they are held to be ultra vires or unconstitutional.” Therefore, we do not find any infirmity whatsoever in the impugned amendment act especially when the same being brought out with the avowed purposes of giving effect to the Directive Principles of State Policy laid down in Article 39 (b) and (c) of the Constitution of India. https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 16/25 W.P.No.26079 of 2001 and W.A.No.1215 of 2005
Supreme Court of India Cites 26 - Cited by 41 - V R Iyer - Full Document

M/S. Hindustan Gum & Ceemicals Ltd vs Staie Of Haryana & Ors on 19 August, 1985

Sometimes the legislature gives its own meaning and interpretation of the law under which the tax was collected and by legislative fiat makes the new meaning binding upon courts. The legislature may follow any one method or all of them and while it does so it may neutralise the effect of the earlier decision of the court which becomes ineffective after the change of the law.” The same view was reiterated in the cases of West Ramnad Electric Distribution Co. Ltd. v. State of Madras [(1963) 2 SCR 747 : AIR 1962 SC 1753] ; Udai Ram Sharma v. Union of India [(1968) 3 SCR 41 : AIR 1968 SC 1138] ; Tirath Ram Rajindra Nath v. State of U.P. [(1973) 3 SCC 585 : 1973 SCC (Tax) 300] ; Krishna Chandra Gangopadhyaya v. Union of India [(1975) 2 SCC 302] ; Hindustan Gum & Chemicals Ltd. v. State of Haryana [(1985) 4 SCC 124] ; Utkal Contractors and Joinery (P) Ltd. v. State of Orissa [1987 Supp SCC 751] ; D. https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 15/25 W.P.No.26079 of 2001 and W.A.No.1215 of 2005 Cawasji & Co v. State of Mysore [1984 Supp SCC 490 : 1985 SCC (Tax) 63] and Bhubaneshwar Singh v. Union of India [(1994) 6 SCC 77] . It is open to the legislature to remove the defect pointed out by the court or to amend the definition or any other provision of the Act in question retrospectively. In this process it cannot be said that there has been an encroachment by the legislature over the power of the judiciary. A court's directive must always bind unless the conditions on which it is based are so fundamentally altered that under altered circumstances such decisions could not have been given. This will include removal of the defect in a statute pointed out in the judgment in question, as well as alteration or substitution of provisions of the enactment on which such judgment is based, with retrospective effect. This is what has happened in the present case. The judgment of the High Court in Writ Petition No. 1464 of 1974, dated 8-10-1976 was solely based on the amendments which had been introduced by Act 7 of 1974. If those amendments so introduced have been effaced by Act 25 of 1978 with retrospective effect saying that it shall be deemed that no such amendments had ever been introduced in the Principal Act, then full effect has to be given to the provisions of the later Act unless they are held to be ultra vires or unconstitutional.” Therefore, we do not find any infirmity whatsoever in the impugned amendment act especially when the same being brought out with the avowed purposes of giving effect to the Directive Principles of State Policy laid down in Article 39 (b) and (c) of the Constitution of India. https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 16/25 W.P.No.26079 of 2001 and W.A.No.1215 of 2005
Supreme Court of India Cites 13 - Cited by 28 - E S Venkataramiah - Full Document

Utkal Contractors & Joinery (P) Ltd. & ... vs State Of Orissa on 24 September, 1987

Sometimes the legislature gives its own meaning and interpretation of the law under which the tax was collected and by legislative fiat makes the new meaning binding upon courts. The legislature may follow any one method or all of them and while it does so it may neutralise the effect of the earlier decision of the court which becomes ineffective after the change of the law.” The same view was reiterated in the cases of West Ramnad Electric Distribution Co. Ltd. v. State of Madras [(1963) 2 SCR 747 : AIR 1962 SC 1753] ; Udai Ram Sharma v. Union of India [(1968) 3 SCR 41 : AIR 1968 SC 1138] ; Tirath Ram Rajindra Nath v. State of U.P. [(1973) 3 SCC 585 : 1973 SCC (Tax) 300] ; Krishna Chandra Gangopadhyaya v. Union of India [(1975) 2 SCC 302] ; Hindustan Gum & Chemicals Ltd. v. State of Haryana [(1985) 4 SCC 124] ; Utkal Contractors and Joinery (P) Ltd. v. State of Orissa [1987 Supp SCC 751] ; D. https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 15/25 W.P.No.26079 of 2001 and W.A.No.1215 of 2005 Cawasji & Co v. State of Mysore [1984 Supp SCC 490 : 1985 SCC (Tax) 63] and Bhubaneshwar Singh v. Union of India [(1994) 6 SCC 77] . It is open to the legislature to remove the defect pointed out by the court or to amend the definition or any other provision of the Act in question retrospectively. In this process it cannot be said that there has been an encroachment by the legislature over the power of the judiciary. A court's directive must always bind unless the conditions on which it is based are so fundamentally altered that under altered circumstances such decisions could not have been given. This will include removal of the defect in a statute pointed out in the judgment in question, as well as alteration or substitution of provisions of the enactment on which such judgment is based, with retrospective effect. This is what has happened in the present case. The judgment of the High Court in Writ Petition No. 1464 of 1974, dated 8-10-1976 was solely based on the amendments which had been introduced by Act 7 of 1974. If those amendments so introduced have been effaced by Act 25 of 1978 with retrospective effect saying that it shall be deemed that no such amendments had ever been introduced in the Principal Act, then full effect has to be given to the provisions of the later Act unless they are held to be ultra vires or unconstitutional.” Therefore, we do not find any infirmity whatsoever in the impugned amendment act especially when the same being brought out with the avowed purposes of giving effect to the Directive Principles of State Policy laid down in Article 39 (b) and (c) of the Constitution of India. https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis 16/25 W.P.No.26079 of 2001 and W.A.No.1215 of 2005
Supreme Court of India Cites 16 - Cited by 34 - K J Shetty - Full Document
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