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Sudarsan Trading Co vs Govt. Of Kerala & Anr on 14 February, 1989 cites

Upper Ganges Valley Electricity Supply ... vs U.P. Electricity Board on 19 December, 1972

In Upper Ganges Valley Elec- tricity Supply Co. Ltd. v. U.P. Electricity Board (supra), the respondent had taken over the appellant's undertakings, but as the parties were at variance on the true market value to be paid to the appellant, the matter was referred to arbitration. As the arbitrators were unable to agree on the question whether the appellant was entitled to compensation for the 'service lines' which were laid with the help of contributions made by consumers, they referred the question to the umpire. The umpire framed an issue and gave a finding that the appellant was not entitled to claim from the re- spondent the value of the position of the service lines which were laid at the cost of the consumers, for the sole reason that they were laid at the cost of the consumers. The appellant filed an application under section 30 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 challenging the validity of the award on the question. The lower court and the High Court held against the appellant. Allowing the appeal, it was held by this Court that the appellant's application for setting aside the award could succeed only if there was any error of law on the face of the award. There, it was found, that the umpire had made a speaking award and there was no question of the construction of any document incorporated in or appended to the award. If it was transparent from the award that a legal proposition which forms its basis is erroneous, the award is liable to be set aside.
Supreme Court of India Cites 17 - Cited by 48 - Y V Chandrachud - Full Document

Jivarajbhai Ujamshi Sheth And Others vs Chintamanrao Balaji And Others on 19 November, 1963

Similarly, in Jivarajbhai Ujamshi Sheth & Ors. v. Chintamanrao Balaji & Ors. (supra), this Court reiterated that an award by an arbitrator is conclusive as a judgment between the parties and the court is entitled to set aside an award if the arbitrator has misconducted himself in the proceeding or when the award has been made after the issue of an order by the Court superseding the arbitration or after arbitration proceedings have become invalid under section 35 of the Arbitration Act or where an award has been improperly pro- cured or is otherwise invalid under section 30 of the Act. An award may be set aside on the ground of error on the face of the award, but an award is not invalid merely because by a process of inference and argument it may be demonstrated that the arbitrator has committed some mistake in arriving at his conclusion. The Court, however, went into the ques- tion whether the arbitrator had included depreciation and appreciation of certain assets in the value of the goodwill which he was incompetent to include by virtue of the limits placed upon his authority by the deed of 685 reference. The Court found that was not a case in which the arbitrator had committed an error of fact or law in reaching his conclusions on the disputed questions submitted for adjudication. It was a case of assumption of jurisdiction not possessed by him and that rendered the award to the extent to which it was beyond the arbitrators' jurisdiction, invalid. This was reiterated by Justice Hidayatullah that if the parties set limits to action by the arbitrator, then the arbitrator had to follow the limits set for him and the court can find that he exceeded his jurisdiction on proof of such excess. In that case the arbitrator in working out net profits for 4 years took into account depreciation of immov- able property. For this reason he must be held to have exceeded his jurisdiction and it is not a question of his having merely interpreted the partnership agreement for himself as to which the Civil Court could have had no say, unless there was an error of law on the face of the award. Therefore, it appears to us that there are two different and distinct grounds involved in many of the cases. One is the error apparent on the face of the award, and the other is that the arbitrator exceeded his jurisdiction. In the latter case, the courts can look into the arbitration agreement but in the former, it can not, unless the agreement was incorpo- rated or recited in the award.
Supreme Court of India Cites 8 - Cited by 191 - J C Shah - Full Document

The State Of Kerala And Anr. vs K.P. Poulose on 29 January, 1973

fore, it was not open to the court to go into the correct- ness or reasonableness of the award. The High Court held that when the arbitrator was constituted the sole and final judge of all questions both of law and of facts, normally his decision should stand final and it was only when there was any error apparent on the face of the award either because a question of law arose on the face of the award or upon some paper accompanying or forming part of the award, it could be interfered with. Thereafter, the High Court in para 8 of its judgment observed that in the light of several decisions it could say that there were any errors apparent on the face of the award, and that the arbitrator had mis- conducted himself and had travelled beyond his power. The High Court referred to the decision of the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in State of Kerala v. Poulose, [1987] 1 KLT 781. The High Court, thereafter, observed that it was not open to the arbitrator or the umpire to arrogate tO himself jurisdiction and answer a question not referred to him.
Kerala High Court Cites 11 - Cited by 4 - Full Document

Champsey Bhara And Company vs The Jivraj Balloo Spinning And C. Co. ... on 6 March, 1923

It was submitted before us that the High Court had exceeded its jurisdiction in acting in the manner it did on these aforesaid aspects. The first question, therefore, that arises for consideration in this case is, whether the award in question was a speaking award or not. In our opinion, the award was not a speaking award. An award can also be set aside if the arbitrator had misconducted himself or the proceedings or had proceeded beyond his jurisdiction. These are separate and district 683 grounds for challenging an award. Where there are errors apparent on the face of the award it can only be set aside if in the award there is any proposition of law which is apparent on the face of the award, namely, in the award itself or any document incorporated in the award. The Judi- cial Committee in Champsey Bhara & Co. v. Jivraj Balloo Spinning & Weaving Co, Ltd., L 1922 IA 324 has discussed this problem. It was held that an award of arbitration can be set aside on the ground of error of law apparent on the face of the award only when in the award or in a document incorporated with it, as for instance a note appended by the arbitrator stating the reasons for his decision, there is found some legal proposition which is the basis of the award and which is erroneous. In that case the appellants had sold cotton to the respondents by a contract which contained a submission to arbitration of disputes as to quality, and a further clause submitting to arbitration all other disputes arising out of the contract. Cotton was delivered, but the respondents objected to its quality, and upon arbitration an allowance was awarded; the respondents thereupon rejected the cotton. The appellants claimed damages for the rejec- tion, and upon that dispute being referred to arbitration under the further clause, were awarded damages. The award recited that the contract, the date and subject of which were stated, was subject to the rules of the Bombay Cotton Trade Association, which were not further referred to; and that the respondents had rejected on the grounds contained in a letter of a certain date. That letter stated merely that as the arbitrators had made an allowance of a certain amount the respondents rejected the cotton. The High Court set aside the award, holding that it was bad on its face, in that under one of the rules of the Association the respond- ents were entitled to reject without liability. It was held by the Judicial Committee that the award could not be set aside; the terms of the contract were not so incorporated with the award as to entitle the Court to refer to them as showing, either that the award was wrong in law, or that under them the contract, and therefore the jurisdiction of the arbitrators, were terminated. This decision and the ratio on this proposition of law has always been accepted by the courts of this country and is well-settled. The next question on this aspect which requires consid- eration is that only in a speaking award the court can look into the reasoning of the award. It is not open to the court to probe the mental process of the arbitrator and speculate, where no reasons are given by the arbitrator, as to what impelled the arbitrator to arrive at his conclusion.
Bombay High Court Cites 1 - Cited by 286 - Full Document

M/S. Alopi Parshad & Sons, Ltd vs The Union Of India on 20 January, 1960

The same principle has been stated in M/s. Alopi Parshad & Sons, Ltd. v. The Union of India, (supra). There this Court held that the award was liable to be set aside because of an error apparent on the face of the award. An arbitra- tion award might be set aside on the ground of an error on the face of it when the reasons given for the decision, either in the award or in any document incorporated with it, are based upon a legal proposition which is erroneous. But where a specific question is referred, the award is not liable to be set aside on the ground of an error on the face of the award even if the answer to the question involves an erroneous decision on a point of law. But an award which ignores express terms of the contract, is bad.
Supreme Court of India Cites 3 - Cited by 298 - J C Shah - Full Document
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