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Bashir Ahmed vs The State Of West Bengal And Ors. on 8 September, 1975 cites

Ratilal Panachand Gandhi vs The State Of Bombay And Others.(And ... on 18 March, 1954

In the case of Ratilal Panchand v. State of Bombay. some of these aspects came up for consideration. The Supreme Court observed that what Sub-clause (a) of Clause (2) of Article 25 of the Constitution contemplated was not the State regulation of the religious practices as such which were protected unless these ran counter to public health or morality but of activities which were really of an economic, commercial or political character though these were associated with religious practices. With regard to the affairs in the matters of religion, the right of management given to a religious body was a guaranteed fundamental right which no legislation could take away. On the other hand, as regards administration of property which a religious denomination was entitled to own and acquire, it had undoubtly the right to administer such property but only in accordance with law. This meant that the State could regulate the administration of trust properties by means of law validly enacted; but under Article 26(d), it was the religious denomination itself which had been given the right to administer its property in accordance with any law which the State might validly impose. A law, which took away the right of administration altogether from the religious denomination and vested it in any other or secular authority, would amount to violation of the right which was guaranteed by Article 26(d) of the Constitution, The distinction between matters of religion and those of secular administration of religious properties might, at times, appear to be a thin one. But in cases of doubt, the Court should take a common sense view and be actuated by consideration of practical necessity.
Supreme Court of India Cites 43 - Cited by 207 - B K Mukherjea - Full Document

The Commissioner, Hindu Religious ... vs Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar Of Sri ... on 16 April, 1954

In the case of Commr. Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Shirur Mutt, the Supreme Court discussed the concept of Mahantship and observed that the word 'property' as used in Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution should be given a liberal and wide connotation and so interpreted, should be extended to those well recognised types of interest which had the insignia or characteristics of proprietary right. Besides the right to manage its own affairs in matter of religion, the Supreme Court observed, which was given by Article 26, Clause (b), the next two clauses of Article 23 guaranteed to a religious denomination the right to acquire and own property and to administer such property in accordance with law. The administration of its property by a religious denomination had thus been placed on a different footing from the right to manage its own affairs in matters of religion. The latter was a fundamental right which no Legislature could take away, whereas the former could be regulated by laws which the Legislature could validly impose It is clear, therefore, that questions merely relating to administration of properties belonging to a religious group or institution were not matters of religion to which Clause (b) of Article 26 applied. What constituted the essential part of a religion was primarily to be ascertained with reference to the doctrines of that religion itself. If the tenets of any religious sect of the Hindus prescribed that offerings of food should be given to the idol at particular hours of the day, that periodical ceremonies should be performed in a certain way at certain periods of the year or that there should be daily recital of sacred texts or oblations to the sacred fire, all these would be regarded as parts of religion and the mere fact that these involved expenditure of money or employment of priests and servants or the use of marketable commodities would not make them secular activities partaking of a commercial or economic character. The language of Articles 25 and 26 was sufficiently clear to enable the Court to determine without the aid of foreign authorities as to what matters came within the purview of religion and what did not. Freedom of religion in the Constitution of India was not confined to religious beliefs only; it extended to religious practices as well subject to the restrictions which the Constitution itself had laid down. Under Article 26(b) a religious denomination or organisation enjoyed complete autonomy in the matter of deciding as to what rites and ceremonies were essential according to the tenets of the religion they hold and no outside authority had any jurisdiction to interefere with their decision in such matters Of course, the scale of expenses to be incurred in connection with these religious observances would be matter of administration of property belonging to the religious denomination and could be controlled by secular authorities in accordance with any law laid down by a competent legislature. The Supreme Court, further, observed that under Article 26(d) it was the fundamental right of a religious denomination or its representative to administer its properties in accordance with law; and the law, therefore, must leave the right of administration to the religious denomination itself subject to such restrictions and regulations as it might choose to impose. A law which took away the right of administration from the hands of a religious denomination altogether and vested it in other authority would amount to a violation of the right guaranteed under Clause (d) of Article 26.
Supreme Court of India Cites 67 - Cited by 618 - B K Mukherjea - Full Document

Digyadarsan Rajendra Ramdassji Varu vs State Of Andhra Pradesh & Anr on 26 March, 1969

Thai question, however, is not quite germane to the present controversy before me. In the case of Digyadarsan Rajendra Ramdasji Varu v. State of Andhra Pradesh, . The Andhra Pradesh Charitable Hindu Religious Endowment Act was under challenge under Article 19 and Article 14 of the Constitution. At p. 188 of the report para. 10, to which my attention was drawn, the Supreme Court after discussing the provisions of the Act came to the conclusion that it has nowhere been established that the petitioner has been prohibited or debarred from professing, practising and propagating his religion.
Supreme Court of India Cites 18 - Cited by 11 - A N Grover - Full Document

Begum Asma Jafar Imam And Anr. vs The State Of Bihar And Ors. on 1 July, 1974

15. Before I conclude I must refer to the fact that my attention was drawn to the decision of the Patna High Court in the case of Begum Asma Jafar Imam v. State of Bihar, . There in discussing the Bihar Wakf Act of 1954 the Division Bench observed that in a wakf-al-al-aulad if there was specific dedication of any property for any purpose recognised by the Muslim law as religious or charitable, to that extent it would be deemed to be a 'wakf' within the meaning of the 1954 Act and the provisions of that Act would apply to that extent. The properties which had been dedicated for such purposes would be within the supervision and control of the Board. Only such Wakf-al-al-aulad in which simultaneously with the making provisions for family members and descendants some property was dedicated for any purpose which was recognised as pious, religious or charitable by Muslim Law would be covered by the definition of 'waqf'. To that extent only the Board would have jurisdiction. I am not concerned in the present case with this question. In the aforesaid view of the matter, I do not think, it is necessary for me to discuss in greater detail the aforesaid decision of the Patna High Court.
Patna High Court Cites 30 - Cited by 12 - N P Singh - Full Document
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