Search Results Page

Search Results

1 - 7 of 7 (0.24 seconds)
Digvijaysinhji Hamirsinhji vs H.K. Oza And Anr. on 22 January, 1965 cites

Puranlal Lakhanpal vs Union Of India on 24 May, 1957

Dealing with Article 22 and Section 3 of the Preventive Detention Act the Supreme Court in Puranlal Lakhanmals case observed that Clause (5) of Article 22 conferred two rights on the detenu namely first a right to be informed of the grounds on which the order of detention has been made and secondly to be afforded the earliest opportunity to make a representation against the order. If the grounds which have rational connection with the objects mentioned in Section 3 are supplied the first condition is complied with. But the right to make a representation implied that the detenu should have such information as would enable him to make a representation and if the grounds supplied are not sufficient to enable the detenu to make a representation he can rely on the second right. The second right however is again subject to the right of privilege given by Clause (6) and the obligation to furnish grounds and the duty to consider whether disclosure involved there is against public interest are both vested in the detaining authority and not in any other. It is thus clear that the obligation to furnish grounds and the duty to consider whether disclosure of any facts involved therein is against public interest are both vested in the detaining authority. If such privilege is exercised the detenu cannot be heard to say apart from the question of mala fides that the grounds did not disclose the necessary particulars or that in the absence of such particulars he was not in a position to make an effective representation.
Supreme Court of India Cites 25 - Cited by 39 - Full Document

Ashutosh Lahiry vs The State Of Delhi And Anr. on 19 May, 1950

In Ashutoshs case the grounds of detention were that the petitioner went to Delhi on March 27 1950 held a press conference there in which he gave a highly exaggerated and communal version of events in Bengal and East Bengal. After that conference the activities of the petitioner continued to be such as would incite communal passions. A communal riot had in fact taken place on March 19 1950 as a result of intemperate statements made at a public meeting. The authorities felt that the petitioners activities might lead in those circumstances to disturbance of public peace and order. Even in these circumstances Mahajan J. as he then was observed that if the petitioners presence in Delhi at that time might lead to disturbance of communal peace there were ample powers under the ordinary law which the authority could exercise for the purpose of preventing the mischief. In point of fact the other persons who were to take a leading part in the meeting to be held on April 1 1950 were externed from Delhi but the petitioner only was consigned to detention in jail. The learned Judge observed that there could be no better proof of mala fides on the part of the executive authorities than the use of the extraordinary provisions of the Act for purposes for which the ordinary law was sufficient. The petition however was dismissed as the Supreme Court was unable to hold definitely that there was want of good faith on the part of the authorities. Nevertheless Mahajan J. as he than was uttered the following words of warning: I can only hope that the authorities will take care to see that no instances occur which might savour of injustice or oppression through misuse of those extraordinary powers which the Parliament has vested in the executive in the interests of the State itself.
Supreme Court of India Cites 7 - Cited by 15 - Full Document

Romesh Thappar vs The State Of Madras on 26 May, 1950

In Romesh Thappar v. The State of Madras the Supreme Court was concerned with the question of validity of Section 9(1A) of the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act 1949 which authorised the Government of Madras for the purpose of securing the public safety or the maintenance of public order to prohibit inter alia the entry into or the circulation sale or distribution in Madras of any document or class of documents. The Act was passed in exercise of the power under Section 100 of the Government of India Act 1935 read with Entry No. 1 of List II of the Seventh Schedule which contained among other matters public order. While considering the ambit of Clause (2) of Article 19 with Clause (1) of that Article Patanjali Sastri J. as he then was speaking for the majority stated after citing a passage from Stephen in his Criminal Law of England Vol. II as follows.-
Supreme Court of India Cites 21 - Cited by 526 - S S Ali - Full Document

Brij Bhushan And Another vs The State Of Delhi on 26 May, 1950

The learned Judge further stated that unless a law restricting freedom of speech and expression was directed solely against the undermining of the security of the State or the overthrow of it such law could not fall within the reservation under Clause (2) of Article 19 although the restriction which it sought to impose might have been conceived generally in the interest of public order. He held that the impugned Section 9(1-A) of the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act 1949 which authorised the imposition of restriction for the wider purpose of securing public safety or the maintenance of public order fell outside the scope of authorised restrictions under Clause (2) and was therefore void and unconstitutional. On the same view of Article 19(2) as it then stood the Supreme Court in Brij Bhushan v. The State of Delhi held Section 7(i)(c) of the East Punjab Public Safety Act 1949 which gave power of pre-censorship before publication to be void and quashed the impugned order passed thereunder. The effect of these two decisions it would appear was that it would be only major offences affecting the security of the State which would save legislation restrictive of the right of freedom of speech and expession under Article 19(1).
Supreme Court of India Cites 14 - Cited by 333 - S S Ali - Full Document

The Superintendent, Central ... vs Ram Manohar Lohia on 21 January, 1960

15. Assuming that we are not correct in the view we take of the scope of Section 3 read in the light of the interpretation of Article 19(2) by the Supreme Court in Dr. Lohias case (supra) we have next to consider the second contention of Mr. Hathi namely whether the grounds communicated to the petitioner were so vague and indefinite that it became impossible for him to make an effective representation to the Government and stultified his right of representation. Section 7(1) provides that when a person is detained in pursuance of a detention order the authority making the order shall as soon as may be but not later than five days from the date of detention communicate to him the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order to the appropriate Government. Sub-section (2) provides that nothing in Sub-section (1) shall require the authority to disclose facts which it considers to be against the public interest to disclose. The section is based on the right conferred on a person detained in pursuance of an order made under a law providing for preventive detention by Article 22(5) of the Constitution. There are several decisions on the scope and content of Section 7 and Article 22(5) but it is not necessary to go into them as there are authoritative pronouncements on them by the Supreme Court.
Supreme Court of India Cites 22 - Cited by 125 - Full Document

The State Of Bombay vs Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya on 25 January, 1951

In Bhardwaj v. The State of Delhi following Atma Rams case (supra) the Supreme Court laid down two propositions (1) that preventive detention is a serious invasion of personal liberty and such meagre safeguards as the Constitution has provided against the improper exercise of the power must be jealously watched and enforced by the Courts and (2) that a petitioner had the right to be furnished with particulars of the grounds of his detention sufficient to enable him to make a representation. It was also held that this constitutional requirement must be satisfied with respect to each of the grounds subject of course to a claim of privilege under Clause (6) of Article 22 and that where it had not been so done in regard to one of the grounds the detention could not be held to be in accordance with the procedure established by law within the meaning of Article 21 and the detenu would in such a case be entitled to be released.
Supreme Court of India Cites 20 - Cited by 283 - H J Kania - Full Document

Dr. Ram Krishan Bhardwaj vs The State Of Delhi And Others on 16 April, 1953

In Bhardwaj v. The State of Delhi following Atma Rams case (supra) the Supreme Court laid down two propositions (1) that preventive detention is a serious invasion of personal liberty and such meagre safeguards as the Constitution has provided against the improper exercise of the power must be jealously watched and enforced by the Courts and (2) that a petitioner had the right to be furnished with particulars of the grounds of his detention sufficient to enable him to make a representation. It was also held that this constitutional requirement must be satisfied with respect to each of the grounds subject of course to a claim of privilege under Clause (6) of Article 22 and that where it had not been so done in regard to one of the grounds the detention could not be held to be in accordance with the procedure established by law within the meaning of Article 21 and the detenu would in such a case be entitled to be released.
Supreme Court of India Cites 8 - Cited by 134 - M P Sastri - Full Document
1