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Raghunath Padhi vs Ratnakar Pati And Ors. on 15 November, 1984 cites

State Of Orissa And Etc. vs Trinath Dash And Ors. on 5 January, 1982

4. The learned Advocate appearing for the appellant did not seriously press the appeal so far as it relates to the acquittal of respondents Nos. 1. and 2 of the charge under Section 379/34, I. P. C, in view of the statement made by the appellant (P W. 1) in cross-examination to the effect that respondent No. 3 committed theft of brinjals and respondent No. 4 committed theft of two bunches of bananas. He did not specifically implicate respondents Nos. 1 and 2 with the commission of theft. Therefore, the trial Court took the correct view in holding that the charge of theft was not brought home to respondents Nos. 1 and 2. This apart, by a series of decisions law has been well settled that a judgment of acquittal should not be interfered with unless the assessment of evidence and the conclusion drawn by the trial Court are unreasonable, erroneous and perverse. Reversal of a judgment of acquittal will not be justified merely on the ground that the appellate Court's view on the evidence on record is different from that of the trial Court or on the same set of evidence two views are reasonably possible [See 54 (1982) C. L. T. 83-State of Orissa v. Trinath Das and Ors., 1933 C. L. R. (Cr.)
Orissa High Court Cites 31 - Cited by 3 - Full Document

Smt. Dhara Dei vs Prafulla Swain And Ors. on 29 June, 1984

9-Charupraya Dei v. Durjyodhan Mohanty and Ors., 55 (1983) C. L. T. 553-State of Orissa v. Arjuna Das and 58 (1984) C. L. T. 101: 1984 (I) OLR 621- Smt. Dhara Del v. Prafulla Swain and Ors.). In the present case, as already referred to above, the views expressed by the learned Judicial Magistrate in acquitting respondents Nos. 1 and 2 of the charge under Section 379/34, I. P. C, was not unreasonable, unjustified or perverse in the context of the evidence of the appellant (P. W. 1) himself and so it would be impermissible and improper according to law to interfere with such order of acquittal.
Orissa High Court Cites 1 - Cited by 9 - Full Document

Mahabir Singh And Anr. vs Emperor on 25 August, 1943

The evidence given by the prosecution witnesses also does not indicated that the offence was attended by criminal force or show such force or by criminal intimidation. Thus it appears to be a simple case of trespass and theft. In the absence of any proof or finding that the offence was attended by criminal force or show of such force or by criminal intimidation the provisions of Section 456(1) of the Code are inapplicable. There is a large number of authorities taking a consistent view to the aforesaid effect, such as-1917 Cr. L. J. 898 (Kaon and Anr. v. Emperor).
Calcutta High Court Cites 34 - Cited by 16 - Full Document

Charuprava Dei vs Duryodhan Mohanty And Ors. on 12 May, 1982

9-Charupraya Dei v. Durjyodhan Mohanty and Ors., 55 (1983) C. L. T. 553-State of Orissa v. Arjuna Das and 58 (1984) C. L. T. 101: 1984 (I) OLR 621- Smt. Dhara Del v. Prafulla Swain and Ors.). In the present case, as already referred to above, the views expressed by the learned Judicial Magistrate in acquitting respondents Nos. 1 and 2 of the charge under Section 379/34, I. P. C, was not unreasonable, unjustified or perverse in the context of the evidence of the appellant (P. W. 1) himself and so it would be impermissible and improper according to law to interfere with such order of acquittal.
Orissa High Court Cites 5 - Cited by 2 - Full Document

Abdul Mannan And Ors. vs Taiyab Ali on 7 February, 1947

Thus if there is an acquittal and the complainant after obtaining leave prefers an appeal to the High Court under Sub-section (4) of Section 378 of the Code, the High Court becomes 'the Court of Appeal' within the meaning of Sub-section (2) of Section 456 of the Code. It is, therefore, amply clear, that according to plain and natural construction the expression 'the Court of Appeal' occurring in Sub-section (2) of Section 456 will mean the Court to which an appeal will ordinarily lie against an order of conviction and sentence and an order of acquittal according to provisions of Chapter XXIX of the Code. Unless such an interpretation is made by giving a natural meaning to the expression 'the Court of Appeal' used in Sub-section (2) of Section 456 of the Code injustice is' bound to follow. To illustrate, if an offence under Section 447, I. P. C., attended by criminal force or show of force or by criminal intimidation is committed and the Judicial Magistrate illegally acquits the accused, the complainant will get no relief according to Sub-section (1) of Section 456 although in an appeal against the order of acquittal under Sub-section (4) of Section 378, the High Court convicts the accused, unless it acts as 'the Court of Appeal' for the purpose of Sub-section (2) of Section 456 of the Code to order delivery of possession to the complainant. In other words, unless the High Court acts as 'the Court of Appeal' against an order of acquittal so as to order delivery of possession under Sub-section (1) of Section 456 in appropriate cases, injustice is bound to occur. Such a situation can never be contemplated in criminal jurisprudence. My attention was drawn to a decision reported in A. I. R. 1947 Cal. 390-Abdul Mannon and Ors. v. Tiyab Ali, in which it was held by a learned single Judge that the occasion for the exercise of the power conferred upon the Court of Appeal, confirmation, reference or revision by Section 522(3) arises only when an appeal or reference or revision against the order of conviction is pending before that Court.
Calcutta High Court Cites 1 - Cited by 6 - Full Document
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