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Sunny Vyas vs Union Of India on 25 November, 2021 cites

Miss Mohini Jain vs State Of Karnataka And Ors on 30 July, 1992

4. In order to appreciate the controversy, we may note in brief the factual background as well as the statutory framework. Article 21A was inserted in the Constitution by Constitution (Eighty-sixth Amendment) Act, 2002 with effect from 01.04.2010 which provides that the State shall provide free and compulsory education to all children of the age of 6 to 14 years in such manner as the State may, by law, determine. Long before the amendment of the Constitution and insertion of Article 21A, the right to primary education was recognized as a fundamental right being part of Article 21 by the Supreme court in the cases of Mohini Jain vs. State of Karnataka [(1992) 3 SCC 666] and in the case of Unni Krishnan J.P. vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (Downloaded on 01/12/2021 at 08:39:21 PM) (134 of 166) [CW-1853/2021] [(1993) 1 SCC 645]. With the insertion of Article 21A, this right was recognized as an independent fundamental right in the Constitution. To operationalise this valuable right, the Parliament framed the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 ('RTE Act', for short). The term 'school' has been defined in Section 2(n) as to mean any recognized school imparting elementary education and would include the schools established, owned or controlled by the appropriate Government or a local authority, schools receiving aid and even unaided schools. Clause (g) of Section 8 of the RTE Act, pertaining to duties of appropriate Government, requires that the appropriate Government shall ensure good quality elementary education conforming to the standards and norms specified in the Schedule. Section 18 requires compulsory recognition of all schools. Section 19 of the RTE Act pertains to norms and standards for school. Sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that no school shall be established or recognized under Section 18, unless it fulfills the norms and standards specified in the Schedule. The Schedule lists norms and standards for the schools imparting education for the classes-I to V. There are different prescriptions for the number of teachers for this section as compared to classes-VI to VIII.
Supreme Court of India Cites 25 - Cited by 330 - K Singh - Full Document

Unni Krishnan, J.P. And Ors. Etc. Etc vs State Of Andhra Pradesh And Ors. Etc. Etc on 4 February, 1993

28. Analysis of Sub-section (2) of Section 23 would thus show that the Central Government has the power to relax the qualifications laid down for appointment of the teacher where adequate number of institutions offering courses or training in teacher education or teachers possessing minimum qualifications in a state are not available. Such powers are in the nature of relaxation to the essential qualifications that may be prescribed under Sub-section (1) of Section 23. In the main body of Sub- section (2) and the first and second proviso thereto reference is to the qualifications laid down under Sub-section (1). The emphasis is on the person to be appointed as a teacher to possess the qualification prescribed under Sub-section (1) of Section 23 which can be relaxed subject to fulfillment of conditions as provided. Thus, there is a clear distinction between the powers to be exercised under Sub-section (1) of Section 23 which are vested in the NCTE and those that can be exercised by the Central (Downloaded on 01/12/2021 at 08:39:21 PM) (153 of 166) [CW-1853/2021] Government under Sub-section (2) of Section 23 of relaxing the standards laid down by NCTE under Sub-section (1) of Section 23.
Supreme Court of India Cites 153 - Cited by 957 - L M Sharma - Full Document

A. Manoharan And Ors vs Union Of India And Ors on 14 February, 2008

In the case of A. Manoharan and others vs. Union of India and others [(2008) 3 SCC 641] while interpreting the powers of the Central Government to give directions to the Major Trust under Sub-section (1) of Section 111 of the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963, which provided that the authority in discharge of its functions under the Act be bound by such directions on questions of policy as the Central Government may give in writing from time to time, it was held and observed as under:
Supreme Court of India Cites 27 - Cited by 74 - S B Sinha - Full Document

Ramana Dayaram Shetty vs The International Airport Authority Of ... on 4 May, 1979

"24. The power of the Central Government to issue directions as contained in Section 111 of the 1963 Act cannot be stretched to amend the Regulations. Power must be exercised by the Central Government only in regard to the administration of the Trust. Such a power to issue direction must be construed strictly. (See (Downloaded on 01/12/2021 at 08:39:21 PM) (157 of 166) [CW-1853/2021] Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India (1979) 3 SCC 489, Harjit Singh v. State of Punjab (2007) 9 SCC 582, Ashoka Smokeless Coal India (P) Ltd. v. Union of India (2007) 2 SCC 640 and Poonam Verma v. DDA. (2007) 13 SCC 154)"
Supreme Court of India Cites 47 - Cited by 2519 - P N Bhagwati - Full Document

M/S Ashoka Smokeless Coal Ind. P. Ltd. & ... vs Union Of India & Ors on 1 December, 2006

"24. The power of the Central Government to issue directions as contained in Section 111 of the 1963 Act cannot be stretched to amend the Regulations. Power must be exercised by the Central Government only in regard to the administration of the Trust. Such a power to issue direction must be construed strictly. (See (Downloaded on 01/12/2021 at 08:39:21 PM) (157 of 166) [CW-1853/2021] Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India (1979) 3 SCC 489, Harjit Singh v. State of Punjab (2007) 9 SCC 582, Ashoka Smokeless Coal India (P) Ltd. v. Union of India (2007) 2 SCC 640 and Poonam Verma v. DDA. (2007) 13 SCC 154)"
Supreme Court of India Cites 66 - Cited by 181 - S B Sinha - Full Document

Poonam Verma & Ors vs Delhi Development Authority on 13 December, 2007

"24. The power of the Central Government to issue directions as contained in Section 111 of the 1963 Act cannot be stretched to amend the Regulations. Power must be exercised by the Central Government only in regard to the administration of the Trust. Such a power to issue direction must be construed strictly. (See (Downloaded on 01/12/2021 at 08:39:21 PM) (157 of 166) [CW-1853/2021] Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India (1979) 3 SCC 489, Harjit Singh v. State of Punjab (2007) 9 SCC 582, Ashoka Smokeless Coal India (P) Ltd. v. Union of India (2007) 2 SCC 640 and Poonam Verma v. DDA. (2007) 13 SCC 154)"
Supreme Court of India Cites 20 - Cited by 79 - S B Sinha - Full Document

L. Chandra Kumar vs Union Of India And Others on 18 March, 1997

33. We may also not be unduly perturbed by the finality attached to the decision of the Central Government under Section 29(2) of the NCTE Act on the question of what constitutes policy matter. Any such decision is open to judicial review of the court under Article 226 of the Constitution. Such judicial review being a basic feature of the Constitution as held by the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar vs. Union of India and other [(1997) 3 SCC 261] cannot be barred.
Supreme Court of India Cites 86 - Cited by 2564 - A M Ahmadi - Full Document

P.M. Latha And Another vs State Of Kerala And Others on 5 March, 2003

In the case of P.M. Latha (supra), for recruitment to the post of lower and upper primary school teachers in Government schools, qualification prescribed was Trained Teachers Certificate ('TTC', for short) pass. Instead of selecting the TTC holders, B.Ed. degree holders were selected on the basis that B.Ed. is higher qualification than TTC. It was in this background held that there is no force in the argument that B.Ed. qualification is higher qualification than TTC.
Supreme Court of India Cites 1 - Cited by 212 - Full Document

Government Of Andhra Pradesh Etc. Etc vs P. Dilip Kumar And Anr. Etc. Etc on 3 February, 1993

46. The contention of Shri Rastogi that the challengers to the notification have no locus standi to bring the petition because the amendment merely expands the zone of consideration, cannot be accepted. Whether by mere expansion of zone of consideration the challenge will succeed or not is a matter of a different context but a person who is already eligible finds himself in a wider competition on account of widening the zone of consideration for appointment or promotion holds a belief that such amendment is illegal he has every right to call in question. To reiterate the question of locus standi of such a person and maintainability of his or her petition stands on vastly different footing as compared to the success or failure of such challenge to widening of the zone of consideration for appointment or promotion. The judgments relied upon in this context by Shri Rastogi in the cases of Government of Andhra Pradesh vs. P. Dilip Kumar and others [1993 (2) SCC 310] and Shyama Charan Dash and others vs. State of (Downloaded on 01/12/2021 at 08:39:22 PM) (164 of 166) [CW-1853/2021] Orissa and others [2003 (4) SCC 218] would fall in a latter category. It is open for him to argue that when the only consequence of the amendments in the regulations is expanding the zone of consideration, the Court should not strike down the amendment is entirely different from arguing that the persons recognized as eligible as per the existing regulations cannot question the amendment.
Supreme Court of India Cites 9 - Cited by 169 - A M Ahmadi - Full Document
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