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K.S. Paripoornan vs State Of Kerala on 12 September, 1994 cites

Union Of India And Another Etc. Etc vs Zora Singh Etc. Etc on 22 November, 1991

111. In respect of acquisition proceedings initiated prior to the date of commencement of the amending Act 68 of 1984, the payment of the additional amount under Section 23(1-A) of the Act will be restricted to matters referred to in clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the said amending Act. Union of India v. Zora Singh7 insofar as it holds that 8 (1992) 1 SCC 684 7 (1992) 1 SCC 673 6 (1990) 1 SCC 277 * Ed.: Signed by all the five Hon'ble Judges Constituting the Bench 663 the said amount is payable in all cases where the reference was pending before the reference Court on 24-9-1984, irrespective of the date on which the award was made by the Collector, does not lay down the correct law.
Supreme Court of India Cites 20 - Cited by 91 - M H Kania - Full Document

Union Of India & Anr vs Raghubir Singh (Dead) By Lrs. Etc on 16 May, 1989

101. Reliance was placed on construction of sub-section (2) of Section 30 by the Constitution Bench in Union of India v. Raghubir Singh9 and it was urged that since the two sub- sections of Section 30 were enacted on the same date with same purpose and objective, the interpretation put by the Constitution Bench on the limited retrospectivity of sub- section (2) should be extended to sub-section (1) of Section 30 as well. The submission suffers from inherent fallacy of ignoring the difference in phraseology of the two sub- sections and the objective sought to be achieved by them. Their field of operation is different and they serve different purposes. The amendment in sub-section (2) of Section 23 brings about a change in existing ratio of solatium from 15% to 30%. And sub-section (2) of Section 30 makes it operative from 30-4-1982 in relation to any award made by the Collector or Court or to any order passed by the High Court or Supreme Court in appeal against any such award.
Supreme Court of India Cites 44 - Cited by 724 - R S Pathak - Full Document

Bhag Singh & Ors vs Union Territory Of Chandigarh, Through ... on 14 August, 1985

Both the decisions, i.e., Bhag Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh which was held to be incorrectly decided and Raghubir Singh9 agreed to the extent that the retrospectivity visualised by the sub-section applied to the award made by the Collector or Court. But difference arose as to whether 30% enhanced solatium was payable in appeals pending in the High Court and this Court irrespective of the date of award. The interpretation turned on the expression "such award" used in the sub-section. In Bhag Singh 11 it was extended even to the appeals pending in the High Court or Supreme Court against award of the Collector or the Court whereas in Raghubir Singh9 it was confined to those appeals in High Court 9 (1989) 2 SCC 754 11 (1985)3SCC737 658 or this Court which arose out of "such award". The question of limited retrospectivity arose on specific language of the sub-section. In absence of sub-section (2) of Section 30 the enhanced solatium would have been payable on not only an award after 30-4-1982 but in all appeals pending in the High Court or this Court irrespective of the date of award. The legislature, therefore, carved out an exception and confined payment of enhanced solatium in pending appeals only if they had arisen out of award made after 30-4-1982. A comparison of the two sub-sections of Section 30 indicates that the expression in sub-section (1) beginning from the "provisions of sub-section" and up to "in relation to" is identical to first part of sub-section (2). But there the similarity ends. Sub-section (1)(a) applies to every proceeding which was pending on 30-4-1982 in which no award has been made by the Collector before that date. Whereas sub-section (2) extends the benefit of retrospectivity to any award made by the Collector or Court or to any order passed by the High Court or the Supreme Court in appeal against any "such award" under the provisions of the principal Act after 30-4- 1982. The construction in Raghubir Singh case9 turned on the use of the words "such award". It was held that the use of the expression "any such award" restricted the operation of the section to only those awards which had been made after 30-4-1982. Therefore, it was held that a landowner could claim additional solatium in those appeals only which were directed against such award as had been made after 30-4-1982. The interpretation placed on sub-section (2), therefore, could not help in arriving at the legislative intention of sub-section (1) of Section 30. Why this difference in phraseology of the two sub-sections? What could be the rationale for confining additional solatium in appeals arising out of the awards made after 1982? A legislature is presumed to know the needs of its people. Similarly it should be presumed to be aware of the state of affairs prevalent at the time of enacting a law. Solatium is no doubt compensation but it is in the nature of payment for displacement. The effect of acquisition due to rise in price and inflation was not so acute in Sixties or Seventies as in Eighties and Nineties. It was for this economic reason that the legislature enhanced the solatium from 15% to 30%. But this enhanced amount was not to be paid to those landowners whose land had been acquired much before 1982 but its final adjudication was pending in appeal in the High Court or this Court. The legislature must be presumed to be aware that such disputes in which land had been acquired much earlier were still pending and could not be disposed of due to heavy workload in higher courts. Therefore, the legislature in its wisdom considered it proper to confine the benefit of enhanced solatium to those landowners whose appeals arose out of the award made after 1982.
Supreme Court of India Cites 14 - Cited by 317 - P N Bhagwati - Full Document

Union Of India And Ors vs Filip Tiago De Gama Of Vedem Vasco De Gama on 30 November, 1989

108. In the present set of petitions this Court is concerned whether the power of the Court to grant additional compensation, which as explained earlier, in absence of any express indication to the contrary extends in all 9 (1989) 2 SCC 754 661 those cases where reference was pending at the stage of making the award by the Court under Section 18 could be curtailed or negatived by taking recourse to the transitional provision. The question cropped up first in Union of India v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama6 when this Court while recognising that Section 23(1-A) enjoined a duty on the Court to award the additional amount on 12% on the market value of the land observed as under:
Supreme Court of India Cites 19 - Cited by 291 - K J Shetty - Full Document

Bishun Narain Mishra vs State Of Uttar Pradesh And Others on 7 October, 1964

In Bishun Narain Misra v. State of Up.5 a rule made by the State Government providing that the age of retirement would be 55 years came up for consideration before the Constitution Bench. It was argued that since the rule could not apply retrospectively, a government servant who was recruited 1 (1848) 12 QB 120, 127: 17 LJMC 172: 116 ER 811 2 AIR 1953 SC 394, 398 3 (1968) 3 SCR 542 : AIR 1968 SC 1489 4 AIR 1966 SC 1758: 1962 Supp (1) SCR 700 5 AIR 1965 SC 1567 :(1965) 1 SCR 693 650 and appointed earlier to the date when the rule was made by the Government could not be retired in exercise of power under this rule otherwise it would amount to application of the rule retrospectively. The submission was repelled and it was held that the rule could not be struck down on the ground that it was retrospective in operation as all that it provided was that from the date it came into force the age of retirement became 55 years.
Supreme Court of India Cites 6 - Cited by 82 - K N Wanchoo - Full Document

K.S. Pariapoornan And Ors. vs State Of Kerala And Ors. on 17 December, 1991

(emphasis supplied) Whereas in K.S. Paripoornan v. State of Kerala8, the order by which reference was made to the larger bench it was observed : (SCC p. 690, para 9) "The legislature having designed the horizontal growth in such manner, the collective scheme which has been made operational prospectively on 24-9-1984 and onwards becomes plain because that is the date on which the amendment comes into effect.
Supreme Court of India Cites 30 - Cited by 13 - Full Document

Aswini Kumar Ghose And Anr. vs Arabinda Bose And Anr. on 12 December, 1952

(See State of Travancore Cochin v. Bombay Co. Ltd.35 and Aswini Kumar v. Arabinda Bose32.) On a perusal of the Bills of 1982 and 1984 we find that they did not contain the provisions found in Section 23(1-A) of the principal Act and Section 30(1) of the amending Act. These provisions were inserted when the 1984 Bill was under consideration before Parliament. The Statement of Objects and Reasons does not, therefore, throw any light on the circumstances in which these provisions were introduced.
Supreme Court of India Cites 1 - Cited by 472 - Full Document
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