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The Royal Sundaram Alliance vs D.Gunasekaran on 13 June, 2014 cites

National Insurance Co. Ltd vs Cholleti Bharatamma & Ors on 12 October, 2007

74. IMT 37-A, would cover persons, falling under Section 147(1)(c), ie., to cover any contractual liability, which is provided under IMT.37-A, which states that, other than statutory liability. As per Rule 236 of the Motor Vehicles Rules, if six persons are permitted to travel in a goods carriage vehicle, then it cannot be expected that all the six persons can sit in the cabin. Inevitably, they have to travel only in the back portion of the vehicle, along with the goods. The argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that the owner of the vehicle has to travel only in the cabin and if not, he is not entitled to any compensation, cannot be accepted in the case of a goods carriage vehicle, when Rule 236 of the Tamil Nadu Motor Vehicles Rules, permit carrying 7 persons, including a driver. No where in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, there is a prohibition that the owner cannot travel in the back portion of a goods carriage vehicle. In a given case, if the cleaner of a goods carriage vehicle, travels in the cabin, then the owner of the vehicle, has to travel in the back portion of the goods carriage vehicle. Though the learned counsel for the appellant placed strong reliance to Paragraph 19 of the judgment made in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Cholleti Bharatamma reported in 2008 (1) SCC 423, wherein, it is stated that, 19. It is now well settled that the owner of the goods means only the person who travels in the cabin of the vehicle., no other judgment has been produced before this Court nor any specific provision, in the Act or the Rules, is pointed out, to substantiate his contention that the statute mandates that for claiming compensation, arising out of an accident, the owner of the goods or his representative, must have travelled only in the cabin. Otherwise, such a owner of goods or his representative, becomes an unauthorised or a gratuitous passenger.
Supreme Court of India Cites 19 - Cited by 279 - S B Sinha - Full Document

National Insurance Co. Ltd vs Anjana Shyam & Ors on 20 August, 2007

164. While dismissing the appeals, filed by the appellant-Insurance Company, there shall be an suo-motu enhancement, as stated supra. But there would be reduction in the quantum of compensation, in terms of Anjana Shyam's case. The enhanced compensation, with proportionate interests and costs, shall be deposited, within a period of four weeks, from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. It is made clear that the claimants are entitled to the compensation, as determined by this Court, subject to apportionment, as directed. While making applications for payment out, the respondents/claimants directed to affix necessary Court fee, in cases, where the quantum of compensation, now determined by this Court is more than the claim amount. No costs. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petitions are also closed.
Supreme Court of India Cites 11 - Cited by 339 - P K Balasubramanyan - Full Document

New India Assurance Company vs Minor Krishnan on 25 March, 2004

85. IMT.37-A, speaks about non-fare paying passenger, other than employees, which is in plural. It says that Rs.75/- to be paid as additional premium per passenger. In the light of Rules 236 and 238 of the Tamil Nadu Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989, the term "non-fare paying passenger", used in singular, has to be understood and read, as plural, wherever the context permits. The statutory rules framed in exercise of the powers under Sections 28, 38, 65, 95, 107, 311 and 138 read with Section 211 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, cannot be chaffed from the grain, the Act. Further, from the judgment in Minor Krishnan's case, it could be seen that though the passengers in the offending vehicle, were not the owner or representative of the goods, the contention of the Insurance Company was that more than six loadmen travelled in the vehicle, meaning thereby, that it exceeded the number of persons permitted under the Rule 236 of the Tamil Nadu Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989.
Madras High Court Cites 17 - Cited by 8 - Full Document

Sarla Verma & Ors vs Delhi Transport Corp.& Anr on 15 April, 2009

In C.M.A.No.1743 of 2007, considering the number of dependants, ie., two, as per Sarla Verma's case, 1/3rd is deducted from the monthly income of the deceased and after adopting '13' multiplier, to the age of the deceased, ie., 48 years, the dependency compensation works out to Rs.4,68,000/- (Rs.4,500/- x 12 x 13 x 1/3). Compensation of Rs.5,000/- awarded under the head, Funeral expenses is enhanced to Rs.10,000/-. The two surviving daughters are entitled to a compensation of Rs.10,000/- each, under the head, loss of love and affection. Rs.5,000/- is awarded for transportation and Rs.1,000/- is granted for damages to clothes. Rs.5,000/- is awarded under the head, loss of estate. Therefore, the respondents/claimants are entitled to Rs.5,09,000/-.
Supreme Court of India Cites 12 - Cited by 20141 - R V Raveendran - Full Document

Banarsi And Ors vs Ram Phal on 17 February, 2003

8. Furthermore, the above excerpt also would reveal that without even relying upon any precedent, the Division Bench of this Court, simply enhanced the compensation and that too to the extent of double that of what the Single Judge of this Court ordered. It is also clear that when the Hon'ble Apex Court wanted a precedent in that regard, the learned counsel for the appellant therein cited only the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Banarsi v. Ram Phal , 2003 (2) SLT 258: 2003 (9) SCC 606. As such, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of that case, the Hon'ble Apex Court felt that the power under order 41, Rule 33 of C.P.C. invoked by the High Court and that too in a case where such an enhancement was not at all warranted, looked askance at it. It is therefore explicite that the Hon'ble Apex Court in the cited decision has not laid down the law that even in a fit case, the High Court should not invoke Order 41, Rule 33 of C.P.C. in the absence of filing cross Appeal. Furthermore under Order 41, Rule 33, there are earlier decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court, which could be cited as under:
Supreme Court of India Cites 14 - Cited by 268 - R C Lahoti - Full Document

The State Of Punjab & Ors vs Bakshish Singh on 8 September, 1998

As pointed out by the Apex Court in State of Punjab v. Bakshish Singh , 1998 (8) S.C.C. 222, the reading of the provision would make it clear that the Appellate Court has got wide power to do complete justice between the parties and which enables this Court to pass such decree or order as ought to have been passed or as the nature of the case may require notwithstanding that the party in whose favour the power is sought to be exercised has not filed any Appeal or cross-objection.
Supreme Court of India Cites 4 - Cited by 173 - S S Ahmad - Full Document

Mahant Dhangir And Another vs Madan Mohan And Others on 28 October, 1987

At this stage, learned counsel appearing for the respondent/claimants would submit that the Tribunal has awarded interest only from the date of the Judgment and not from the date of the petition. The learned counsel for the respondents/claimants would submit that even though no Appeal has been filed by the respondents/claimants or no cross-objections have been filed by them, this Court has discretionary power by virtue of Order 41, Rule 33 of Code of Civil Procedure and also in view of the rulings of the Supreme Court in Dhangir v. Madan Mohan , AIR 1988 SC 54 to grant the proper relief. Of course, the Apex Court has pointed out in clear and categorical terms and the power conferred under Order 41, Rule 33 on the Appellate Court is discretionary, and then it must be used in proper case using the judicial discretion to render justice.
Supreme Court of India Cites 2 - Cited by 188 - K J Shetty - Full Document

New India Assurance Co. Ltd vs Asha Rani & Ors on 17 August, 2001

15. Before the Supreme Court, it was contended by the learned counsel on behalf of the driver and owner of the vehicle that the decision in Asha Rani's case (cited supra) and Devireddy Konda Reddy's case (cited supra) were delivered with respect to the position prevailing prior to the amendment of Section 147 by the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1994. As such, the effect of the legislative amendment was not in question in the above cases and therefore, the law laid down by these decisions would not be considered as binding law in view of coming into force of the said Amendment.
Supreme Court of India Cites 13 - Cited by 935 - Full Document
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