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K.Ramanathan vs State Of Tamil Nadu & Anr on 27 February, 1985 cites

Sujan Singh Matu Ram vs The State Of Haryana on 8 February, 1967

Shri P. Govindan Nair, learned counsel appearing for the appellant argued the case with much learning and resource. Learned counsel with his usual fairness did not advance some of the contentions raised before the High Court as they were apparently misconceived. He has confined his submissions to only two grounds, namely: (l)Cl. 3 (IA) of the impugned Order issued by the State Government under s. 3 of the Act read with G. S. R. 800 dated June 9, 1978 issued by the Central Government under s. 5 of the Act with the prior concurrence of the Government of India placing a ban on the transport, movement or otherwise carrying of 1037 paddy from out of Thanjavur district, the two taluks of South Arcot district and the four taluks of Thiruchirapalli district, was ultra vires the State Government being in excess of the delegated powers. It is urged that the delegation of a specific power under cl. (d) of subs. (2) of s. 3 of the Act by the aforesaid notification issued by the Central Government under s. 5 of the Act to regulate the storage, transport, distribution, disposal etc. Of an essential commodity, in relaston to foodstuffs, does not carry with it the general power of the Central Government under sub-s. (l) of s. 3 to regulate or prohibit the production, supply and distribution thereof and trade and commerce therein. And (2) The word 'regulating' in cl. (d) of sub- s. (2) of s. 3 of the Act does not take in 'prohibiting' for the words 'regulating' and 'prohibiting' denote two distinct and separate attributes of power and they are mutually exclusive Otherwise according to learned counsel, there was no point in the Legislature using both the words 'regulating' and 'prohibiting' in sub-s. (1) of s. 3 of the Act and the words 'regulating' and 'prohibiting' differently in various clauses of sub-s. (2) thereof. It is urged that there cannot be a total prohibition on transport, movement or otherwise carrying of paddy out of the areas in question under cl. (d) of subs. (2) of s 3 but only regulation of such activities in the course of trade and commerce by grant of licences or permits The learned counsel is fortified in his submissions by the decisions of the Punjab, Allahabad and Orissa High Courts in Sujan Singh v State of Haryana,(1) State of Uttar Pradesh v. Suraj Bhan(2) and Bejoy Kumar Routrai v. State of Orissa(3) and he questions the correctness of the decision of the Gujarat High Court in Nanalal Navalnathji Yogi Collestor of Bulsar& Ors.(4) taking a view to the contrary. We are afraid, we are unable to accept any of the contentions advanced by him.
Punjab-Haryana High Court Cites 16 - Cited by 14 - Full Document

The State Of Uttar Pradesh And Ors. vs Suraj Bhan Pande on 3 April, 1972

Shri P. Govindan Nair, learned counsel appearing for the appellant argued the case with much learning and resource. Learned counsel with his usual fairness did not advance some of the contentions raised before the High Court as they were apparently misconceived. He has confined his submissions to only two grounds, namely: (l)Cl. 3 (IA) of the impugned Order issued by the State Government under s. 3 of the Act read with G. S. R. 800 dated June 9, 1978 issued by the Central Government under s. 5 of the Act with the prior concurrence of the Government of India placing a ban on the transport, movement or otherwise carrying of 1037 paddy from out of Thanjavur district, the two taluks of South Arcot district and the four taluks of Thiruchirapalli district, was ultra vires the State Government being in excess of the delegated powers. It is urged that the delegation of a specific power under cl. (d) of subs. (2) of s. 3 of the Act by the aforesaid notification issued by the Central Government under s. 5 of the Act to regulate the storage, transport, distribution, disposal etc. Of an essential commodity, in relaston to foodstuffs, does not carry with it the general power of the Central Government under sub-s. (l) of s. 3 to regulate or prohibit the production, supply and distribution thereof and trade and commerce therein. And (2) The word 'regulating' in cl. (d) of sub- s. (2) of s. 3 of the Act does not take in 'prohibiting' for the words 'regulating' and 'prohibiting' denote two distinct and separate attributes of power and they are mutually exclusive Otherwise according to learned counsel, there was no point in the Legislature using both the words 'regulating' and 'prohibiting' in sub-s. (1) of s. 3 of the Act and the words 'regulating' and 'prohibiting' differently in various clauses of sub-s. (2) thereof. It is urged that there cannot be a total prohibition on transport, movement or otherwise carrying of paddy out of the areas in question under cl. (d) of subs. (2) of s 3 but only regulation of such activities in the course of trade and commerce by grant of licences or permits The learned counsel is fortified in his submissions by the decisions of the Punjab, Allahabad and Orissa High Courts in Sujan Singh v State of Haryana,(1) State of Uttar Pradesh v. Suraj Bhan(2) and Bejoy Kumar Routrai v. State of Orissa(3) and he questions the correctness of the decision of the Gujarat High Court in Nanalal Navalnathji Yogi Collestor of Bulsar& Ors.(4) taking a view to the contrary. We are afraid, we are unable to accept any of the contentions advanced by him.
Allahabad High Court Cites 10 - Cited by 16 - Full Document

Bijoy Kumar Routrai And Ors. vs State Of Orissa And Ors. on 13 May, 1975

Shri P. Govindan Nair, learned counsel appearing for the appellant argued the case with much learning and resource. Learned counsel with his usual fairness did not advance some of the contentions raised before the High Court as they were apparently misconceived. He has confined his submissions to only two grounds, namely: (l)Cl. 3 (IA) of the impugned Order issued by the State Government under s. 3 of the Act read with G. S. R. 800 dated June 9, 1978 issued by the Central Government under s. 5 of the Act with the prior concurrence of the Government of India placing a ban on the transport, movement or otherwise carrying of 1037 paddy from out of Thanjavur district, the two taluks of South Arcot district and the four taluks of Thiruchirapalli district, was ultra vires the State Government being in excess of the delegated powers. It is urged that the delegation of a specific power under cl. (d) of subs. (2) of s. 3 of the Act by the aforesaid notification issued by the Central Government under s. 5 of the Act to regulate the storage, transport, distribution, disposal etc. Of an essential commodity, in relaston to foodstuffs, does not carry with it the general power of the Central Government under sub-s. (l) of s. 3 to regulate or prohibit the production, supply and distribution thereof and trade and commerce therein. And (2) The word 'regulating' in cl. (d) of sub- s. (2) of s. 3 of the Act does not take in 'prohibiting' for the words 'regulating' and 'prohibiting' denote two distinct and separate attributes of power and they are mutually exclusive Otherwise according to learned counsel, there was no point in the Legislature using both the words 'regulating' and 'prohibiting' in sub-s. (1) of s. 3 of the Act and the words 'regulating' and 'prohibiting' differently in various clauses of sub-s. (2) thereof. It is urged that there cannot be a total prohibition on transport, movement or otherwise carrying of paddy out of the areas in question under cl. (d) of subs. (2) of s 3 but only regulation of such activities in the course of trade and commerce by grant of licences or permits The learned counsel is fortified in his submissions by the decisions of the Punjab, Allahabad and Orissa High Courts in Sujan Singh v State of Haryana,(1) State of Uttar Pradesh v. Suraj Bhan(2) and Bejoy Kumar Routrai v. State of Orissa(3) and he questions the correctness of the decision of the Gujarat High Court in Nanalal Navalnathji Yogi Collestor of Bulsar& Ors.(4) taking a view to the contrary. We are afraid, we are unable to accept any of the contentions advanced by him.
Orissa High Court Cites 34 - Cited by 14 - Full Document

Santosh Kumar Jain vs The State.Union Of India--Intervener on 5 March, 1951

almost in identical terms with s. 5 of the Act. Sinha, J. (as he then was) held that the powers to promulgate the levy order was derived from sub-s. (1) of s 3 of the Act; and that the power was general in terms and authorized inter alia the promulgation of any order providing for regulating or prohibiting the production, supply and distribution of, and trade and commerce in, any essential commodity, insofar as it appears necessary or expedient to the State Government for maintaining or increasing supplies or for securing their equitable distribution and availability at fair prices. The learned Judge after referring to the Privy Council decision in Sibnath Banerjee's case and that of this Court in Santosh Kumar Jain's case, observed :
Supreme Court of India Cites 13 - Cited by 66 - H J Kania - Full Document

Emperor vs Sibnath Banerji on 17 July, 1945

almost in identical terms with s. 5 of the Act. Sinha, J. (as he then was) held that the powers to promulgate the levy order was derived from sub-s. (1) of s 3 of the Act; and that the power was general in terms and authorized inter alia the promulgation of any order providing for regulating or prohibiting the production, supply and distribution of, and trade and commerce in, any essential commodity, insofar as it appears necessary or expedient to the State Government for maintaining or increasing supplies or for securing their equitable distribution and availability at fair prices. The learned Judge after referring to the Privy Council decision in Sibnath Banerjee's case and that of this Court in Santosh Kumar Jain's case, observed :
Bombay High Court Cites 28 - Cited by 238 - Full Document

Atulya Kumar De And Ors. vs The Director Of Procurement And Supply ... on 3 March, 1953

Quite recently, the Calcutta High Court in Tarakdas Mukherjee v. State of West Bengal(1) and Lila Biswas v. State of West Bengal 12) following the dictum of Sinha, J. in Atulya Kumar's case, supra, have held that the delegation of specific powers to issue an impugned order of this nature is derived from sub-s. (1) of s. 3 and that the provisions of sub-s. (2) thereof are merely illustrative. It has further held that the various clauses of sub-s. (2) of s. 3 of the Act cannot be made operative independently by any notification (1) [1978] 2 Cal. LJ 383 (2) [1978-9] 83 CWN 539 1043 under s. 5 of the Act without deriving the general powers under sub-s. (1) of s. 3 of the Act. We are of the considered opinion that the view of the Calcutta High Court accords both with reason and principle. The view to the contrary taken by the Punjab, Allahabad and Orissa High Courts in Sujan Singh's. Suraj Ban's and Bejoy Kumar Routrai's cases, supra, dose not lay down good law. It must accordingly be held that although cl. (d) of sub-s. (2) of s. 3 of the Act deals only with a specific power, the general power to issue the impugned order flows from the provisions of sub-h. (1) of s. 3 which stands delegated to the State Government by virtue of the notification issued under s. S of the Act.
Calcutta High Court Cites 25 - Cited by 12 - Full Document

Narendra Kumar And Others vs The Union Of India And Others on 3 December, 1959

Shri P. Govindan Nair, learned counsel for the appellant however contends that the word 'regulation' should not be confused with the expression 'reasonable restrictions' occurring in Art. 19(2) to (6) of the Constitution and therefore the view t-taken in Narendra Kumar's case is not applicable. According to him, the word 'regulation' in cl. (d) of sub-. (2) of s. 3 of the Act does not take in 'prohibition'. He seeks to draw a distinction between prohibition or prevention o-certain activities and their regulation or governance. It is said that a power to regulate or govern would imply continued existence of that which is to be regulated or governed; and to be inconsistent with absolute prohibition. He therefore submits that cl. 3 (IA) of the Order was ultra vires because the State Government had only power under cl. (d) of sub-s, (2) of s. 3 of the Act to regulate production, supply and distribution of, and trade and commerce in, essential commodities like foodstuffs by (1) [1960] 2 SCR 361.
Supreme Court of India Cites 14 - Cited by 119 - K C Gupta - Full Document

State Of Mysore vs H. Sanjeeviah on 16 January, 1967

In Sanjeeviah's case, the question arose whether two provisos framed by the State Government under s. 37 of the Mysore Forest Act, 1900 which empowered the making of rules to regulate the transit of forest produce which placed absolute prohibition against transportation of forest produce between sunset and sunrise and a qualified prohibition in certain circumstances, was beyond the rule-making power of the State Government. The contention on behalf of the State was. that the two provisos were regulatory and prohibitory- In repelling the contention, the Court observed:
Supreme Court of India Cites 17 - Cited by 54 - J C Shah - Full Document

G. K. Krishnan Etc. Etc vs The State Of Tamil Nadu & Anr. Etc on 12 November, 1974

In State of Tamil Nadu v. M/S Hind Stone and Ors.(') Chinnappa Reddy, J. referred with approval the observations of Mathew, J. in G.K. Krishnan v. State of Tamil Nadu(2) laying down that the word 'regulation' has no fixed connotation and that its meaning differs according to the nature of that, thing to which it is applied. The learned Judge also observed:
Supreme Court of India Cites 21 - Cited by 156 - K K Mathew - Full Document
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