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1 - 10 of 12 (0.21 seconds)Smt. Ram Peary And Ors. vs Gauri And Ors. on 20 April, 1977
In support of
this proposition a Full Bench decision of the Allahabad
High Court in Smt. Ram Peary and others v. Gauri and
others [ AIR 1978 All. 318] as well as a Division Bench
judgment of the Madras High Court was pressed into
service. Therefore, the question before us in this case is
what is the effect of the lis pendens on the subsequent sale
of the same property by the owner to the second
purchaser. Section 19 of the Specific Relief Act clearly
says subsequent sale can be enforced for good and
sufficient reason but in the present case, there is no
difficulty because the suit was filed on 3.5.1975 for
specific performance of the agreement and the second sale
took place on 5.5.1975. Therefore, it is the admitted
position that the second sale was definitely after the filing
of the suit in question. Had that not been the position then
we would have evaluated the effect of Section 52 of the
Transfer of Property Act. But in the present case it is more
than apparent that the suit was filed before the second sale
of the property. Therefore, the principle of lis pendens will
govern the present case and the second sale cannot have
the overriding effect on the first sale. The principle of lis
pendens is still settled principle of law.
The Specific Relief Act, 1963
Guruswamy Nadar vs P.Lakshmi Ammal(D) Through Lrs. & Ors on 1 May, 2008
16. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Guruswamy Nadar Vs. P.
Lakshmi Ammal (D) through Lrs.
Section 19 in The Transfer Of Property Act, 1882 [Entire Act]
The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Section 19 in The Specific Relief Act, 1963 [Entire Act]
Gurmit Singh Bhatia vs Kiran Kant Robinson on 17 July, 2019
And Ors. (2 supra) wherein as per the
facts of the said case, the second purchase by the appellant was on 5.5.1975
i.e. two days after the filing of the suit for specific performance on 3.5.1975,
held that:
Samarendra Nath Sinha & Anr vs Krishna Kumar Nag on 1 November, 1966
7. In the light of these principles we have got to consider
whether in the event of a conflict arising between the
doctrine of lis pendens enshrined in S, 52 of the Transfer
of Property Act and the rule availing a subsequent
21 Dr.GRR,J
I.A.Nos.1 and 2 of 2018
in/and
S.A.No.1350 and 1359 of 2018
transferee without notice, contained in Section 19(b) of the
Specific Relief Act either the one or the other should
prevail. Ordinarily, it is true that the title acquired by the
subsequent purchaser is good, the sale to him being not
void. But he who pruchases during the pendency of the
suit is bound by the decree, that may be made against the
person from whom he derives title. The litigating parties
are exempted from the necessity of taking any notice of a
title so acquired (see Samarendra Nath Sinha v. Krishna
Kumar Nag (AIR 1967 SC 1440)), As to the vendor and
the prior contractor it is as if no such title existed. Section
52 places a complete embargo on the transfer of any right
to immoveable property pending suit, which is directly
and specifically in question in such a litigation; it enacts
that during the pendency of the suit in which any right to
immoveable property is "directly and specifically in
question, the property cannot be transferred or otherwise
alienated by any party to the suit so as to affect the rights
of any other party thereto under any decree."
Thus, in the present case it may be that the subsequent
transferee was entirely, ignorant of any right on the part of
contractor, and also of the pendency of the suit filed
against the vendor by such contractor, yet as the transfer
was made to him by the vendor after the institution of the
suit of the contractor and, while it was pending, the
subsequent purchaser cannot set up against the contractor
any right from which his vendor is excluded by the decree.
The title of the subsequent purchaser is good against him
on the ground of breach of covenant, but against the
plaintiff contractor who seeks specific performance of the
contract against the vendor, the subsequent transferee can
be in no way 'better position than the vendor himself.
Gouri Dutt Maharaj vs Sheikh Sukur Mohammed on 6 April, 1948
It is
well settled that in a suit for specific performance of
contract in respect of immoveable property a right to
immoveable property is directly and 'specifically in
22 Dr.GRR,J
I.A.Nos.1 and 2 of 2018
in/and
S.A.No.1350 and 1359 of 2018
question, (see Gauri Dutt Mahraj v. Sheikh Sukur
Mohammad ,(75 Ind App 165) s (AIR 1MB PC 147)).
...In our opinion, therefore, when the doctrine of lis
pendens renders a transfer made during the pendency
of the suit subservient to the rights of the plaintiff
seeking specific performance of a prior contract
entered into by the vendor in his favour and when 'on
account of the operation of the doctrine of lis pendens
such conveyance is treated as if it had never any
existence, the subsequent transferee, even though he
had obtained the transfer without notice of the
original contract, cannot set up against plaintiff-
contractor any right; for it would defeat the rule of lis
pendens which is founded upon public policy. And
considered in that manner, Section 52 of the T. P. Act
is not subject to S, 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act.